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Abstract 
Sport psychology has historically adopted a positivist and post-positivist 
conceptualization of science at the expense of systematic engagement with epistemology itself 
(Whaley & Krane, 2011). In this thesis it will be argued that positivist orthodoxy does not hold 
a monopoly over the idea of science, and that future theoretical developments within sport 
psychology will require more systematic engagement with epistemology. In order to explore 
this proposition, the thesis examines the epistemology developed in C. G. Jung’s analytical 
psychology, an approach which has been generally overlooked within the sport psychology 
literature. In addition, more recent epistemological developments within psychology are 
considered with respect to current and future theorising within sport psychology. 
 The thesis is a “desktop study” comprising of 8 chapters. The introduction (chapter 1) 
outlines how the current crisis within psychological science is epistemological, not 
methodological, in nature. Chapter 2 identifies key foundational challenges to sport psychology 
based on positivism; and introduces C. G. Jung’s analytical psychology which developed out 
of the rejection of a positivist conceptualization of science. Chapter 3 introduces aspects of a 
new epistemological framework (i.e., unconsciousness~consciousness; the psyche as a 
process) based on the work of Jung and identifies points of convergence between these 
contributions and more recent theorising. Chapter 4 considers the implications of analytical 
psychology with respect to momentum in sports. An original theoretical account of 
psychological momentum is outlined, based on libido theory (Jung, 1960), and the implications 
are considered with respect to current literature within sport psychology. Chapter 5 considers 
more recent developments in psychology (i.e., cybernetic systems paradigm, idiographic 
science) which have important parallels with analytical psychology, and which have important 
implications for the future of sport psychology as a science. Chapter 6 outlines an original 
theoretical perspective with respect to our understanding of performance variation in sport 
(Cowen, Nesti, & Cheetham, 2014), based on epistemological and theoretical developments 
outlined in the preceding chapters. Chapter 7 considers the implications of the epistemology 
outlined in the thesis with respect to current and future theorising in sport psychology. The 
central theme of this chapter is temporality, which, it is argued is necessarily an axiomatic 
component of future theoretical work, in order to overcome the foundational problems 
associated with a positivist conceptualisation of science.   
In the final concluding chapter (Chapter 8) it is proposed that the provisional 
epistemological criteria outlined in the thesis (i.e., subject~object, conceptual integration, 
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being~becoming, teleology, temporality) offers a basis on which an analytical sport 
psychology could be developed. With respect to sport psychology, these criteria suggest that 
future developments should focus more on understanding performance variation itself rather 
than prioritising the study of psychological constructs, or objectivist representations, associated 
with performance. It is concluded that the “personal equation” – the creativity, judgement, 
intuition and/or insight of the researcher - represents an important component of the process of 
knowledge construction; which in turn necessitates collaboration as a necessary counterpoint 
to individual subjectivity. Taken together, this thesis suggests that analytical psychology, 
despite historically sitting outside of psychological science, can make an important 
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Historians of science have often noted that at any given time scholars in a particular 
field tend to share the same basic assumptions about their subject. Social scientists are 
no exception; they rely on a view of human nature which provides the background of 
most discussions of specific behaviors but is rarely questioned. (Kahneman, 2011, p. 8) 
 
…there is no Archimedean point from which to judge, since the psyche is 
indistinguishable from its manifestations. The psyche is the object of psychology, and 
– fatally enough – also its subject. There is no getting away from this fact”. (Jung, 
1969b, pp. 49-50) 
 
[T]he circle of sciences ultimately demonstrates what the analysis of each particular 
form of knowledge directly emphasizes, but in varying degrees, namely the close 




















1.1   Psychology’s historical alignment with science  
 
Understanding the psychological factors which influence performance has been a defining 
aspect of sport psychology’s historical development (Kornspan, 2012). Although interest in 
how the mind can influence performance goes back to antiquity, the emergence of sport 
psychology as a scientific discipline has occurred in the past 40 years (Williams & Straub, 
2010). With respect to its most recent iteration, Moran and Toner (2017) have defined sport 
psychology as “the application of psychological theory and methods to understand the 
performance, mental processes and well-being of people who are involved in sport” (p.22). 
This definition reflects the disciplines increasing diversity of interests, and recognition of the 
reciprocal links between performance, participation in sport, and the associated psychological 
phenomena. These reciprocal links are also apparent in Williams’ (1986) earlier definition 
which states that sport psychology is concerned with “both the psychological factors that 
influence participation and performance in sport and exercise and the psychological effects 
derived from them” (p. 1). The interdependent relationship between psychological phenomena 
and sport participation continues to be researched in relation to an increasing number of 
esoteric topics and epistemological frameworks. Despite the increasing range of interests being 
explored within sport psychology, and the associated lack of consensus about the nature of 
what sport psychology is, its status as a science is generally assumed (Moran and Toner, 2017). 
The development of sport psychology as a modern science has been strongly shaped by 
its parent discipline, psychology (Kontos & Feltz, 2008)1. Psychology has not only influenced 
the theoretical perspectives adopted (i.e., behaviourism, cognitivism etc.), but also with respect 
to the more fundamental assumptions about the basis for “doing science” (i.e., ontology and 
                                               
1 In this thesis, psychology will be used in places to denote both psychology and sport 
psychology. Consideration of their respective epistemologies is assumed to transcend that 
which separates the two discipline areas. 
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epistemology). In this respect, the dominant paradigm adopted by sport psychology researchers 
is positivist or post-positivist orthodoxy with limited consideration of epistemology2 itself 
(Krane & Baird, 2005; Whaley & Krane, 2011). In parallel with its parent discipline, the 
“scientific half” of sport psychology research has historically appropriated methods of the 
natural sciences, which implicitly assumes that we still live in Newtonian universe that is 
mechanistic in nature (Balague, Torrents, Hristovski, Davids, & Araújo, 2013; Martens, 1987). 
This is despite this model of science being a redundant one for psychology (Smith, Harré, & 
Langenhove, 1995), given the incompatibility between the scientific method and the nature of 
the subject matter (Giorgi, 2000). The history of psychology identifies psychology’s alignment 
with the natural sciences and its separation from philosophy, as the birthplace of the modern 
scientific discipline (e.g., Goodwin, 1999). Interest in human nature, the notion of the mind, 
and the validity of knowledge “is as old as reflection” (Robinson, 1986, p. 12); but scientific 
psychology in its current form, specifically the enduring influence of empiricism, rationalism 
and positivism, owes much to its formative years. 
The philosophy of science is interested in the assumptions and methods that provide 
the basis for scientific enquiry, and the extent to which scientific knowledge relates to truth 
and reality (Pintuck & Reynolds, 2012). As a branch of epistemology, the philosophy of 
science is an ongoing enquiry into what constitutes scientific knowledge. In western 
philosophy, science did not begin with the scientific revolution in the 16th century, but dates 
back to the Plato and Aristotle. However, it was during the scientific revolution in which the 
relationship between philosophy and science was at its most interdependent (Brown, 2012). 
Prior to this period in western philosophy, eternal knowledge concerning nature, including 
human nature, was inseparable from its creator (i.e., God; Lent, 2017). For example, Plato’s 
theory of Forms suggested that the world exists in both a material and ideal form. Pure reality 
does not exist in the material world but exists exclusively in the form of immutable ideas or 
ideals, as created by God. Plato viewed mathematics as the pure representation of ideal forms, 
but the notion extended to all forms of human abstraction, such as beauty and justice. In 
contrast, the material world represented the changeable, imperfect manifestation of the ideal 
forms as experienced by the body (i.e., the senses); the central implication being that 
transcendent knowledge was not primarily dependent on the senses or the material world, but 
in reason (i.e., rationalism) and by association, the separation of mind and body. Thus, one of 
                                               
2 “Epistemology determines what researchers accept as the truth or as real, which then 
guides how we attain that knowledge” (Whaley & Krane, 2011, p. 396). 
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the legacies of Platonic thought was the assumption that a dualism between mind and body was 
necessary for the accumulation of pure knowledge (Lent, 2017). 
The scientific revolution was a period wherein the authority of the church diminished, 
and relatedly, the authority of science itself increased (Russell, 1961). As it became 
increasingly accepted that God did not hold a monopoly over truth, philosophers where 
concerned with establishing a philosophy of science which was not dependent religious 
cosmology for its origin. Eminent amongst those philosophers was Descartes who continued 
in the rationalist tradition, and whose philosophy of knowledge was based on his skepticism 
regarding the senses ability to capture true reality (Russell, 1961). In its place, Descartes 
developed a four-part method for acquiring rational knowledge: 
1.   Truth to be based on that which negates uncertainty and doubt in the mind 
2.   To separate a problem into as many of its constituent parts as possible 
3.   To start with the smallest problems first before 
4.   To ensure that any solutions found can be generalised with no exceptions 
(Adapted from Robinson, 1986) 
The famous result of this method was Descartes cogito – I think, therefore I am – which 
asserts all which is presented to the senses (i.e., the material world) is inevitably subjective 
with respect to its interpretation, and we can only truly know with certainty that which exists 
in our minds (i.e., idealism). The Cartesian legacy was to perpetuate the dualism between 
mind and body, mental processes and physical processes, because the only way to overcome 
the limitations of the senses was through their separation (Robinson, 1986). Descartes never 
considered the possibility that reason and sensory experience might both offer a legitimate 
insight into nature (Lent, 2017). 
The 17th century philosopher John Locke is generally credited with founding the 
empiricist movement, based on the idea that knowledge is only available to us through our 
sensory experience. However, it was J. S. Mill’s appropriation of this philosophy during the 
19th century with respect to human nature which is generally considered to be the birthplace of 
psychology as a modern empirical science (Hergenhahn, 2009). In contrast to Kant’s idealism, 
which contends that knowing it not merely based on our sensory experience of objects but is 
also dependent on interpretation of “things in themselves”, Mill advocated the possibility of an 
objective empirical psychology based on principle of induction (Robinson, 1986). This 
principle contends that knowledge can be generated through establishing laws and theories 
based on a finite number of observations (Chambers, 1982).  
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The knowledge which results from principle of induction is dependent on three laws of 
association originally developed by David Hume: resemblance, the association of events which 
resemble one another; contiguity, the association of events which occur at the same time and 
place; and cause and effect, the association of two events when one regularly follows the other 
(Goodwin, 1999). By aligning empiricism with the principle of induction, empirical 
psychology became inseparable from method (i.e., the inductive process) as the basis for 
knowledge construction. Consequently, the value assigned to knowledge becomes dependent 
on its ability to conform to the methodological demands of the inductive process (i.e., 
consistency, or strength of association). Given that such knowledge is predicated on an 
observed consistency between events, “anomalies” in the form of variation becomes 
antithetical to the process of knowledge construction and can therefore be dismissed as 
“nature’s noise” (Powers, 1973). 
By assigning sense data, not thought (i.e., rationalism), as the epistemological basis for 
knowledge construction, empiricism makes a claim to objectivity and therefore science. In 
other words, if a scientific law is defined as “a consistently observed relationship between two 
or more classes of empirical events” (Hergenhahn, 2009, p. 8), then objective knowledge is 
dependent on the appropriation of the methods of empiricism (i.e., the scientific method). The 
name originally given for this was positivism by the 19th century philosopher Auguste Comte, 
who believed that the purpose of science was to establish general laws of nature which could 
be used to predict and control. However, Comte was primarily concerned with a science which 
could establish lawful relations between observable phenomena, and therefore did not believe 
that the mind was suitable for scientific study (Hergenhahn, 2009).  
Mill himself acknowledged that the methods of empiricism would never lead to an 
exact science due to the probabilistic outcomes, but empirical psychology would be a science 
nevertheless. The reasoning for this was the assumption that the subject of psychology – 
thoughts, emotions etc. – are still governed by natural laws and are therefore knowable, albeit 
probabilistically (Robinson, 1986). Critically however, Mill understood that the mind was not 
a mechanical device wherein complex psychological phenomenon could be understood by 
being reduced down to its parts. For this to happen would require the mind to be governed 
solely by primary laws allowing for the precise prediction of observed phenomena. Precise 
prediction about human nature was not possible according to Mill due to the interaction of 
primary laws with secondary laws (i.e., individual differences and context) which resulted in 
variation not consistency (Hergenhahn, 2009). This did not prevent psychology as an empirical 
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science during the 20th century tacitly adopting a positivist philosophy of science, and a 
reductionist and deterministic view of human nature (Langenhove, 1995).  
Lincoln and Guba (1985) observed that positivism is based on five key assumptions: 
(1) Reality exists independently of our senses (i.e., ontological realism) which can be broken 
down into its constituent parts in order to be studied; (2) The epistemological assumption that 
there can be a meaningful separation of the subject and object, the observer and observed; (3) 
Observations made exist independently of time and context, “so that what is true at one time 
and place, under appropriate circumstances…also be true at another time and place” (p. 28); 
(4) Linear causality between causes and effects; and (5) The methods of science ensure that 
any given findings are free from subjective influence.  
By adopting a positivist philosophy of science, empirical psychology separated from 
philosophy, and aligned itself with the natural sciences. Positivism provided the 
aforementioned ontological and epistemology lens through which psychological phenomena 
could be scientifically observed, and any phenomena that did not conform was generally 
deemed unworthy of scientific consideration. The enduring influence on empirical psychology 
throughout the 20th century was the dominance of the scientific method as the basis for 
knowledge construction (i.e., scientism), and the general neglect of the challenges to 
positivism’s ontological and epistemological foundations (Langenhove, 1995). Ironically, the 
consequence of this neglect is the reoccurring questioning regarding psychology’s scientific 
credentials. 
 
1.2   Current crisis of psychological science – a modern crisis? 
 
It has been repeated—up to a state of intellectual boredom—that psychology, despite 
its apparent successes, is a science in crisis. That has been so since it departed from 
philosophy in the 19th century. To put it short, the crisis is theoretical and about the 
conceptual and methodological foundation of scientific psychology. Psychology lacks 
coherence and unity, conceptual clarity, efficient analytical and conceptual tools able 
to accumulate and integrate empirical facts and to enrich and put critical perspectives 
on individual and collective phenomena. (Mammen & Mironenko, 2015, p. 681-2) 
 
In 1954 Edmund Husserl wrote, “the history of psychology is actually only a history of 
crisis” (Husserl, 1970, p. 203). Husserl believed the human sciences and in particular 
psychology is in a privileged position to capture subjectivity but continues to fail having 
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“obscured the very subjectivity they seem to elucidate” (Buckley, 1992, p. 101). The basis for 
this failure according to Husserl has been the absurd assumption that psychic phenomena 
adhere to the same rules as physical phenomena, and therefore can be studied and understood 
in the same way (Buckley, 1992).  
The view that natural phenomena could not be fully understood mechanistically became 
apparent at the beginning of the 20th century by developments in the natural sciences which 
revealed nature to be non-linear, complex, intrinsically dynamic and interdependent (Capra, 
1975). Indeed, it was the journey to isolate the building blocks of matter that has ultimately led 
to a view of nature entirely inconsistent with its reductive premise:  
Quantum theory has thus demolished the classical concepts of solid objects and of 
strictly deterministic laws of nature. At the subatomic level, the solid material objects 
of classical physicals dissolve into wave-like patterns of probabilities, and these 
patterns, ultimately, do not represent probabilities of things, but rather probabilities of 
interconnections. (Capra, 1975, p. 78) 
The discovery of the quantum world, and the theory of relativity exposed the limits of 
the Newtonian world-view. Rather than just seeing non-linearity as problematic, apparent 
disorder has been found to generate complexity in the form of richly organised patterns (Gleick, 
1997), as studied by non-linear science. Whilst this branch of science might appear far-
removed from psychological epistemology, Neils Bohr, a key architect in the development of 
quantum theory suggested that there were potentially fundamental equivalences between the 
two. Writing on the epistemological significance of quantum theory for the future development 
of psychology, Bohr concluded that  
With regard to the more profound biological problems…in which we are concerned 
with the freedom and power of adaptation of the organism in its reaction to external 
stimuli, we must expect to find that the relationships of wider scope will require that 
the same conditions be taken into consideration which determine the limitation of the 
causal mode of description in the case of atomic phenomena. (Bohr, 1934, p. 118-119) 
Yet, through experience and observation, it was still possible to have a view that human 
reality is complex whilst at the same time engaging in reductive science, despite the issue 
concerning their apparent incompatibility. As long as this incompatibility exists, psychological 
science is required to make a choice between scientism or confronting the epistemological 
challenges that acknowledging a complex subject matter presents. This tension does not 
exclusively apply to the human sciences, as the renowned physicist and philosopher of science 
David Bohm observed in 1980: 
     8  
At present physicists tend to avoid this issue by adopting the attitude that our overall 
view concerning the nature of reality are of little or no importance. All that counts in 
physical theory is supposed to be the development of mathematical equations that 
permit us to predict and control…Such a goal is not regarded as merely for its pragmatic 
and technical utility; rather, it has become a presupposition of most work in modern 
physics that prediction and control…is all that human knowledge is about. (Bohm, 
1980, p. xvi) 
Or put more directly: “The choice is always the same. You can make a model more complex 
and faithful to reality, or you can make it simpler and easier to handle” (Gleick, 1998, p. 278). 
In psychological science, this continues to be evident in the seemingly unbridgeable gap 
between reductive theoretical explanations of human behaviour and the complexity of lived 
experience itself (Ferguson, 2015). 
By aligning itself with the natural sciences of the 19th century, psychology continued 
to be beset by the fundamental challenges which were recognised during this formative period 
and into the 20th century (Robinson, 1986)3. Whereas in its early form, psychology was intent 
on establishing a system which could be applied to all psychological phenomena, at the turn of 
the 20th century psychology was becoming increasingly fragmented in its interests (Robinson, 
1986); a phenomenon which continues to be evident to this day. In the name of method, 20th 
century scientific psychology (i.e., behaviourism, cognitivism) was able to bury its head in the 
sand by systematically overlooking the fundamental epistemological challenges to its 
development as a separate discipline, and in turn allow for the ongoing fragmentation to go 
unchallenged. Towards the end of the last century however, developments in psychology began 
to acknowledge the inherently complex nature of psychological phenomena and consider the 
implications with respect to the development of theory and research (e.g., Kelso, 1995; Nowak 
& Vallacher, 1998; Thelen & Smith, 1994). Furthermore, given the temporal nature of 
psychological phenomena, there was renewed recognition of the fact that psychological 
processes are not static and deterministic, but dynamic and therefore subject to variation (e.g., 
Boker, 2002; Clark, 1997). As Boker summarises: 
Psychological data share little of the convenient aspects of physical data from 
astronomical observation. The relation of empirical psychological data to unobservable 
psychological processes presents measurement problems, the frame of reference for 
measurement is often undergoing change during the interval in which data are collected, 
                                               
3 Also see Koch (1964). 
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and the interaction between the observed process and the frame of reference is 
frequently non-negligible. (2002, p. 411) 
However, such epistemological observations have not prevented mainstream 
psychological science as a research-intensive enterprise continuing to model psychological 
phenomena on a mechanistic view of nature which assumes that control and prediction is not 
only possible but meaningful. The inevitable consequence as Husserl observed in 1937, is a 
science in perpetual crisis. In a recent iteration of this crisis, Pashler and Wagenmakers (2012) 
asked whether prevalent doubts regarding the reliability of research findings have led to a 
“crisis in confidence in psychological science” (p.529). This doubt was subsequently 
reinforced in a study (Open Science Collaboration, 2015) in which 100 experimental and 
correlational peer-reviewed studies were replicated based on their “high-powered designs”. 
Results found that only 36% of replications produced significant results, compared with 97% 
in the original studies. Given that replication is viewed as a central, yet neglected, element of 
social science (Schmitt, 2009), the study has re-exposed the ongoing debate regarding 
psychology’s status as a science. 
For example, in an opinion piece in The New York Times (Barrett, 2015) a few days 
after the study was published, Lisa Barrett, a psychology professor at Northeastern University 
(USA), suggested that the failure in replication did not represent such a crisis, but contextual 
oversight which many of these studies were presumably not sensitive to. On this point Barrett 
(2015) strangely conceded that “Much of science still assumes that phenomena can be 
explained with universal laws and therefore context should not matter. But this is not how the 
real world works!” (“Psychology is not in crisis”, para. 10). Consequently, the failure in 
replication was seen by Barrett (2015) as an important part of process, given the opportunity it 
presents for further scientific discovery. In response, Caplan (2015) challenged this position, 
concluding that 
If things in psychology are as Professor Barrett maintains, then much more modesty 
ought to be in evidence when psychologists publish their findings, communicate them 
to the press, or popularize them in books and talk for laypeople. Drawing broad 
conclusions from a few highly controlled studies of the behavior of a small number of 
sophomores is not a responsible way to proceed. 
 Professor Barrett’s attempted rescue of her field is enough to make one suggest 
turning to the humanities for sources of truth about human nature and behavior. (“How 
reliable are psychology studies?”, para. 4-5) 
     10  
The requirement of accountability brings into acute focus the challenges and limitations of 
empirical science, where the demand for outward certainties mask and compensate for the 
uncertainty associated with any honest appraisal of the subject matter. This uncertainty does 
not just reflect a profoundly complex subject, but relatedly the challenge of establishing an 
epistemology on which a human science can be meaningfully based. As will be explored in 
this thesis, the problem of establishing psychology as a discipline separate from the other 
sciences is primarily epistemological, not methodological, in nature. 
 
1.3   The crisis is epistemological not methodological in nature 
 
…the ontological and epistemological basis of psychology remains largely 
unquestioned. If one really takes the trouble to scrutinize the science of psychology, 
one is left puzzled by the sophistry and illusion that reigns. (Langenhove, 1995, p. 10) 
 
…the difficulties which has plagued, not just in our time but for centuries – its own 
peculiar “crisis” – has a central significance both for the appearance of puzzling, 
insoluble obscurities in modern, even mathematical sciences and, in connection with 
that, for the emergence of a set of world-enigmas which were unknown in earlier times. 
They all lead back to the enigma of subjectivity and are thus inseparably bound to the 
enigma of psychological subject matter and method. (Husserl, 1970, p. 5, italics 
original) 
 
The debate lays bare the vulnerability of psychology’s current status as a legitimate 
science, due to the evident tension between the appropriation of the scientific method, and the 
requirement for these methods to avoid a destructive analysis of the subject matter and generate 
outcomes which are accountable to academic peers and the public. If such accountability is to 
be tied, in any way, to the notion that reality exists independently of our senses (i.e., ontological 
realism) as opposed to relativism, then one is required to fundamentally question the 
epistemological assumptions underpinning the methods used - from which the “knowledge” 
derives - and not merely assume that to keep digging provides the best way out of the crisis. In 
other words, it cannot be assumed that issues of methodology can be addressed through 
continual refinement of method. Furthermore, to dismiss the replication crisis on the basis of 
context, requires that the development of theory, and associated research, is tied to more 
nuanced examination of the contextual variables. If this is to be the case, progress appears to 
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equate discovery with increasingly idiographic contextual outcomes - a state of infinite regress 
– not a generally accepted hallmark of science! 
Whatever one’s position on this ongoing debate, it is evident that the history of 
psychology has been shaped by the tension between the questions we would like to answer and 
the methods we have to answer them (Jones, 2013). These questions extend beyond the more 
traditional preserve of science, and as Jones observed, “it is a paradox of modernity that when 
we seek to apply scientific techniques and discourses, the soul - the seat of subjectivity - 
vanishes” (2013, p. 411). As such, there appears to be a trade-off between engagement with 
science and the possibility of contact with the realm of the subject. However, rather than accept 
this trade off, the central thesis to be developed is that an opportunity is presented for sport 
psychology to establish new epistemological footings on which to develop what has been 
referred to as a “better philosophy of the psyche” (Giorgio, 2000, p. 63). This opportunity is 
neither primarily dependent on continual refinement of method, nor more data, but re-
orientating the discipline with epistemology and therefore science itself. 
Epistemology is “the study of how we know what we know, of what constitutes a valid 
understanding/explanation/knowledge” (Papadopoulos, 2006, p. 11), and therefore determines 
the “standards to which genuine knowledge should conform” (Harré, 1972, p. 5). Methodology 
on the other hand provides the link between our epistemology and the methods used (Whaley 
& Krane, 2011). Whilst methodology provides a framework on which the quality of research 
can be judged, it is epistemology which “provides the foundation for methodology” (Krane & 
Baird, 2005, p. 89). In other words, epistemology, methodology, and method are mutually 
dependent constructs; any critical consideration of methodology is incomplete without 
exploring the underpinning epistemological assumptions.  
Yet as suggested, the alliance of sport psychology with positivism has resulted in 
methodology, not epistemology, being the basis on which research has been judged (Whaley 
& Krane, 2011). Given methodology is the application of one’s epistemological assumptions 
(Papadopoulos, 2006), the validity of the associated data is determined primarily by the extent 
to which it conforms to one’s epistemology, rather than reflects nature itself. For example, 
when theory and research is based on a positivist epistemology (i.e., the assumption of linear 
causality, objectivity), the validity of the methods adopted will be judged on the extent to which 
the data conforms to a view of nature consistent with these epistemological assumptions. As 
shown by the “replication crisis” (e.g., Pashler and Wagenmakers, 2012), data which does not 
readily conform (e.g., individual differences, temporal/contextual variation) represents a threat, 
rather than an essential phenomenon in its own right.  
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The idea that developments in science are tied to developments in epistemology is not 
a new proposition. The enlightenment period shifted our understanding of knowledge as being 
concerned with “facts”, towards viewing knowledge itself as a process (Piaget, 1972). Indeed, 
Popper (2002) argued that the problem of demarcation, between science and non-science, 
cannot be addressed through methodology, but is a matter for epistemology. Popper goes 
further in asserting that the idea of science is centrally placed to understand how knowledge 
itself develops: “The central problem of epistemology has always been and still is the problem 
of the growth of knowledge. And the growth of knowledge can be studied best by studying the 
growth of scientific knowledge” (p. xix). Central to his conviction was the belief that positivism 
is not able to address all questions of science. Therefore “epistemology, or the logic of scientific 
discovery, should be identified with the theory of the scientific method” (p. 27). In other words, 
when no one epistemology has a monopoly over the idea and practice of science, developments 
in science become inseparable from developments in epistemology.  
Epistemology does not only determine one’s methodology but represents an ongoing 
enquiry in its own right. However, as Popper (2002) observed, positivists dislike “the idea that 
there should be meaningful problems outside the field of ‘positive’ empirical science – 
problems to be dealt with by a genuine philosophical theory” (p. 29). Thus, when positivism 
holds a monopoly over the idea of science, questions of epistemology can become seemingly 
irrelevant to the development of science. With respect to psychology, the separation from 
philosophy resulted in a separation between the pursuit of knowledge concerning the nature of 
experience, and the fundamental questions concerning the nature of knowledge itself (Charles, 
2013). By acknowledging that the current fragmentation within psychology is tied to its 
separation from philosophy, Charles (2013) stresses that future unification is dependent on 
engagement with two closely related questions: “What is the nature of knowledge? What is the 
nature of experience?” (p. 141). 
Despite positivism historically being afforded a privileged status as the basis for 
knowledge construction in sport psychology (Whaley & Krane, 2011), the sport sciences are 
beginning to embrace an increasingly diverse array of epistemological approaches (Giardina, 
2017). The recognition that positivism does not and cannot hold a monopoly over the idea of 
science has been recognised within the sport psychology literature (e.g., Martens, 1987; Nesti, 
2004; Whaley & Krane, 2011). Consideration of different epistemological criteria within the 
human sciences is in many respects to be welcomed, as it provides a critical tension on which 
the discipline can develop. Yet the flip side of epistemological diversity is fragmentation with 
research being framed within an increasing number of “isms”, and the erroneous assumption 
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that the fragmented application of epistemology (i.e., methodology) is the same as engagement 
with epistemology itself. 
Given the limited consideration of epistemology within sport psychology (Whaley & 
Krane, 2011), this thesis will explore the proposition that scientific developments in the 
discipline is primarily dependent on engagement with questions related to epistemology itself. 
At the heart of this dialogue between science and philosophy, for all the human sciences, is the 
question of subjectivity, objectivity and their inter-relation (Husserl, 1970). For if sport 
psychology is to make a claim to objective science, it has to do so based on claiming dominion 
over a subject matter (i.e., mind or psyche) which appears to have a relativistic, subjective 
nature. Given the importance of the inter-relation of objectivity and subjectivity for philosophy, 
Husserl (1970) contended that psychology was centrally placed to examine where these two 
ideas intersect4, yet has failed given its alignment with a positivist philosophy of science. As 
this thesis will explore, the inter-relation of objectivity and subjectivity with respect to the 
development of sport psychology as a science raises some key questions: (1) Is it possible to 
assume objective knowledge about the nature of subjective experience? For if that is the case, 
it would be dependent on the assumption that subjective experience is structured according to 
objective, universal laws; and (2) What methods can be used to elucidate that which structures 
subjective experience? Taken together the question that this thesis will consider is: If positivism 
and/or post-positivism does not hold monopoly over the idea of science, and objectivity and 
subjectivity are inter-related, what does this mean for the future of (sport) psychology as a 
science?  
 
1.4   Rationale and contribution 
Carl Gustav Jung’s analytical psychology was primarily an epistemological endeavour 
(Papadopoulos, 2006), concerned with the aforementioned questions. Perhaps best known for 
his theoretical (e.g., archetypes, the collective unconscious) and applied (e.g., psychotherapy) 
contributions, Jung systematically explored this tension between objective universality and 
subjective individuality as the basis for his own science of the psyche (Saban, 2014). The link 
between epistemology and psychology is fundamental to Jung’s methodology, given that his 
work was in part based on “a reflection on the very possibility of psychology” (Shamdasani, 
                                               
4 Psychology is “decisive for the struggle between subjectivism and objectivism. For by 
beginning as an objective science, and then becoming transcendental, it bridges the gap 
(Husserl, 1970, p. 208). 
     14  
2003, p. 91). Jung was particularly interested in the “personal equation”5 which he recognised 
both informed and compromised his theoretical contributions. Indeed, developments in 
epistemology (e.g., Polanyi, 1958) suggest a personal dimension to so-called objective 
knowledge is unavoidable for all sciences, not least for the human sciences. Therefore, if an 
objective understanding of psychological processes in sport is in part dependent on the role of 
subjectivity, understanding the theoretical basis for their inter-relation is of primary concern 
for the development of the discipline as a science. As this thesis will explore, Jung’s 
epistemological and theoretical contributions have important implications with respect to the 
future development of sport psychology as a science. 
To date, theoretical developments in sport psychology have been informed by 
psychology, with systematic consideration of psychodynamic theory being limited to the work 
of Freud (e.g., Conroy & Benjaman, 2001; Hanrahan & Andersen, 2010; Hill, 2001; Strean & 
Strean, 1998)6. As a colleague and mentor, Freud was an important influence on Jung’s early 
career, but differences in their views concerning the nature of the psyche led to their disunion 
in 1912. At the heart of this split was disagreement over the focus that Freud placed on sexuality 
with respect to psychopathology (Doran, 2017). In contrast to Freud, who theorised that 
neuroses were caused by a sexual trauma in the past, Jung maintained the view that neuroses 
were equally a function of the present, and what the psyche is working towards. As will be 
shown in this thesis, Jung developed a teleological, dynamic view of the psyche which is 
irreconcilable with Freud’s casual-reductive epistemology (Papadopoulos, 2006). 
Furthermore, in contrast with Freud, whose “causal/reductive approach is labelled objective” 
(Saban, 2014, p. 40), Jung’s epistemology assumes that a dialectical relationship exists between 
subjectivity and objectivity. Specifically, the importance of the “personal equation” which is 
necessarily associated with any psychological observation, and role of the objective psyche 
(i.e., archetypes and the collective unconscious) in accounting for subjective experience 
(Saban, 2014). Differences in their respective approaches resulted in the development of two 
separate schools, with the term analytical psychology being used to represent the work of Jung 
(Jacobi, 1962). 
                                               
5 Coined by William James and later adopted by Jung to describe the subjectivity of 
experience in both the observer and the observed (Shamdasini, 2003). 
6 An exception is a paper by Beauchamp, Maclachlan, & Lothian (2005) who considered 
Jung’s typology of “personality types” with respect to group dynamics in sport. 
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As will be shown, analytical psychology offers an original perspective on which to re-
examine established psychological phenomena within sport. For example, this thesis will 
consider the implications of libido theory (Jung, 1960) with respect to psychological 
momentum in sport, a well-established but poorly understood phenomena (Crust & Nesti, 
2006). In concluding their review which found that the empirical evidence failed to support the 
existence of the “hot hand” - a phenomenon associated with positive momentum - Bar-Eli, 
Avugos, & Raab, (2006) wrote: 
In light of the conflicting outcomes of the studies presented in this review, we think a 
step further needs to be taken. First, the debate should be shifted from the search for 
evidence for or against the existence of the hot hand to a profound discussion about the 
norms used by statisticians, psychologists, and sports people. Such an approach may 
promote a better understanding of the issue. (p. 550) 
These norms do not just relate to methodology, but to the deeper assumptions which potentially 
go unchallenged when an epistemological position is adopted. Psychological momentum is 
complex and dynamic in nature (Gernigon, Briki, & Eykens, 2010), and so is unlikely to 
conform to positivist epistemology. The ‘profound discussion’ referred to by Bar-Eli et al. 
(2006) is one that concerns the very assumptions on which science is based (i.e., epistemology) 
and extends beyond issues concerning the construct itself. Although discussion in this thesis 
will consider a number of psychological constructs (e.g., psychological momentum, 
motivation, confidence), the purpose is to show how limitations in their conceptualisation and 
evidence base ultimately reflect flaws in the underlying epistemological assumptions. When 
the theory and data do not conform to our epistemological assumptions, the discussion needs 
to be concerned with the assumptions themselves and the view of nature they afford, rather than 
prioritising the refinement of method. Given the foundations on which empirical science is 
based (i.e., positivism and post-positivism) does not provide the final word on the idea of 
science, I will argue that scientific advancement in sport psychology without engagement with 
epistemology is not a sustainable position. 
By exploring the links between Jung’s theory of knowledge and the associated 
theoretical contributions, this thesis will also consider how engaging in epistemological 
questions offers a basis on which knowledge concerning psychological phenomena within 
sport can be developed. For example, adopting the assumption that psychological phenomena 
reflect a process - rather than a state - which are temporal and dynamic in nature, necessitates 
the study of performance variation itself, rather than continuing to prioritise psychological 
constructs associated with performance (Cowen, Nesti, & Cheetham, 2014). In addition to the 
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work of Jung, I will draw upon other theoretical developments within psychology which have 
placed epistemology at the heart of their approach and place great importance on the study of 
variation as an essential phenomenon in its own right: namely, the cybernetic-systems 
paradigm (Vancouver, 2000) and idiographic science (Molenaar, 2004). The cybernetic 
systems paradigm is interested in how open systems maintain their stability, adapt and change 
through their interaction with dynamic environments, based on a hypothesised set of sub-
systems (e.g., feedback loops; Vancouver, 2005). In contrast to cognitivism which contends 
that mental processes can be enframed within objective representations, cybernetics suggests 
that conceiving the mind as an open system requires an “ontology of unknowability and 
becoming” (Pickering, 2010, p. 33), wherein thought and behaviour are emergent responses. 
Similarly, idiographic science views the mind as a self-organising open system, and therefore 
experience is, by its very nature, unique to the individual. Idiographic science is primarily 
concerned with intra-individual variation and contends that the establishment of general laws 
is only possible by studying the singularity of psychological phenomenon (Salvatore and 
Valsiner, 2010). To my knowledge, neither of these approaches has been given consideration 
within the sport psychology literature to date yet they provide important implications with 
respect to the development of the discipline as a science. 
In addition to the influence of Jung’s analytical psychology, this thesis is also a product 
of personal/subjective views relating to ontology (i.e., the “personal equation”), which I 
continue to grapple with. Despite the deep uncertainties I hold in this regard, experience has 
led me to some tentative (ontological) beliefs which drew me to the work of Jung and underpin 
this thesis. Central, is the belief that existence, including that of the psyche, is dependent and 
can therefore be understood based on a dynamic balance, or inter-dependence, between so-
called dualisms. Kelso and Engstrøm, (2006) have referred to this as “the complimentary 
nature”, to describe how existence at all levels is dependent on mutually dependent opposites, 
or complimentary pairs (e.g., energy and matter, wave and particle, consciousness and 
unconsciousness). Furthermore, they proposed the use of the symbol ~ to represent the 
complementarity of any pair of opposites (e.g., energy~matter, wave~particle, 
consciousness~unconsciousness). Given my own ontology, the notion of complementarity is a 
defining characteristic of the epistemology developed in this thesis, and the symbol ~ will be 
used - as described by Kelso and Engstrøm (2006) - for the purpose of representing a 
complimentary pair.      
Finally, as someone who has studied psychology and not philosophy, the task of 
considering the implications of epistemology with respect to the development of sport 
     17  
psychology as a science is a daunting proposition. I am not the first to do so with respect to the 
development of psychology as a discipline. In addition to Jung, a number of psychologists have 
made important contributions, some of which will be considered in this thesis (e.g., Giorgi, 
2000; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991).  I feel very similar to Koch (1961) who, in proposing 
that psychology was centrally placed to explore the potential unity between science and the 
humanities, wrote: 
If my tools for this task are feeble, I claim some extenuation merely from the fact that 
I am a psychologist. Little that my field has done during its brief history as an 
independent science could equip me for work on the present question. (p. 629) 
My education has given me no systematic grounding in philosophy yet reflecting on the 
question of psychology as a science has inevitably led me to epistemology. Taken together, 
what follows therefore is not a thesis on epistemology itself, but an exploration of the 
epistemological questions posed by Jung, in relation to current and future theorising in sport 
psychology. 
 
1.5    Chapter summaries 
Chapter 2 (‘Positivism and analytical psychology’) begins by introducing the 
foundational challenges to a sport psychology based on positivist epistemology. To provide 
oppositional contrast, the second half of the chapter introduces C.G. Jung and the central tenets 
of his analytical psychology.  
Chapter 3 (‘Towards an analytical sport psychology’) explores in greater depth the 
challenges to positivist science identified in chapter 1 in relation to current theorising into flow 
and motivation. A new epistemological framework is outlined based on the work of Jung (i.e., 
subject~object, conceptual integration, being~becoming), and points of convergence between 
key contributions (i.e., consciousness~unconsciousness, psyche as a process) and more recent 
theorising are identified. 
Chapter 4 (‘Jungian analysis of momentum in sport’) considers the implications of 
analytical psychology with respect to momentum in sports. An original theoretical account of 
psychological momentum is outlined, based on Libido theory (Jung, 1960), and the 
implications are considered with current literature which suggests a close relationship between 
the “person” and “athlete”. 
Chapter 5 (‘Towards a psychology of being and becoming’) considers more recent 
developments in psychology (i.e., cybernetic systems paradigm, idiographic science) which 
have important parallels with analytical psychology and which have important implications for 
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the future of sport psychology as a science. Taken together, these developments suggest that 
future research should focus more on understanding performance variation itself rather than 
prioritising the study of psychological constructs, or objectivist representations, associated 
with performance. 
Chapter 6 (‘The psychology of performance variation in sport’) outlines an original 
theoretical perspective with respect to our understanding of performance variation in sport 
(Cowen, Nesti, & Cheetham, 2014), based on epistemological and theoretical developments 
outlined in the preceding chapters. 
Chapter 7 (‘Theoretical implications for sport psychology: The role of time’) explores 
the implications of the epistemology outlined in the thesis with respect to current and future 
theorising in sport psychology. The central theme of this chapter is temporality, which, it is 
argued is necessarily an axiomatic component of future theoretical work, in order to overcome 
the foundational problems associated with a positivist conceptualisation of science.  
Chapter 8 (‘Conclusions’) proposes that the provisional epistemological criteria 
outlined in the thesis (i.e., subject~object, conceptual integration, being~becoming, teleology, 
temporality) offers a basis on which an analytical sport psychology could be developed. It is 
concluded that the “personal equation” – the creativity, judgement, intuition and/or insight of 
the researcher - represents an important component of the process of knowledge construction; 


















Positivism and analytical psychology 
 
A psychological interpretation of science begins with the acute realization that science 
is a human creation…Its laws, organization, and articulations rest not only on the nature 
of reality that it discovers, but also on the nature of the human nature that does the 
discovering. (Maslow, 1954, p. 1) 
 
Anyone who wants to know the human psyche will learn next to nothing from 
experimental psychology. He would be better advised to abandon exact science, put 
away his scholar's gown, bid farewell to his study, and wander with human heart 
through the world. (Jung, 1966a, p. 246-247) 
 
2.1   Introduction 
Given the complex and dynamic nature of the psyche, Jung understood that its 
expression manifests indirectly in the form of symbols which contained the deeper associated 
meaning (Fordham, 1966). Yet one consequence of the dominance of positivism in our human 
sciences, and society at large, is symbolism being afforded little value (Massarelli & Terret, 
2012). As a result, progress is assumed, and defined by the development or accumulation of 
tangible “facts” which are assigned discrete labels, and which help to give sense to objectivist 
sensibilities. Data which does not fit this criterion is, by implication, unworthy of scientific 
investigation, and therefore belonging to the realms of mysticism7. However, as this chapter 
will begin to explore, this form of science is unlikely to lead sport psychology to a body of 
knowledge which can capture the inherent nature and characteristics of the subject, and 
continuation on this path will lead to “the scientific study of ourselves without a subject matter” 
(Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, p. 13).  
                                               
7 Which Russell (1963) describes as “little more than a certain intensity and depth of feeling 
in regard to what is believed about the universe” (p.10). 
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Central to this thesis is that to date scientific developments in sport psychology have 
been one-sided in their acceptance of the dominant and guiding positivist tradition (Martens, 
1987; Nesti, 2004; Whaley & Krane, 2011), with the function of empirical evidence appearing 
at times to make the scene fit the crime. Similarly, Giorgi (2000) observed that “maintaining 
the experimental model and attempting to explain psychological phenomena by cause and 
effect relationships…is to presume too much uncritically” (p. 66). Developments in 
epistemology and psychology have challenged the epistemological underpinnings of 
positivism, with regards to the basis on which legitimate knowledge can be assumed. Without 
exploring the implications of these challenges, any science associated with sport psychology is 
likely to be epistemologically, theoretically and methodologically flawed. Furthermore, 
science becomes restricted to ultimately serving and being answerable to the adopted method, 
at the expense of progress; whereby progress is defined by genuine scientific discovery, 
resulting from exploring the exception to the rule rather than the rule itself (Kuhn, 1996). 
As with empirical data, in order to accept the validity of a set of epistemological 
assumptions, one needs to be continually open to any reasonable challenge, thus allowing for 
accountability and the possibility of rejection (Popper, 2002). If scientists are required to 
remain skeptical and dispassionate, one cannot hold onto acceptance without equally holding 
onto the possibility of rejection. Thus, acceptance loses credibility and meaning when the 
possibility of rejection is diminished. Ongoing faith in the methods of the natural sciences, 
pervasive in both behaviourism and the cognitive revolution in psychology, reflects a desire 
for scientific status (Giorgi, 2014). Up until its recent history, this has occurred at the expense 
of other conceptual foundations being overlooked, and a general lack of epistemological debate 
in psychology concerning the basis and means associated with the doing of science (Smith, 
Harré, & Langenhove, 1995).  
Despite the recent increased interest in non-positivist epistemologies, mainstream 
psychology continues to associate scientific rigour with positivist epistemology (Rogers & 
Willig, 2017). Yet as Smith et al. (1995) observed, when our understanding concerning the 
nature of science means is monopolised, we and our science becomes impoverished given that 
at its nature it is “a polymorphous activity, drawing from a range of theoretical and 
philosophical bases and employing a range of different methods” (p. 2). In other words, if one 
accepts that the purpose of science is to expand our understanding, as well as to place 
     21  
restrictions on the criteria associated with scientific knowledge, the spirit of science is being 
compromised not advanced if one unquestioningly sticks to a dominant creed.8  
In sport psychology, one might reasonably argue that in response to the dominance of 
positivism and post-positivism there has been a noticeable increase in interpretativist, 
qualitative based research, aimed at capturing the subjective experiences of athletes. However, 
as this chapter will consider, defining one’s epistemology based on the choice between 
objectivity or subjectivity, positivism or interpretivism, is a legacy of psychology’s 
philosophical foundations, and in particular the entrenchment of dualistic thinking. As long as 
their (i.e., positivism/interpretivism) incompatibility remains unresolved, so-called “mixed 
methods” research serves only to remind us of this entrenchment, through attempting to solve 
the problem from within. The problem is not how to make the choice, but that this choice 
appears to be an epistemological necessity.  
Russell (1963) observed that attempts to understand the world led people to either 
science or mysticism, but was ultimately dependent on a union between the two. Despite their 
complementarity, Russell (1963) argued that few thinkers have historically been able to 
combine both impulses, with the tendency towards one, science or mysticism, dominating. 
Writing in relation to psychology, Giorgi (2000) believed that any integration of positivist and 
interpretivist approaches would require a new philosophy of science on which to reconcile their 
apparent incompatibility. Furthermore, Giorgi argued that natural science cannot capture all 
aspects of human nature and experience, and instead advocated the need for a  
…better philosophy of the psyche (or experience, consciousness, behavior) that might 
guide methods in a better way to the essences of its phenomena, which in turn would 
lead to a more adequate and articulate framework concerning the whole discipline of 
psychology (2000, p. 63). 
The criteria and purpose of a human science that Giorgi (2000) proposed is not modest, 
and includes (a) working towards an understanding of the interconnectedness of all human 
phenomena; (b) acknowledging the temporal and symbolic dimension to experience; and (c) 
                                               
8 The notion of ‘discovery’ in psychology is further complicated by the fact that, at its heart, 
there is arguably a question of whether psychology has anything to truly discover or solve. 
Furthermore, this leads to the question of accountability. By comparison, in the natural 
sciences, there is clearer accountability with regard to the outcomes of scientific endeavor – a 
spacecraft either does or does not land on the moon! (I am indebted to a colleague for this 
observation).  
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the establishment of an indigenous psychology which “confront their phenomena directly and 
develop methods independently of what the natural sciences did” (p. 69). If this is the task, the 
retreat to an established philosophy of science becomes an understandable proposition! 
However, the path of least resistance should not be a valid basis on which to conduct science. 
In the name of objectivity, the inconvenient truths regarding a subjective, complex subject 
matter do not, in themselves, offer any apparent justification for their epistemological (i.e., 
scientific) denial. Equally, the apparent gulf between the natural sciences and a human science, 
as described by Giorgi (2000), does not, in itself, provide a justification for the retreat to 
subjectivity.  
The dominant epistemological traditions – positivism and interpretivism – are by their 
natures incompatible with one another (Denzin, 2010; Lincoln, 2010), and both contribute 
towards a dualistic view of subjectivity and objectivity. Positivism assumes that a true reality 
exists beyond the senses (i.e., realist ontology), and the possibility of nomothetic, objective 
knowledge based on the methods of the natural sciences (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In contrast, 
the interpretivist tradition assumes multiple realities (i.e., relativist ontology), and is based on 
a subjectivist epistemology concerned with individual meaning (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). This 
dualism also creates an unhelpful separation between “real-science” (i.e., positivism/post-
positivism) concerned with nomothetic objectivity, and “soft-science” (i.e., interpretivism) 
concerned with idiographic subjectivity. Rather than being required to make a choice, the 
proposition to be explored in this chapter is that a better philosophy of the psyche is predicated 
on a union of subjectivism or objectivism.  
Given the association of positivism with real science, this chapter will begin by 
exploring how the assumptions on which this epistemology is based are problematic with 
respect to the development of sport psychology as a science. The limitations of the positivist 
conceptualisation of science are considerable and have been considered extensively within the 
psychology (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln, & Guba, 1985; Langenhove, 1995) and 
philosophy of science (e.g., Popper, 2002) literature. Emphasis will therefore be placed on 
examining how a positivist epistemology has helped to shape as well as compromise the 
development of theory within sport psychology, rather than a general critique of positivism 
itself. In light of these challenges to positivist science, the second part of the chapter will 
provide an introduction to C.G. Jung and his main contributions; which will be considered 
more in-depth throughout the thesis.  
 
 
     23  
2.2   Theoretical developments within sport psychology – foundational problems 
Throughout its history, sport psychology has been shaped by psychology its parent 
discipline, but since the 1980s there has been a shift towards studying sport-related constructs 
(e.g., confidence, mental toughness, flow, motivation; Kontos & Feltz, 2008). Yet despite this, 
the assumptions underpinning a positivist conceptualization of science continue to be evident 
in theoretical developments associated with these constructs. As outlined in the introduction, 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) identified 5 key aspects of a positivism: (1) Phenomena can be 
meaningful reduced down into its constituent parts (i.e., reductionism); (2) separation of 
subject and object; (3) a-temporality; (4) linear causality; and (5) the scientific method ensures 
objectivity. The purpose of what follows is not to provide a comprehensive review, but to 
identify some of the foundational problems associated with the development of theory in sport 
psychology shaped by positivist epistemology. This will be done by situating the main 
epistemological themes (e.g., subject~object; temporality) explored within the thesis, in 
relation to the development of theory which intends to elucidate sport related constructs.  
 
2.2.1 The problem of abstraction 
 
The scientific method of abstraction is very efficient and powerful, but we have to pay 
a price for it. As we define our system of concepts more precisely, as we streamline it 
and make the connections more and more rigorous, it becomes increasingly detached 
from the real world. (Capra, 1975, p. 40-41) 
 
Given the nature of the mind or psyche does not present itself directly to our senses, in 
addition to the study of behaviour, psychology as a science has been reliant on abstracting 
hypothesised internal states. Abstraction, or abstract generalisation, is a form of objectivist 
representation which Powers (1973) refers to as “the classification of specific observations into 
categories” (p. 10). As will be shown, abstraction in psychology typically perpetuates a dualist 
view of the subject and object, and the organism and environment; as well as offering only 
surface descriptions of observable phenomena: 
The problem with abstract generalisations is that they are superficial, in the literal sense. 
They deal only with the surface appearance of a phenomema. More often, their true 
basis is nothing more solid than verbal custom or common sense. (Powers, 1973, p. 13) 
Abstraction has become a very popular method in sport psychology as a way of 
developing theory. If the validity of this method of science was based on the volume of work 
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devoted to the identification and elucidation of sport related constructs, sport psychology is in 
good health. Such constructs have been afforded countless articles to their “discovery”, 
qualification, classification, and quantification of their meaning; a process that Kuhn (1996) 
referred to as “fact-finding”. Yet, this form of atomisation is inconsistent with Kuhn’s (1996) 
notion of a paradigm. As he observes: “In the absence of a paradigm or some candidate for a 
paradigm, all the facts that could possibly pertain to the development of a given science are 
likely to seem equally relevant” (p. 15). The consequence is a conceptual landgrab, with 
researchers becoming associated which these concepts through publishing a critical mass of 
papers devoted to their elucidation, at the expense of critical debate regarding the underpinning 
epistemological assumptions on which their validity is based. 
Two epistemological problems with abstraction can be identified: It either (a) results in 
a separation between the subject and object - the end result of which is the elucidation and 
refinement of the construct, not necessarily that which it seeks to reflect; and/or (b) weds the 
associated meaning of a construct so closely to the meaning of its observed effects, to the point 
that there is barely anything separating then. For the latter, consider the following, albeit 
extreme, examples:  
•   “Research supports the idea that self-confidence in athletes is positively related to 
positive affective feelings (e.g., satisfied, excited, proud) and negatively related to 
negative affective feelings (e.g., distressed, nervous, ashamed)”. (Vealey & Chase, 
2008, p. 85)  
•   “Athletes also experienced a large variety of affective themes during PM [psychology 
momentum]. Generally PM+ [positive momentum] and PM- [negative momentum] 
were associated with pleasant (e.g., elation, satisfaction, self-confidence) and 
unpleasant (e.g., self-doubt, displeasure, anxiety) feelings, retrospectively”. (Briki, Den 
Hartigh, Hauw, & Gernigon, 2012, p. 378) 
A fundamental consequence of this form of theorising is that we are left with limited 
potential for explanatory power, given the meaning of such constructs are typically self-
serving, and therefore based on circular reasoning (Smedlund, 2016; Valsiner, 2014). For 
example, self-confidence in sport, or “sport-confidence” (Vealey, 1986; Vealey & Chase, 
2008) is said to exert a positive ‘causal’ influence on sporting performance. Yet as Bandura 
recognises, past performance accomplishments are the most influential source for these self-
efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1986, 1997). As will be shown in chapter 5, this form of 
representation is pseudo-empirical as data is not required for its verification (Smedlund, 2016).  
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In addition to the reliance on studying abstract generalisations, there has also been a 
noticeable recent trend towards emphasising the multidimensional nature of constructs such as 
confidence (e.g., Hays, Maynard, Thomas, & Bawden, 2007; Vealey, 2001; Vealey & Chase, 
2008) mental toughness (e.g., Gucciardi, Gordon, & Dimmock, 2008; Jones, Hanton, & 
Connaughton, 2007) and anxiety (Martens et al., 1990), and thus to divide them into discrete 
elements. For example, Gucciardi et al. (2008), argued that previous research into mental 
toughness “has failed to provide conceptual clarity due to the atheoretical approaches to the 
research” (p. 262), and suggested Personal Construct Psychology (PCP; Kelly, 1955) as a 
suitable framework. Given that PCP is an approach which attempts to understand how 
individuals construct their unique understanding of their world (i.e. is subjectivist in nature), it 
is perhaps surprising that they arrive at 11 key characteristics (or objectivist representations) 
for mental toughness (self-belief; work ethic; personal values; self-motivated; tough attitude, 
concentration and focus; resilience; handling pressure; emotional intelligence; sport 
intelligence; physical toughness), which are in turn further broken down9. Whilst it could be 
argued that characteristics such as “tough attitude” allow for different interpretations for each 
person, one cannot help but feel a sense of Cartesian anxiety resulting from this oscillation 
between subjectivity and objectivity, due to their paradoxical interdependence and 
incompatibility. 
 
2.2.2   The problem of objectivity 
The question of how to account for cognition and behaviour is a debate not new to 
psychology. The rise of cognitivism in the 1950’s, associated with the demise of behaviourism, 
assumed the mind is a “representational system”, which reflects or reconstructs a pre-given 
world (Varela et al., 1991). In the 1990’s the dynamical systems approach has brought into 
question the more traditional approach to our understanding of internal representation (Clark, 
1997; Thelen & Smith, 1994). Whereas early cognitive theorists sought to attribute causation 
to objectivist representations of internal mental states (Varela et al., 1991), cybernetics10, and 
more recent developments in cognitive science referred collectively by Clark (1997) as the 
                                               
9 See chapter 5 and Andersen (2011) more a more extensive critique of current theorising into 
mental toughness in sport. 
10 Cybernetics, a precursor to cognitivism, has historically operated outside of mainstream 
psychology (for an outline and history, see Pickering, 2010). Also see chapter 5 for an 
introduction to cybernetics. 
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“Embodied Cognition Thesis”, have embraced notions of complexity, self-organisation, 
interrelation and change (see Clark, 1997). Such theoretical developments provide an 
opportunity to re-examine the current reliance on abstract generalisations with respect to our 
understanding of the psychological basis for performance in sport.  
The embodied cognition thesis posits that the mind is not passively representing and 
processing environmental stimuli as suggested by traditional cognitive theory but is engaged 
in continuous dialogue with the external conditions, resulting in emergent responses (Varela et 
al., 1991). Based on this thesis, any substantive explanation of cognitive processes requires an 
approach which allows us to understand the basis for how these responses change temporally 
in their embodied form; in contrast to objectivist representation (i.e. deriving knowledge 
through abstraction) which Clark (1997) described as being “detached, action-independent, 
highly detailed, [and] static” (p. 472). To do the latter could be viewed as equivalent to trying 
to understand the properties underlying the flow of water in a stream by extracting any 
particular unit of water for analysis at any given time. Furthermore, to assume a relationship 
between a disembodied objectivist representation and the ‘subject’ is to assume that a 
separation of the ‘object’ for the purposes of study will ultimately elucidate our understanding 
of the subjective experience. Yet, as shown in relation to current theorising into mental 
toughness, objectifying an embodied phenomenon is dependent on capturing its subjective 
form, which has inevitably resulted in a regress with respect to its elucidation (see Andersen, 
2011). As Varela et al. (1991) point out, “representation can be construed either as the 
‘projection’ (subjectivism) or ‘recovery’ (objectivism) of the world” (p. 241). Thus, any 
attempt at providing an objectivist representation of phenomena which are subjective in their 
manifestation “discloses the shiftiness, the instability of the entire subjective/objective 
polarity” (p. 242).  
If lived experience exists as a function of time and context, the notion of embodiment 
suggests that there can be no demarcation between the subject and object, the organism and 
environment (Varela et al., 1991). However, if one makes the assumption that objectivist 
knowledge derived through abstraction is an appropriate epistemology for the study of human 
behaviour, one is assuming that there can be a meaningful separation in psychology between 
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2.2.3   The problem of time 
Extrapolation, the process of making an inference about the future based on past events, 
ultimately fails because it doesn’t account for the fact that over time conditions change 
(Powers, 1973). Thus, although it might be reasonable to assume that an athlete might have 
their own optimal psychological state (e.g., arousal level) for any given competition, that state 
cannot be expected to be exactly the same for future competitions. In evolutionary terms such 
an optimal state is referred to as a “fitness peak” and is one, or one of a number of points on a 
“fitness landscape” (Kauffman, 1995). But as Kauffman has observed: “The idealization we 
have used that fitness landscapes are fixed and unchanging is false. Fitness landscapes change 
because the environment changes” (p. 208). This analogy is a useful one because as with its 
original evolutionary premise, competition for limited “resources” is integral to sport, which 
requires those who take part to continually adapt to their competitor’s adaptations: “In 
coevolving systems, each partner clambers up its fitness landscape toward fitness peaks, even 
as that landscape is constantly deformed by the adaptive moves of it coevolutionary partners” 
(p. 27). 
Fitness landscapes suggest that the whole notion of a fixed optimal psychological state 
in sport is a misnomer. Psychological states must change continually over time in response to 
the dynamic environments in which sports men and women engage. For example, there will be 
times when either high or low levels of anxiety are required depending on the nature of the 
situation faced by an athlete (Nesti, 2011). Arguing for a more ecological basis for our 
understanding of sporting performance, Davids & Araújo (2010) observed that 
In such landscapes of possibilities it is difficult to prescribe the existence in advance of 
‘the optimal’ decision for a particular performer since affordances are dynamic and 
differ in stability (i.e., they appear and dissolve momentarily in the dynamic 
performance environment), dependent on the interaction of intrinsic dynamics of an 
individual performer, with task dynamics and environmental constraints. (p. 636) 
Similarly, Araújo, Davids, and Hristovski (2006) write: 
As a performer moves with respect to his/her surroundings, opportunities for action 
persist, emerge and dissolve, even though the surroundings analysed as objects, and the 
relations among them, remain stable. Subtle changes of action can give rise to multiple 
and marked variations in opportunities for subsequent actions. (p. 655)  
What emerges therefore is a picture of variability and complexity: Athletes operating 
in dynamic environments, where variation is one of the few constants. Athletes are not just 
adapting and responding to the changing external conditions, but also modifying their 
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behaviours in response to their changing internal state. Given the resultant indeterminacy 
(Schall, 2004), the reciprocity and mutuality between athlete and environment (Araújo et al., 
2006); on an ecological level, notions of isolation, prediction and control become an 
irrelevance. That is not to say that in the name of objectivity individual psychological 
constructs cannot be theoretically isolated, but within a sporting environment they become 
indivisible, and ultimately unrecognisable with the “the-world-as lived” by the athlete (Nesti, 
2004).11  
 
2.2.4   The problem of causation 
 A view of human nature which acknowledges complexity, temporality and change 
makes the notion of determinism, based on the assumption of linear cause and effect 
relationships, a misnomer (Pickering, 2010). If we assume that psychological constructs have 
causal agency (e.g., confidence will have a positive effect on performance), establishing a 
linear relationship is dependent on separating the objective representation from other internal 
processes taking place (i.e., subject), and from the environment itself. Davids and Araújo 
(2010) have referred to the latter as “organismic asymmetry”, which is the tendency in 
psychology to focus on “organism-centred mechanisms”, whereby the role of the environment 
is overlooked, based on the implicit assumption that agency exists exclusively in the organism 
(also see Dunwoody, 2006). Yet as Araújo et al. (2006) point out with respect to decision 
making in sport, the process does not exist solely within the individual themselves but is an 
emergent response which exists on the performer-environment level.  
 Assigning agency to the construct itself, Vancouver (2005) has referred to a “system-
level theorizing” (p. 41), in contrast to a sub-system level of analysis which acknowledges that 
multiple (typically unconscious) sub-systems provide the mechanism for outward appearances. 
In contrast to system-level theorising which is dependent on abstract generalisation and 
extrapolation, Powers (1973) described the focus on the sub-systems, and their interaction, as 
model building. Critically however, Powers (1973) suggests that psychological theory tends to 
confuse subdivisions of observed appearances with sub-systems inside the behaving system. 
Powers refers to such theories as pseudo-models given their habit of confusing observed 
symptoms with underlying explanatory properties. Consideration of sub-systems (i.e., internal 
systems that we are not aware of) is equivalent to what Dennett (1969) referred to as the “sub-
                                               
11 The idea that psychological processes are temporal in nature will be considered more in-
depth in chapter 7. 
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personal level”, where cognitive processes are not accessible, or equivalent to conscious 
processes. The result is a tension between explanation and surface description because the 
processes which account for, and therefore explain behaviour are not discernable in conscious 
awareness (Varela et al., 1991). Writing on this tension between explanation and surface 
description in relation to cognitivist theories, Varela et al. (1991) observed that  
By this phrase, Dennett means that cognitivism postulates mental (not just physical and 
biolological) mechanisms and processes that are not accessible to the “personal level” 
of consciousness, especially self-consciousness. In other words, one cannot discern in 
conscious awareness or self-conscious introspection any cognitive structures and 
processes that are postulated to account for cognitive behaviour. Indeed, if cognition is 
fundamentally symbolic computation, this discrepancy between personal and sub-
personal immediately follows, since presumably none of us have any awareness of 
computing in an internal, symbolic medium when we think. (p. 48-49) 
This tension between explanation and description is part of the broader epistemological 
debate concerning empiricism and rationalism. In order to be “scientific”, sport psychology 
has favoured empiricism, given the tendency for surface description over explanation. The 
former is evident in the emphasis on accumulating objectivist representations, over elucidating 
the unconscious mechanisms which shape thought and behaviour. The focus on system level 
theorising within sport psychology is perhaps not surprising, given past attempts to model the 
interrelation between hypothesised systems (i.e., cognitive structures) and their respective 
observed appearances (i.e., behaviour).  
Indeed the starting point for this thesis was the personal observation that despite the 
goal of sustained peak performance levels, performance variation appeared to be inevitable for 
most if not all elite athletes. The question that emerged was: Is there a psychological basis for 
this variation in performance, or can it be entirely accounted for through 
external/environmental change? This question led me to consider an existing theory which 
aimed to account for performance variation in sport, namely catastrophe theory (Fazey & 
Hardy, 1988). This theory developed in response to a dissatisfaction with the existing models 
of the anxiety-performance relationship (Hardy, 1990) at the time – the inverted-U hypothesis 
(Yerkes & Dodson, 1908) and multi-dimensional anxiety theory (Martins et al., 1990) – yet as 
soon became apparent, did not offer a meaningful step forward. What the theory did offer was 
the realisation that theoretical problems, and therefore also theoretical developments, are 
primarily a function of engagement, or lack of, with the associated epistemological 
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assumptions. In this instance, catastrophe theory is predicated on the assumption that cognition 
(i.e., cognitive anxiety) was causally linked to performance and its variation. 
Catastrophe theory attempted to predict the effects of cognitive anxiety and 
physiological arousal on performance in a three-dimensional model (Hardy, Beattie, & 
Woodman, 2007); and provided a series of four testable relationships between these three 
components. Namely:  
1.   There is a positive relationship between physiological arousal and performance when 
cognitive anxiety is low. 
2.   There is a negative relationship between cognitive anxiety and performance when 
physiological arousal is high. 
3.   There exists an inverted-U relationship between physiological arousal and performance 
when cognitive anxiety is low, and; 
4.   When cognitive anxiety is high, increased levels of physiological anxiety will lead to a 
sudden, catastrophic drop in performance (Hardy, Beattie, & Woodman, 2007). 
Thus, beyond the predicted interactive effects of the multidimensional components of 
performance anxiety (i.e., physiological arousal and cognitive anxiety), catastrophe theory has 
two key features which distinguishes itself from the inverted-U hypothesis and the 
multidimensional model of anxiety:  
1.   Unlike the multidimensional model of anxiety (which assumes a negative relationship 
between cognitive anxiety and performance), catastrophe theory predicts that the 
direction of the relationship (i.e., whether it is positive or negative) between cognitive 
anxiety and performance is dependent on whether physiological arousal is high or low. 
2.   Unlike the inverted-U hypothesis (which assumes that there is a gradual decline in 
performance with increasingly high arousal), catastrophe theory predicts a sudden (or 
discontinuous) drop in performance (mediated by the “interactional effects” of 
cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal).  
In light of these two key distinguishing features, it is worth returning to some of the 
original objections laid out by Hardy and colleagues (Fazey & Hardy, 1988; Hardy, 1990; 
Hardy & Parfitt, 1991), in order to critically examine to what extent catastrophe theory is a 
significant theoretical step forward. 
The inverted-U hypothesis neither describes nor explains the relationship between 
arousal and performance; principally because it is based on a redundant stimulus-response 
explanation, which does not consider the role of cognition. In response to this criticism, Hardy 
and colleagues added the cognitive anxiety component to their catastrophe model of 
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performance, typically operationalised using the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory - 2 
(CSAI-2; Martins et al., 1990). Given this is a descriptive tool, it is not clear how this provides 
an explanation for the “catastrophe effect”; especially given Hardy’s (1996a) rather confusing 
observation that: 
[The catastrophe model] attempts to describe how cognitive anxiety and physiological 
arousal interact to determine performance. However, it should also be noted that the 
catastrophe model is only a model. It is not a theory, since it does not at this stage make 
any attempt to explain what causes cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal to 
interact” (p. 72).  
In other words, the model assumes that this interaction exists, and its only claim is to describe 
the effect of the interaction on performance. Its value as a model therefore rests solely on 
whether it can describe or predict the anxiety-performance relationship.  
Beyond the anecdotal observation that sudden drops in performance occur in sport, the 
assumption that it can be accounted for solely in relation to cognitive anxiety and physiological 
arousal appears questionable. Indeed, Hardy (1990) recognised this in observing “the model 
ignores several other potentially important meta-cognitive variables, such as perceived 
control…self-image…and self-confidence” (p. 99) as well as task difficulty (perhaps naming 
but a few), which led to speculation of “five-dimensional catastrophes”, “bias factors” and 
“butterfly factors”. Such developments led researchers (e.g., Gill, 1994) to question whether 
the model itself was too complex. An alternative view however is that the subject matter is 
itself simply too complex to be meaningfully captured by theory based on positivist 
epistemology (i.e., objectivity, a-temporality, linear causality). By neglecting the flaws in the 
epistemological assumptions, the absurdity of reducing complex phenomena down to a finite 
number of isolated cognitivist states becomes permissible; and there was no reason to stop the 
continued quest for empirical support.  
Any explanation should be accompanied by causal evidence to support the meditational 
role of these components. Models developed within sport psychology have historically been 
poor at offering predictive power for performance levels (Mack, Huddleston, Dutler, & Mintah, 
2000), given their tendency to isolate a limited number of interrelated “sub-systems”, or 
objectivist representations, as the basis for the observed appearances. In relation to the original 
formulation of catastrophe theory (Fazey & Hardy, 1988), this amounts to accounting for 
sudden drops in performance solely based on the nature of the interaction between cognitive 
anxiety and physiological arousal. Hardy and colleagues (Hardy, 1996b; Hardy & Parfitt, 1991; 
Hardy, Parfitt, & Pates, 1994; Parfitt, Hardy, & Pates, 1995) speculated that physiological 
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arousal could influence performance in a number of ways: For example, high physiological 
arousal could affect the ability of performers to utilise cognitive and physiological resources; 
and high somatic anxiety could effectively act as a distraction (Hardy & Parfitt, 1991). Whilst 
these are plausible explanations for a sudden drop in performance, one cannot help but feel that 
this narrow focus overlooks the potential significance of other concomitant contextual, 
temporal, and individual factors.  
It should be of no surprise that the quantitative studies which followed (i.e., Hardy, 
1996a; Hardy, Parfitt, & Pates, 1994; Parfitt, Hardy, & Pates, 1995) were only able to offer 
weak support for the model. Despite citing a number of flaws in their methodology (i.e., small 
sample size, “wild” scores), replication of these particular studies – with these flaws removed 
– are conspicuous by their absence. Similarly, in a qualitative study where athletes were asked 
about their experiences of “catastrophic performances”, Edwards, Hardy, Kingston, and Gould 
(2002) failed to provide clear support for a sudden drop in performance being associated with 
high cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal, and reduced confidence. This is despite 
confidence (or lack of) being identified as one of the most significant factors associated with 
performance12. The problem is further compounded by Edwards et al. (2002) recognition that 
performance is a dynamic, temporal process; and thus the suggestion that “ongoing 
performance needs to be examined when determining theoretical explanations for the 
patterning of performance and causal influences” (p.15). Similarly, in a bid to increase the 
predictive power of the model, additional factors13 have been incorporated, or proposed, as 
well as considering performance as an ongoing process rather than a discrete event, based on 
the finding that the anxiety-performance relationship is a temporal process which emerges over 
time (Hardy, 1996a). Therefore, beyond the initial observation that drops in performance tend 
to be sudden rather than gradual, it is not clear what remains of the theory or model itself. 
In sum, objective representations such as cognitive anxiety are little more than 
objectivist representations or abstractions, rather than possessing inherent explanatory 
                                               
12 Self-confidence has been cited several times by other researchers as being an important 
influence on athletic performance (e.g., Hays, Thomas, Maynard, & Bawden, 2009; Feltz, 
2007; Vealey, 2001). A recent meta-analysis confirmed that there is stronger effect size 
between self-confidence and performance (r = 0.24), than for cognitive anxiety and 
performance (r = -0.10) (Woodman & Hardy, 2003).  
13 I.e., self-confidence (Hardy, Woodman, & Carrington, 2004); and effort (Hardy, Beattie, 
Woodman, 2007). 
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properties for observed performance phenomena. Adding more variables merely highlights the 
complexity of the subject, rather than increases the power of the model. We are back to where 
we started; the anecdotal observation that performance drops dramatically rather than 
gradually; but without any clear psychological explanation for it. Yet, the failure is not 
primarily down to the theory/model itself, or the methods used to provide causal evidence, but 
the absurdity of the underpinning epistemological assumptions on which it is conceived (i.e., 
objectivity, a-temporality, linear causality). Thus, it became clear that the task of understanding 
the psychological basis for performance variation is first and foremost establishing an 
epistemological framework capable of capturing complex and dynamic processes.   
 
2.2.5   The problem of induction 
Science owes its identity and value to being a counterpoint to mysticism. Specifically, 
the so-called scientific method is based and judged on its ability to produce tangible outcomes 
that have a distinctly different quality from those generated through pure subjective belief. For 
mysticism, ideas cannot be ultimately separated from the creator. In science, progress is 
implicitly tied in part to the appropriation of nature, whose creator is an external invisible force 
– be it a God or nature itself - to be understood. This is what gives science its authority, and 
scientific realism, the belief that a “reality” exists independently of our senses, is part of the 
ontological basis on which this authority rests. 
Objectivity, a guiding principle of scientific enquiry is only possible at the expense of 
a dualism between subject and object. In an attempt to overcome this dualism, orthodox science 
generally owes its methods to empiricism, or naive inductivism, whereby science, and scientific 
knowledge, results from careful dispassionate observation, experimentation, and generalisation 
(Chambers, 1982).  Thus, a connection is required between the observer and that which is being 
observed, in order for data to be recorded and described; as captured (not without irony) in 
Berkeley’s principle: “Esse est percipi” (“To be is to be perceived”).  
In order for the empirical process to remain objective, science generally relies on 
inductive reasoning to establish laws and theories in association with a finite number of careful 
observations. Chambers (1982) summarises the process of inductive reasoning as follows: “If 
a large number of As has been observed under a wide variety of conditions, and if all those 
observed As without exception possessed the property B, then all As possess the property B” 
(p. 13). An example of which might be: 
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(Premise) 
37 footballers (A) report feeling confident (B) when they are playing well 
 (Conclusion) 
Therefore all footballers feel confident when playing well 
 
However, as Chambers (1982) points out, inductive arguments are not inherently 
logical, given that if the premises are true it does not necessarily follow that the conclusion 
(which results from the induction) must also be true. To use the previous example: If Footballer 
No.38 played well in a match; it is possible without contradiction that he/she was lacking 
confidence during that time. If the inductive process cannot be underwritten by logic, the 
alternative is an appeal to experience wherein generalisations, or “universal statements”, are 
inferred from repeated observations. The latter approach too becomes unstuck in that it relies 
on circular reasoning: 
The argument purporting to justify induction is circular because it employs the very 
kind of inductive argument the validity of which is supposed to be in need of 
justification. The form of the justificatory argument is as follows: 
 The principle of induction worked successfully of occasion x1. 
 The principle of induction worked successfully of occasion x2 etc. 
 The principle of induction always works. 
A universal statement asserting the validity of the principle of induction is here inferred 
from a number of singular statements recording past applications of the principle. The 
argument is therefore an inductive one and so cannot be used to justify the principle of 
induction. We cannot use induction to justify induction. This difficulty associated with 
the justification of induction has traditionally been called “the problem of induction”. 
(Chambers, 1982, p. 15) 
David Hume first recognised this circularity over 250 years ago, and in doing so 
presenting a challenge to the foundations of empirical science. In response, some philosophers 
have countered by justifying the inherent validity of the empirical process based on its ability 
to account for natural processes, as well as stressing its undeniable predictive power (Earman 
& Salmon (1999). Yet, as Earman and Salmon (1999) point out, the logic of the scientist is 
uncannily similar to that of the mystic: Both justify the success of their method based on its 
previous success. Whilst this logic might acceptable for sciences where linear causation is a 
meaningful concept and outcomes are relatively stable, the replication crisis exposes the 
problematic nature of method of induction for a human science. 
     35  
The problem of induction led Popper (2002) to suggest that “the various difficulties of 
inductive logic…are insurmountable” (p. 6). A consequence of these difficulties has been a 
retreat to probability (Chambers, 1982) wherein inductive inferences become probable 
inferences (Keynes, 1921; Popper, 2002). As such we settle for scientific knowledge which we 
assume is likely to be true rather than proven as such. Whilst the application of inferential 
statistics - which is assumed to provide this measure of certainty - continues to be an accepted 
basis on which hypotheses are accepted or rejected, the retreat to probability has not been 
without its critics.  
Powers (1973) suggested that the reliance on statistics in psychology is a legacy of 
behaviourism, and the misplaced belief in linear cause and effect relationships. Furthermore, 
Powers suggests that statistics betray a denial concerning nature’s noise which experimental 
psychology seeks to eliminate. Jung (2002) made a similar point when he observed that the 
desire for theories to have universal validity occurs at the expense of individual facts. By 
generating and working to an abstract mean, exceptions can only be viewed as exceptions, 
leading Jung (2002) to suggest that “[t]he statistical method shows the facts in light of the ideal 
average but does not give us a picture of their empirical reality…absolute reality has 
predominantly the character of irregularity” (p. 5).14 Furthermore, Powers (1973) suggested 
that “statistics has become the mainstay of psychology, to the point where it is a substitute for 
thought, creativity, and evaluation (my italics; p.12).  
As long as we implicitly maintain faith in the inductive process, we are also dependent 
on and implicitly trust statistical inference and the conclusions set by this. The crime is the 
continued faith placed in empiricism as the dominant means of conducting science. The scene 
is a discipline which appears to hold little place for genuine thought, creativity and evaluation 
which challenges such scientific orthodoxy. A change in approach or method ultimately starts 
with a change in our underlying assumptions concerning the basis on which the legitimacy of 
scientific knowledge is assumed. The proposition is that any such change will require 
individual intuition, judgment and insight to be afforded its rightful place. If sport psychology 




                                               
14 This point is developed further in chapter 5, in relation to more recent developments in 
psychology (i.e., Idiographic science). 
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2.3   Another way - The psychology of C.G. Jung 
Given the inherent logical flaws in the inductive process, Popper (2002) argued that 
there is no inherently logical means of developing scientific knowledge. Instead Popper 
suggested that “every discovery contains ‘an irrational element’, or ‘a creative intuition’” (p. 
8). In support, Popper cites Einstein’s preference for pure deduction as a means of developing 
his universal laws, without an appeal to logic: “There can be no logical path…leading to 
these…laws. They can only be reached by intuition, based on something like intellectual love 
of the objects of experience” (Einstein, quoted in Popper, 2002, p. 8-9). By definition, 
deduction, as opposed to inductive logic doesn’t allow for the appropriation generalised 
statements, or laws, from finite observations. Therefore, applying the principle of deduction 
alone doesn’t allow for a law to be developed with a sense of absolute certainty (Harré, 1972). 
This led Harré (1972) to suggest, “we can only properly be said to have a belief in a law” (p. 
10). 
Indeed, it was the trust that Einstein placed in his own intuition, rather than established 
principles, which allowed him to see beyond the rules of “classical” physics. Famously, 
Einstein was working outside of academia in a patent office for new inventions during the 
period when he wrote his seminal scientific papers which would ultimately lead to his general 
theory of relativity. It has been suggested that Einstein’s separation from academia during this 
formative intellectual period proved invaluable in protecting his creative independence and 
critical vigilance. Furthermore, it is evident that the radical and creative nature of Einstein’s 
scientific endeavours, despite their universal significance, cannot be ultimately separated from 
the man himself (see Isaacson, 2007). 
If, in sport psychology, we are concerned with understanding as well as the 
accumulation of facts, thinkers who have allowed their subjective voice to act as a looking 
glass on the psychology of human nature cannot be ignored. Even if the empirical process was 
inherently logical, it appears inconceivable that true insight into human nature can be directly 
gained through objectivity and method alone, which holds no true place for the observer. Rather 
than hide behind the doctrine of objectivity, paradoxically, by letting the subjectivity into the 
final analysis it is likely that the end result will be more objective: “By admitting subjective 
phenomena into the model, we shall end up being more objective, that is, more honest about 
the fact that we know only appearances” (Powers, 1973, p.59-60). Thus, a better philosophy of 
the psyche will only become possible once we look beyond restrictive scope of empirical 
science, towards an empirical human science which recognises that a subjective voice, not 
method alone, can transcend subjectivity. Whilst it is unlikely that any one approach would be 
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able to exclusively capture Giorgi’s bold vision, its spirit is evident in the psychology 
developed by Carl Gustav Jung in the previous century.  
The genesis of Jung’s work owes much to his ability to combine the spirit of science 
and mysticism into an organised whole, to the extent that it has been described as “a complex 
and finally global vision of the human psyche that contains an integrated combination of layers 
and levels of influence.” (Stein, 2005, p. 209).  Rather than shirk the tough epistemological 
challenges associated with a dynamic, ethereal and complex subject matter, as will be shown, 
Jung’s openness to himself, and human nature at large was at the heart of his work.  
A central purpose of this chapter is to acknowledge and explore an additional criterion 
for a legitimate human science; that is the acknowledgement of the complementarity between 
the practitioner and the science that results (subject~object), which in turn provides the tension 
on which a critical epistemology can be established. Jung’s own genius lies in his unwillingness 
to settle for epistemology which did not match his own experience, and his conviction in the 
necessity of science to accurately reflect all that was presented to him.  
Jung primarily valued the “immediate experience with human beings” (Jung’s 
foreword, in Jacobi, 1962), whilst also seeking a hidden, unifying order in the chaos that he 
had experienced during his own life (Fordham, 1966). Indeed, Jung was acutely aware that 
through his original observations and insights he was “necessarily speaking about myself” 
(Jung, 1975, p. 228), but in the process of doing so, made significant contributions to 
psychology and beyond. As I will now attempt to show, Jung’s psychology grew out of the 
desire for a scientific understanding of his most private personal experiences.   
 
2.3.1   A very brief, (auto)biography of Jung’s early life15 
Carl Gustav Jung was born in Switzerland in 1875 and spent much of his childhood 
lonely, albeit relatively content, in a rural home. His mother had a warm nature, but could be 
distant from him and spent several months in Jung’s early years away in hospital with an 
unidentified physical ailment. In contrast his father was reliably present, but privately was a 
troubled clergyman struggling with his religious beliefs. Despite their incompatibility and 
unhappy private life, Jung’s parents stayed together for outward appearance. These conflicts 
mirrored Jung’s private world, and he described possessing two alternative personalities from 
an early age, and throughout his life: Personality No.1, his public, adaptive self, and personality 
                                               
15 The following sketch is particularly indebted to Jung’s autobiography, Memories, Dreams, 
Reflections (Jung, 1995), in which a more detailed account can be found. 
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No.2, “old…skeptical, mistrustful, remote from the world of men, but close to nature”16 (Jung, 
1995, p. 61).  
During adolescence Jung become increasingly skeptical about the religious doctrine 
espoused by his father, and found it to be increasingly at odds with his own relationship with 
God: 
There arose in me profound doubts about everything my father had said. When I heard 
him preaching about grace, I always thought of my own experience. What he said 
sounded stale and hollow, like a tale told by someone who knows it only by hearsay 
and cannot quite believe it himself. I wanted to help him but I did not know how. (Jung, 
1995, p.59)  
Around this time his father’s own faith was becoming increasingly hollow, but he was unable 
to let it go, at least outwardly: “Not until several years late did I come to understand that my 
poor father did not care to think, because he was consumed by inward doubts. He was taking 
refuge from himself and therefore insisted on blind faith” (Jung, 1995, p. 92). 
 Jung’s recognised that his own journey took on a compensatory nature away from 
pursuing external convention and creed. He could not find God represented in the egos of men, 
rather “…it seemed to me that the high mountains, the rivers, lakes, trees, flowers and animals 
far better exemplified the essence of God than men with their ridiculous clothes” (p.62). The 
undesirable qualities that Jung saw in pious men, he recognised in his personality No. 1, and 
as a result increasingly sought refuse in personality No. 2. In doing so, began a life long journey 
of exploration to his inner nature, and what began as a means of becoming closer to God, 
developed into a lifelong commitment to explore “the dark recesses of his own soul” (Stevens, 
1990, p.5). 
By finding God absent in the church, whilst still at school, Jung sought refuge in 
literature and philosophy with the hope that it might offer independent thought consistent with 
his own. Towards the end of adolescence a decision had to be made about what to study at 
university, and for a long time Jung was torn between science and comparative religion: 
What appealed to me in science were the concrete facts and their historical background, 
and in comparative religion the spiritual problems, into which philosophy also entered. 
In science I missed the factor of meaning; and in religion, that of empiricism. Science 
met, to a very large extent the needs of No. 1 personality, whereas the humane or 
historical studies provided beneficial instruction for No. 2. (Jung, 1995, p. 91) 
                                               
16 Jung also referred to personality No.2 as the “natural mind” (Jung, 1995).  
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 Having settled upon medicine, this tension between the desire to understanding his 
immediate subjective experience and the requirements of an objective science, played out in 
his reluctance to settle upon a specialism, until he began to read a psychiatry textbook in 
preparation for an exam. This field offered the basis for an intellectual union of subject and 
object, but also on a personal level the basis for integration of the self:  
Beginning with the preface, I read: “It is probably due to the peculiarity of the subject 
and its incomplete state of development that psychiatric textbooks are stamped with a 
more or less subjective character”. A few lines further on the author called the psychosis 
“diseases of the personality.” My heart suddenly began to pound. I had to stand up and 
draw a deep breath. My excitement was intense, for it had become clear to me, in a 
flash of illumination, that for me the only possible goal was psychiatry. Here alone the 
two currents of my interest could flow together and in a united stream dig their own 
bed. Here was the empirical field common to biological and spiritual facts, which I had 
everywhere sought and nowhere found. Here at last was the place where the collusion 
of nature and spirit become a reality”. (My italics; 1995, p.129-130) 
On completion of his university studies in 1900, Jung took a post in a psychiatric 
hospital where he served his “apprenticeship”. Jung describes the treatments administered to 
patients as an indifferent process of assessment, diagnosis of symptoms, and the use of drugs. 
Although he took it upon himself to do so, there was no precedent for talking to patients about 
their problems, as the general assumption appeared to be that it might make them worse.  
On being appointed as a lecturer in psychiatry in 1905, Jung reputation grew following 
research based on Galton’s word association test, as well as a book on schizophrenia in 1907. 
This led to a period of collaboration with Freud between 1907 and 1912, despite Jung being 
initially warned by fellow academics that an association with Freud would be ruinous for his 
career prospects.  
His split with Freud, due in large part to not accepting the central role given to sexuality 
in psychological development, led to a period of sustained inner turmoil which Jung referred 
to as his “confrontation with the unconscious” – between 1912-1916. During this time Jung let 
himself succumb to his unconscious world, through the experience of dreams, fantasies and 
images. In doing so Jung gave way to experience whilst maintaining active curiosity as to their 
personal meaning. The unrestrained nature of this endeavour however was not matched at the 
time by Jung’s ability to articulate that which had occurred to him and the wider significance 
as he saw it: 
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I became aware that I had not yet found the right language, that I still had to translate it 
into something else. Therefore I gave up this æstheticising tendency in good time, in 
favor of a rigorous process of understanding. I saw that so much fantasy needed firm 
ground underfoot, and that I must first return wholly to reality. For me, reality meant 
scientific comprehension. I had to draw concrete conclusions from the insights the 
unconscious had given me – and that task was to become a life work. (Jung, 1995, p. 
213)   
During this period of personal upheaval Jung decided to stop working as a university 
lecturer. He was unable to reconcile his secure academic life with the internal doubts and 
uncertainty he was experiencing, and which were leading him towards a new personal and 
intellectual orientation. This new direction led Jung to recognise that the laws of nature 
governing the psyche could not be captured by the science of the time. He therefore took it 
upon himself to develop a new empirical basis on which to capture and articulate the language 
of the psyche.  
 
2.3.2   Introduction to Jung’s depth psychology 
The purpose of what follows is not to offer a comprehensive introduction to Jung’s 
original psychology17. A summary of Jung’s ideas runs counter to the spirit of his work, and as 
such he himself was reluctant to do so. In particular Jung was keen to avoid presenting a 
doctrinal system, a position fundamentally inconsistent with his views on the human psyche 
(Jacobi, 1962). However, given the very limited consideration that has been given to his work 
in sport psychology, it is felt that a cursory description of some of his main contributions is 
necessary. Rather than focus primarily on the new language of the psyche that Jung created, 
the emphasis will be on how he endeavored to embrace complexity, interconnectedness and 
temporality. In his formative work on the psychology of the conscious, Jung created a typology 
of different personality types (see Psychological Types, Jung, 1971). By doing so Jung became 
interested in the “unity which must compensate for this diversity” (Jung, 1995, p. 234); that 
which connects us together, and makes us whole.   
 
 
                                               
17 Excellent, and more comprehensive introductions to Jung’s psychology include, An 
Introduction to Jung’s Psychology (Fordman, 1966); The Psychology of C. G. Jung (Jacobi, 
1962); and On Jung (Stevens, 1990).  
     41  
2.3.2.1   The dynamic psyche 
Jung’s separation between his inner and outer world during his formative years reached 
its zenith following the intellectual break with Freud and his subsequent “confrontation with 
the unconscious”. Much of his future work can be viewed as a means to reconnect with the 
external world, as well as with himself. In doing so Jung recognised that different aspects of 
himself (i.e., inner/outer, unconscious/conscious) were defined by their complimentary, 
dialectical relationship; wherein one’s sense of self, as expressed through personality, was not 
a fixed entity but an ongoing dynamic, evolutionary process.  
Jung conceived of the psyche as a dynamic system in continual flux, wherein the 
regulatory function of opposites underpins psychic activity (Jung, 1966a). This can perhaps 
best be understood in relation to Jung’s conceptualisation of the libido, which presents a clear 
illustration of the divergence between the theories of Freud and Jung. For Freud, the term 
“libido” exclusively represents a person’s sexual energy, whereas for Jung it refers to the 
movement of psychic energy in general derived from the tension between a pair of opposites 
(i.e. conscious~unconscious, progression~regression; Fordham, 1966).18 
 
2.3.2.2   Energy versus causality 
Jung (1960) suggested that our understanding of psychic events requires consideration 
of both causal determinism and the energetic standpoint. As Rose (1997) observed, “we require 
epistemological diversity in order to understand the ontological unity of our world” (p. 296). 
According to Jung, energy “is a concept abstracted from relations of movement” (Jung, 1960, 
p.4), and the energetic standpoint is based on the principle of equivalence which states that “for 
a given quantity of energy expended or consumed in bringing about a certain condition, an 
equal quantity of the same or another form of energy will appear elsewhere” (p.18). Whereas 
causal explanations seek to establish linear determinism from “effect” to “cause”, and so are 
governed by fixed laws, the energetic viewpoint according to Jung is teleological in nature, 
where finality19 is ultimately bound by the principle of equivalence and by implication the 
                                               
18 Jung introduced two concepts, progression and regression, in order to account for the 
movement of the libido. A more in-depth exploration of the libido will be considered in 
chapter 4 with respect to our understanding of momentum in sports. 
19 It is important to note that finality doesn’t exclusively imply design. Although design is a 
case of finality, the latter represents an intended outcome which doesn’t necessarily 
correspond to what emerges (Bohn, 1980). In addition to final cause, Bohn (1980) argued 
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conservation of energy. Thus, despite changes taking place, energy is assumed to be constant 
throughout, with the system working towards a state of general equilibrium or entropy (Jung, 
1960). This approach is also therefore based on circular logic: Optimal functioning is 
maintained through self-regulation (rather than linear determinism), and the functioning of 
elements is coordinated in such a way that driven by a tendency towards optimality (Lovelock, 
2009). Thus, as with the circularity within the process of induction, an element of faith is 
required regarding epistemological value one places in either the assumption of causality or 
finality. 
Jung himself was acutely aware that unlike physical energy, the concept of psychic 
energy holds little objective meaning beyond the idea that it is a useful concept to account for 
empirical findings that he arrived upon. As such, the term libido, and by association psychic 
energy, are a posteriori concepts used as a useful basis on which to account for the teleological 
nature of psychic activity (Jacobi, 1962). Specifically, that the functioning of the dynamic 
psyche is in part determined by the inherent need to regulate itself. The basis on which this 
self-regulation occurs forms one of the cornerstones of Jung’s work. 
 
2.3.2.3   Regulatory function of opposites 
Given that Jung conceived the psyche as being dynamic rather than static in nature, a 
basis on which it organised itself was required. Jung postulated that the laws which govern the 
physical universe apply to the psyche, given that both are part of nature. In particular the 
principle of homeostasis which accounts for how biological organisms maintain a state of 
dynamic equilibrium in response to ever changing environmental conditions, via positive and 
negative feedback (Stevens, 1990). 
           Although net energy is assumed to be constant throughout the system, in order for this 
dynamic equilibrium to be maintained Jung (1966a) suggested that a system of opposites 
regulates psychic functioning. The regulatory function of opposites is not an original idea, and 
Jung (1966a) credits the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus for its discovery. Heraclitus 
called this process enantiodromia, which supposes that everything at some point must flow 
into its opposite (Jacobi, 1962). Given its value as an a posteriori concept, Jung believed that 
the libido, or psychic energy, when considered in this way has clear archetypal equivalence to 
                                               
that insights into nature should also represent formative cause: “an ordered and structured 
inner movement that is essential to what things are” (p. 16).  
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physical processes: “Just as metabolism maintains the balance in the physical economy of the 
organism, so…psychic energy determines various relations between the various elements of 
the psyche and, when it is disturbed, pathological phenomena result” (Jacobi, 1962, p. 53). 
 
2.3.2.4   Individuation 
A common theme which runs throughout Jung’s work is the idea of opposing sides of 
one’s nature, and the associated need to avoid one-sidedness for the sake of psychological 
health. With respect to the nature of the psyche, Jung considered everyone to be man (animus) 
and woman (anima), consciousness and unconsciousness, individual and collective. However, 
the requirement for directed action or adaptation inevitably results in one-sidedness (Jung, 
1960), at the expense of individual growth and realisation of the self20. Through his work with 
patients, Jung observed that when “cured” therapeutically speaking, people would often 
continue their treatment in the form of an ongoing dialogue between the unconscious and the 
conscious mind (Jung, 1968). Jung believed the purpose of this dialogue was a quest for 
wholeness through integrating and “reconciling opposing trends in one’s nature” (Fordham, 
1966, p. 46). This tendency towards integration and wholeness Jung referred to as the 
individuation process. 
 True psychic growth is therefore not linear in nature but has a twofold dialectical 
character. Firstly, the adaptation to external conditions, which Jung (1960) called progression. 
“Regression on the other hand, as an adaptation to the conditions of the inner world, springs 
from the vital need to satisfy the demands of individuation” (Jung, 1960, p. 39). Whilst a 
tension exists between these two processes, satisfactory adaptation to external conditions 
ultimately requires being at harmony with one’s inner self, and vice versa. Furthermore, 
adaption cannot be viewed as an end point in itself, but a means by which further ongoing 
successful adaptations are possible:  
Although progression and regression are causally grounded in the nature of the life-
process on the one hand and in environmental conditions on the other, yet, if we look 
at them energetically, we must think of them only as a means, as transitional stages in 
the flow of energy. Looked from this angle, progression and the adaption resulting 
therefrom are a means to regression, to a manifestation of the inner world in the outer. 
                                               
20 “I have chosen the term ‘self’ to designate the totality of man, the sum total of his 
conscious and unconscious contents” (Jung, 1969b, p. 82).  
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In this way a new means is created for a changed mode of progression, bringing better 
adaptation to environmental conditions. (Jung, 1960, p. 40) 
Thus, the complimentary nature of progression and regression not only allow for 
adaptation to both external and internal conditions, but also the possibility of a continuous, 
emerging, and organismic process. This process not only seeks to embrace the totality of the 
self, including all parts that make the individual whole, but also the future possibilities 
associated with this. Although individuation requires both progression and regression as 
described above, it is the latter process which took precedence for Jung as the basis on which 
one establishes one’s true center of personality (Stevens, 1990). As a result, in the adult stage 
of life, the immediate priority for growth is to become reconciled with that which was 
overlooked during the formative development of the ego-consciousness; namely, the 
unconscious. 
 
2.3.2.5   The unconscious 
 
…the real and authentic psyche is the unconscious, whereas the ego-consciousness can 
be regarded only as a temporary epiphenomenon. (Jung, 1966b, p. 90) 
 
Jung did not dispute Freud’s position on the importance of the unconscious, but 
ultimately believed that its existence was subject to influence beyond the “principle of 
repression”. Jung ultimately rejected what he saw as a one-sided mechanistic regression to the 
unconscious and sexuality inherent in Freud’s approach, which he believed did not stand up to 
scrutiny (see Jung, 1966b). Instead, Jung (1966a) postulated that “unconscious processes stand 
in compensatory relation to the conscious mind” (p. 177). Or to put another way, rather than 
see the unconscious as a relatively passive repository for repressed parts of self, Jung viewed 
it as being actively engaged with and in part defined by consciousness. Furthermore, Jung 
believed that a retreat to the unconscious doesn’t represent a one-directional regression to an 
infantile state, but a necessary step in the process of individuation.  
Jung identified two strata in the unconscious: The personal unconscious and collective 
unconscious. The personal unconscious contains  
everything which I know, but of which I am not at the moment thinking; everything of 
which I was once conscious but have now forgotten; everything perceived by my sense, 
but not noted by my conscious mind; everything which, involuntarily and without 
paying attention to it, I feel, think remember, want and do”. (Jung, 1960, p. 185) 
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Not only does the personal unconscious interact with the environment but also the collective 
unconscious “where the primordial images common to humanity lie sleeping” (Jung, 1966a, p. 
65). A popular misconception is that Jung was suggesting that primordial images, or 
archetypes, represented the existence of inherited ideas or characteristics, shared by humanity. 
Rather, archetypes are considered to be blueprints or predispositions of the psyche which have 
adapted to the conditions of human existence shared by all (Stevens, 1990). Critically therefore, 
archetypes represent the possibility of certain modes of thought and behavior but not their 
preexistence21, and in turn bestow some adaptive value. For example, regarding the archetypal 
figure of “God”, Jung (1966a) wrote “…men have always needed demons and cannot live 
without God’s…The idea of God is an absolutely necessary psychological function of an 
irrational nature, which has nothing whatever to do with the question of God’s existence” (p. 
71). Similarly, de Botton (2012) observed 
The apposite point is not whether the virgin exists, but what it tells us about human 
nature that so many Christians over two millennia have felt the need to invent her. Our 
focus should be on what the Virgin Mary reveals about our emotional requirements – 
and, in particular, on what becomes of these demands when we lose our faith”. (p. 168) 
In short, the archetypes that reside within the collective unconscious represent or reflect 
the objective psyche, that which is shared by all, whilst the personal unconscious and 
consciousness represents the subjective psyche (Jung, 1966a), that which is unique to the 
individual.  
Activity within the objective psyche does not present itself to consciousness directly. 
As such, the objective psyche can only be indirectly inferred in the form of symbols and motifs. 
Conversely, the subjective psyche, whilst more likely to be observable remains unique to the 
individual. This presents an interesting epistemological challenge for the development of a 
scientific depth psychology regarding the nature and meaning of subjective and objective 
knowledge. As Jung (1960) wrote, the “more unconscious a man is, the more he will conform 
to the general canon of psychic behavior” (p. 160). Conversely, “the more conscious he 
becomes of his individuality, the more pronounced will be his difference from other 
subjects…Further, his reactions are much less predictable” (p. 160-161). The ability to infer 
objective, nomothetic statements about the psyche are therefore a function of the unconscious 
depth one is able to capture.  
                                               
21 “I do not by any means assert the inheritance of ideas, but only the possibility of such 
ideas, which is something very different” (Jung, 1966a, p. 65). 
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Given that the further one descends into the unconscious psyche, the further one is 
required to move away from empirical science, there exists a direct trade-off between scientific 
objectivity and a nomothetic psychology. On the other hand, whilst empirical science might 
lend itself to establishing “facts” about a person, these facts ultimately remain subject to that 
person, and are therefore subjective. As long as subject and object remain separated, 
epistemologically speaking, an “objectified subject and a subjectified object” (Varela et al., 
1991, p. 242) become unavoidable. Critically however this trade off only exists as long as one 
makes a choice between objectivity and subjectivity. As such, objectivity and subjectivity in 
isolation cannot ever hope to provide a means of working towards a more complete 
understanding of the human psyche. Only through the synthesis of subject and object, such as 
the psychology developed by Jung, does this become possible.  
 
2.4   Conclusions 
 
By labeling it a psychology with the psyche, Jung implicitly positions its practitioner-
not as someone who detachedly studies something called a psyche - but someone 
trained to apply his or her own psyche as a tool towards trying to fathom how human 
beings attune themselves to own (sic) existence. (Jones, 2013, p. 415) 
 
If the purpose and spirit of science is to work towards a systematic description and/or 
explanation of nature, in all its forms, then a science which sets limits on what is permissible 
for study does not abide by its central goal. If we only concern ourselves with phenomena for 
which we assume proof or evidence can be sought, as well as neglecting natural phenomena 
which do not fit within our “scientific” assumptions; is it rational to say that the latter doesn’t 
belong to science? Or do we reevaluate what science needs to be, that is our most basic 
epistemological assumptions, in order to include such phenomenon in our scientific enquiries. 
Does normal science (Kuhn, 1996) set the agenda, or the phenomenon under consideration? 
Or to put another way: Is it the job of orthodox science to say what nature is, implicitly captured 
within its assumptions, or is it the job of science to find the appropriate means to let nature 
speak for itself? Just because assumptions in alliance with observation might lead to an 
‘answer’, doesn’t mean that it speaks of nature.  
Giorgi (2014) wrote: “Its [psychology] desire to be a natural science actually preceded 
an examination of its subject matter and by adopting and imitating the preexisting natural 
scientific methods, its methods preceded its problems” (p. 235). If ontological realism, the 
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philosophical foundation for positivist science, has any part to play in psychology then the 
methods have to be accountable on the basis that they are able to capture something meaningful 
and authentic about the subject matter itself. Accountability to method alone is not enough.  
There is a self-evident circularity between one’s assumptions, and the subsequent 
observations and conclusions drawn. If we belief that genetic superiority is in part determined 
by skin colour, our experiences and observations are likely to support this proposition. If we 
had believed the Earth was flat, it is highly likely that we would have also interpreted all 
“evidence” in line with this “fact”. Observations are led by our assumptions as well as what 
the senses reveal. It is therefore ironic and fatal when a so-called empirical science overlooks 
the role of the scientific lens through which phenomena are observed, i.e., one’s epistemology. 
To assume uncritically that observation or experience allows for assumptions to be challenged 
is to assume too much. Relativity in nature extends to our insights. Even to accept the 
limitations of a particular scientific creed does not justify sticking with it. The primary role of 
science ought to be to find the best lens, not to polish and defend that which already exists, and 
to leave the former to philosophy. The consequence, as Robinson (1986) suggested is that 
science becomes prone to adopting Kuhn’s notion of normal science; and with it brings cultism, 
high priests and their respective commandments. Furthermore, Robinson (1986) observed that 
the “scientific literature is filled with studies of a replicative nature in which some little nuance 
has been added to an otherwise well-worn field of enquiry. Daring challenges to the authority 
of extant theories are rare” (p. 25-26). 
Science without a critical consideration of epistemology is no more scientific than 
mysticism. In a so-called human science, concurrent consideration of deeply held beliefs, even 
those beyond the realms of current reasoning, provide an opportunity for a critical, mutable 
and non-dogmatic epistemology. Jung’s own psychology was borne out of this critical tension 
of opposites, between scientific materialism and mysticism, recognising that individually they 
“lacked epistemological criticism as well as experience.” (Jung, 1995, p. 114). The true 
significance of Jung’s psychology is not just to be found in the objective fruits of his labours 
but also in its critical spirit.  
 What makes an approach truly scientific? Is it the prescription followed, or the spirit 
that guides it? If the two are connected, then the act of doing science cannot be separated from 
the intention. If the intention is to provide an explanation of nature, then an approach which 
takes us in the opposite direction, despite all that is gained along the way is surely anti-science 
conducted in the name of science. Alternatively, a path with allows us to connect with nature 
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– towards complexity, interconnectedness, and a-causality - requires science to let go of some 
of the need for certainty and the dogmatic aspiration of (naïve) objectivity.  
 The central argument presented in this chapter is that a human science does not have to 
choose between objectivity and subjectivity. Human science should be predicated based on a 
meaningful union of both, viewing them as complementary rather than conflicting in nature. 
Furthermore, in order for any form of human science to be considered rigorous and therefore 
legitimate, systematic engagement with epistemology is required. What is proposed is that 
subjectivity (in the form of individual reflection, intuition, judgment and insight) is an 
acceptable and possibly the only basis on which to evaluate the legitimacy and value of 
“objective” knowledge concerning the human subject. In this respect, the extent to which 
knowledge is derived via objective means is not a meaningful basis on which to judge its 
objective validity. Likewise, “subjective” knowledge belongs solely to mysticism as long as 
there is no objective basis for accountability.  However, such accountability does not have to 
be limited to quantification or statistical inference.  
The following extended quote by Russell (1912) perhaps best summarises the task and 
purpose of a truly all-encompassing human science: 
The true philosophic contemplation…finds its satisfaction in every enlargement of the 
not-Self, in everything that magnifies the objects contemplated, and thereby the subject 
contemplating. Everything, in contemplation, that is personal or private, everything that 
depends on habit, self-interest, or desire, distorts the object, and hence impairs the union 
which the intellect seeks. By thus making a barrier between subject and object, such 
personal and private things become a prison to the intellect. The free intellect will see 
as God might see, without a here and now, without hopes and fears, without the 
trammels of customary beliefs and traditional prejudices, calmly, dispassionately, in 
the sole and exclusive desire for knowledge – knowledge and impersonal, as purely 
contemplative, as it is possible for man to attain. Hence also the free intellect will value 
more the abstract and universal knowledge into which the accidents of private history 
do not enter, than knowledge brought about by the senses, and dependent, as such 
knowledge must be, upon exclusive and personal point of view and a body whose sense-
organs distort as much as they reveal. (p. 160) 
Although Russell (1912) wrote, “all acquisition of knowledge is an enlargement of the 
self” (p. 158), as the previous quote suggests, he was not advocating a truly personal 
knowledge. Instead Russell (1912) believed that knowledge “is a form of union of Self and 
not-Self; like all union, it is impaired by dominion, and therefore by any attempt to force the 
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universe into conformity with what we find in ourselves” (p.159). Russell was suggesting that 
we set unnecessary and unhelpful limits on our scientific endeavours when we pursue one (i.e., 
subjectivity or objectivity) at the expense of the other. Therefore, as well as subjectivity 
offering the necessary critical counterpoint to objectivity, and vice versa, as the basis for a 
critical epistemology; the epistemology of a human science becomes predicated on any 
subsequent union of subject and object. The purpose of human science then becomes to explore 
and articulate the meaning of this union. This was a task undertaken by Jung at the turn of the 
























Towards an analytical sport psychology 
 
Analytical psychology is fundamentally a natural science, but it is subject far more than 
any other science to the personal bias of the observer. The psychologist depends 
therefore in the highest degree upon historical and literary parallels if he wishes to 
exclude at least the crudest errors in judgment. (Jung, 1995, p. 226)  
 
3.1   Introduction 
Although Jung, early in his career, openly questioned the possibility of psychology as 
a science (Jones, 2013), towards the very end of his life, he actively defended the scientific 
status of his own psychology, despite its lack of conformity to the traditional canons of science 
(Shamdasani, 2003). Specifically, Jung argued that the scientific credentials of a theory or 
hypothesis should be based upon careful observation, and its ability to provide explanation and 
stimulate future work. Jung stopped short of suggesting that the basis for scientific proof in 
psychology should be the same as for the natural sciences, suggesting that a relative criterion 
was required due to the trade-off between subjective understanding and objective knowledge 
(Shamdasani, 2003). 
In the spirit that Jung developed his own psychology - in part, based on questioning the 
possibility of psychology’s existence - a central idea developed in the introduction and previous 
chapter was that the development of psychology as a science cannot be separated from an on-
going rationalisation with its epistemological foundations. This close relationship is evident in 
the observation that the existence of psychology, separate from philosophy, is dependent on 
“the claim that properly gathered evidence can answer questions about the nature of knowledge 
and experience” (Charles, 2013, p. 141). Given that the basis on which properly gathered 
evidence is assumed is reliant on ones’ assumptions about the nature of knowledge (i.e. 
epistemology), the legitimacy of psychology is dependent on giving due attention to the latter. 
This is why Charles (2013) suggests that the current fragmentation within psychology can only 
be addressed by revisiting the fundamental questions concerning the nature of knowledge and 
experience which originally led to the split from philosophy: 
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It is time to gather together, marshal our hard-won evidence, and see ourselves once 
again in terms of the foundational questions of the field. This requires, as a first step, 
that we understand the current divisions in our field as attempts to answer different 
parts of the same foundational questions. (p. 141)  
As already suggested, serving the dominant epistemology dogmatically and 
uncritically, inevitably leads to the associated assumptions dictating whether or not the 
phenomena are legitimate for study, help frame the subsequent observations made, and shape 
the conclusions drawn. Furthermore, this thesis proposes that in sport psychology, there has 
been a tendency towards an explicit acceptance of object-subject separation, trust in scientific 
orthodoxy, and by association, an implicit distrust of individual insight and wisdom. Or to put 
another way, a belief that the science will allow the subject to speak for itself, rather than trust 
anyone who might speak on its behalf.  
If our science is to be fundamentally shaped by epistemology in this way, then the 
development of psychological science necessitates the complimentary development of a critical 
understanding about what constitutes knowledge itself. Without the latter, developments within 
our science will inevitably correspond with an increasingly acute awareness of the 
shortcomings of the type of science being conducted. Similarly, Sternberg and Grigorenko 
(2001), arguing for a unified psychology, suggest that any paradigm can only offer a partial 
account of the subject under investigation. Unification is dependent on convergent operations22 
(Garner, Hake, & Erikson, 1956) between different approaches to overcome the limitations of 
any given methodology (see Sternberg and Grigorenko, 2001, for a review). In the first part of 
this chapter, I go further, arguing that the scientific legitimacy of psychology, and by extension 
sport psychology, as a separate discipline is also dependent and therefore should be predicated 
on integration and consistency with other branches of science (i.e., conceptual integration; 
Comides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992).  
The contribution that this chapter will make is to reflect on how Jung’s analytical 
psychology, through its union of subject and object, offers one way of reconciling psychology 
with the idea of a human science. In this respect, an underpinning theme to be developed is the 
idea that that psychology as a separate discipline will be defined and judged by its attempt at 
the simultaneous realisation of separation and integration with the idea of science. Separation, 
by  
                                               
22 Defined as “the use of multiple methodologies for studying a single psychological 
phenomenon” (Sternberg and Grigorenko, 2001, p. 1071). 
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(a) Laying scientific claim to a subject matter that offers no clear subject/object 
demarcation, and  
(b) In the form of an indigenous set of methodologies capable of capturing all the 
qualities of psychological related phenomena (Giorgi, 2000).  
And integration,  
(a) With respect to an indigenous philosophy of the psyche consistent with the idea of 
science, and  
(b) In the form of the respective findings serving to unite psychology with other 
sciences, rather than to isolate.  
Whilst the notions of separation and integration provide underpinning themes on which the 
issue of epistemological rationalisation will be explored, a fully developed consideration of 
each of the associated propositions goes beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Based on the principle of unification it is proposed that ideas and approaches, such as 
Jung’s analytical psychology, which offer the possibility of conceptual integration with other 
areas of science (e.g., Haule, 2011) should be afforded a more central role in the development 
of a maturing discipline. However, unification does not just extend to consistency with other 
scientific disciplines (i.e., external integration), but also to the principle of working towards 
reconciling seemingly disparate approaches within psychology (i.e., internal integration), to 
counter the well documented fragmentation. Indeed, it is likely that one cannot happen without 
the other. If the spirit of unification offers a guiding principle, even if its absolute realisation is 
potentially an improbable reality, ideas which offer the possibility of both internal and external 
integration become of primary importance.  
In the second part of this chapter, developments in other areas of psychology will be 
briefly summarised on the basis that they represent an emergent common thread, consistent 
with two ideas fundamental to Jung’s analytical psychology (i.e., 
consciousness~unconsciousness; psyche as a process). It is proposed that these ideas could 
form part of the foundation for the development of an analytical sport psychology which 
embraces a more dynamic view of the psyche. In turn, analytical sport psychology can escape 
the epistemological trap set by objectivist science, and the tendency to represent complex 
psychological processes in the form of static, objective abstractions23. To illustrate this point, 
                                               
23 This point will be further developed in the following chapter which explores the 
implications of Jung’s libido theory with respect to a complex phenomenon within sport: 
momentum.  
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the consequence of the latter approach is briefly considered with respect to current research on 
two phenomena within sport psychology: flow and motivation.  
In summary, in addition to the principle of subject~object reconciliation proposed in 
chapter 1, this chapter outlines the following epistemological criteria on which the 
development of an analytical sport psychology could be based: Separation~integration, 
consciousness~unconsciousness, and, the psyche as a process).  
 
3.2   The question of separation 
The origin of psychology as a separate discipline owes much to the need for individuals 
and institutions to legitimise psychological related phenomena as a valid area for study in their 
own right (Langenhove, 1995). As a result, “psychology has been far more concerned with 
being a science than with courageous and self-determining confrontation of its historically 
constituted subject matter” (Koch, 1961, p. 629). Thus, a truly scientific psychology will have 
to free itself from the conditions on which it originally sought legitimacy as a separate 
discipline, before that legitimacy can be claimed. Only when this occurs will psychology as a 
human science be able to engage in meaningful dialogue with other sciences. This is what 
Giorgi (2000) means by a “better philosophy of the psyche”, one which is not bound by natural 
science or philosophy. 
Schriven (1964) identified three limitations placed on psychology with respect to its 
ability to develop as a separate discipline. Firstly, rather than viewing psychology as relatively 
young field, Schriven argued that the study of human behaviour stretches further than any other 
discipline, and as such will struggle to escape the development of common sense. If psychology 
does have a youth, it is because, unlike the natural sciences, it cannot claim as yet to have its 
own universal laws or theories. Secondly, the territory of psychology cannot be considered 
mutually exclusive of sciences such as biology and genetics, and any complete explanation of 
behaviour is likely to have to yield to such disciplines. And thirdly, as explored in chapter 2, 
not all questions pertinent to psychology can be distilled to a finite and discrete number of 
psychological variables, which in turn leads to the problem of control and prediction (Schriven, 
1964).  
In the face of these limitations, mainstream psychology has traded off systematic 
exploration of epistemology in favour of dogmatic adherence to orthodox science, resulting in 
a vicious circularity between epistemological confusion and attachment to the idea of science 
(Smith, Harré, & Langenhove, 1995). Similarly, Koch (1961) wrote, “…in its search for 
scientific respectability, psychology has erected a widely shared epistemology, and a 
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conceptual language which render virtually impossible the exploration of the content of man 
in a differentiated way” (p. 630). In summarising Koch’s work on the future of psychology, 
Smith et al. (1995) suggested that given the human component of “doing science”, psychology 
is centrally placed to explore the idea of science beyond the Newtonian scientific paradigm. 
As such, by leading upon and establishing a new philosophy of science, psychology has the 
opportunity to not only stake claim to its own separation, but also to be part of the conversation 
about what science is. In turn, psychology as a human science can be integrated with the idea 
of science, rather than merely be led by it.  
For example, since the 1960’s a growing number of psychologists have begun to assert 
the scientific credentials of phenomenology as a tool for acquiring knowledge about the human 
subject (Wertz, 2014). The emergence of Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA; e.g., 
Smith, 1996) acknowledges the central role of both the researcher and subject in the 
appropriation of meaningful psychological data (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). IPA, with 
its foundations in hermeneutics, views reality as being constructed through an interpretivist 
lens whilst at the same time recognising the potential for intersubjectivity – that (i.e., 
experience) which is shared between individuals (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). 
Furthermore, hermeneutics, and by extension IPA, recognises that our shared histories go a 
long way toward shaping our individual experience of the world, thus allowing for the 
possibility of collective meaning. Similarly, Frias & Monfort (2015) wrote: “Given the nature 
of the factors that influence our interpretations of reality, interpretations are not subjective, but 
rather inherited from and largely shaped by the traditions and the context of which we are part” 
(p. 6). Thus, IPA represents a methodology which is theoretically consistent with analytical 
psychology, given the recognition it affords to the interrelation between the objective psyche 
(i.e., the collective unconscious/archetypes), and subjective psyche (i.e., 
consciousness/personal unconscious).  
In contrast, by continuing to be led by so-called science predicated on subject-object 
separation - wherein the researcher’s insight and wisdom is implicitly viewed as a threat – 
psychology, I believe, is potentially denying itself the possibility of becoming one. When 
psychology as a science acknowledges subjectivity and objectivity, yet does not directly 
address the nature of their relationship to one another, the end result is that its scientific status 
exists in an existential state similar to that of “the uncanny”; originally described by Jentsch 
(1906/1997) and elaborated upon by Freud (1919/1999). In characterising Jentsch’s position 
on the uncanny, Freud wrote: “He ascribes the essential factor in the production of feeling of 
uncanniness to intellectual uncertainty; so that the uncanny would always be that which one 
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does not know where one is, as it were” (p. 221). As such the uncanny can be seen to represent 
the no-man’s land between what is familiar and unfamiliar, what is subjective and what is 
objective, and what is science and what is mysticism. Similarly, as outlined in chapter 2, when 
an epistemology prioritises either objectivity or subjectivity, we are confronted with “the 
shiftiness, the instability of the entire subjective/objective polarity” (Varela, Thompson, & 
Rosch, 1991, p. 242).  
 
3.3   The question of integration 
 
The behavioural and social sciences borrowed the idea of hypothesis testing and 
quantitative methodology from the natural sciences, but unfortunately not the idea of 
conceptual integration. (Cosmides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992, p. 4) 
 
At the beginning of the 20th century when Jung began lecturing in psychiatry, the 
discipline of psychology in general was already in a fragmented state (Robinson, 1986). This 
was despite those who initially fought to have psychology recognised as a separate discipline 
at the end of the 19th century conceiving psychology as a unitary endeavour, like that of physics 
and chemistry. The plethora of divergent psychologies that were emerging, resulted in the 
question of the need for unity, or at least some form of common language with which to proceed 
(Shamdasani, 2003). However, this early fragmentation within psychology has left a lasting 
legacy and has resulted in what many view as not one discipline but an umbrella term for 
multiple sub-disciplines (Goodwin, 1999). Whilst it could be argued that increasing 
specialisation represents a healthy maturing science, Jung firmly believed that establishing a 
basis on which psychology could be unified within, and with other sciences was of central 
importance for the attainment of scientific status (Shamdasani, 2003).  
Kuhn (1996) clearly outlines the characteristics of a discipline when it is still maturing. 
For example, in the pre-paradigm stage the accumulation of “facts” occurs with no clear basis 
on which to assess the scientific importance of any given contribution. Such activity does not 
represent science but rather what James (1892) referred to as “the hope of science” (p. 468). 
When a synthesis emerges attracting a critical number of followers, normal science can 
commence: 
Mopping-up operations are what engage most scientists throughout their careers. They 
constitute what I am here calling normal science. Closely examined…that enterprise 
seems an attempt to force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that 
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the paradigm supplies. No part of the aim of normal science is to call forth new sorts of 
phenomena; indeed those that will not fit the box are often not seen at all. (Kuhn, 1996, 
p. 24) 
According to Kuhn (1996) normal science is not interested in genuine discovery and 
will typically dismiss phenomena which cannot be accounted for by the dominant 
epistemology, as not being a legitimate subject for scientific study. Polanyi (1958) referred to 
this aspect of science as destructive analysis, and as he points out, it can serve an important 
function to expose irrational and groundless endeavours. Yet  
to deny the feasibility of something that is alleged to have been done or the possibility 
of an event that is supposed to have been observed, merely because we cannot 
understand in terms of our hitherto accepted framework how it could have been done 
or could have happened, may often result in explaining away quite genuine practices or 
experiences. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 51) 
As these quotes suggest, science runs the risk of overlooking important areas for study if one 
blindly and without question adheres to the pervasive means of doing science (i.e., scientism). 
Furthermore, the explanatory power of any theory is ultimately bound by the limitations in the 
underlying epistemology, as a basis on which to uncover empirical reality. For example, as 
explored in the previous chapter, theory (i.e., catastrophe theory [Fazey & Hardy, 1988]) 
developed on the epistemological assumption that performance in sport can be reduced down 
to a finite number of psychological variables (i.e., epistemological reductionism) is ultimately 
limited by the assumption that reductionism can meaningfully applied to complex sporting 
phenomena (Balague, Torrents, Hristovski, Davids, & Araújo, 2013). By not questioning the 
underlying epistemology, unwarranted longevity is afforded to such theories in the absence of 
a coherent critique. Up until recently, a lack of deeper critical review appeared systemic within 
the discipline of sport psychology and has not been helped by the fact that undergraduate 
textbooks typically offer only cursory consideration of epistemology, if at all. This seems to 
have happened under the, I believe, mistaken assumption that the accumulation of facts rather 
than the critical process, is the primary basis on which to do science. The end result of which 
has been many false starts. 
As well as the need to explore alternative epistemologies, this chapter proposes that an 
additional benchmark of any endeavour resulting from new philosophy of the psyche will be 
the extent to which it offers the possibility of connections with other branches of science. This 
has been referred to as the principle of conceptual integration, which requires all disciplines 
within the human sciences to be mutually consistent, as well as to be consistent with the natural 
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sciences (Comides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992). Although the natural sciences contain many 
seemingly disparate disciplines, this has not resulted in disintegration and incoherence with 
regards to the underpinning laws. On the contrary, these “disciplines are becoming integrated 
into an increasingly seamless system of interconnected knowledge and remain nominally 
separated more out of educational convenience and institutional inertia than because of any 
genuine raptures in the underlying unity of the achieved knowledge” (Tooby & Cosmides, 
1992, p. 19). Furthermore, the objective importance of any theory is also dependent on its 
ability to extend beyond the realm in which it is conceived (Polanyi, 1958). To illustrate this 
point, Polanyi (1958) uses the example of Copernican theory, which not only removed the earth 
from the centre of the universe, but also inspired Kepler’s discoveries on planetary motion and 
Newton’s subsequent work on gravitation. As such, the legitimacy in any scientific discovery 
extends beyond its appeal to objectivity, to include the possibilities it creates for further 
scientific work.  
In contrast, in psychology the issue of fragmentation and lack of unity is an enduring 
concern. Koch (1961) argued that the primary task of psychology to be the basis on which 
science and the humanities are unified. However, writing over 30 years later, Koch questioned 
whether it is possible for psychology to be coherent and integrated, based on developments 
within the discipline to date (Koch, 1993). On this point I subscribe to the view that whilst 
specialisation is necessary to allow for the diversity of interests to be recognised, the associated 
risk of fragmentation needs to be countered by grounds for integration being actively explored. 
The latter should be a defining feature of the maturing discipline, and in itself recognises that 
the purpose of a psychology as a distinct discipline transcends personal interest and specialism.  
Although in themselves, many cornerstones of the scientific method (e.g., subject-
object seperation) would not be compatible, the natural sciences provide important guiding 
principles which do not compromise the development of a robust and authentic scientific 
paradigm for psychology. Judging work based on its potential for conceptual integration and 
the extent to which it scaffolds future discoveries, are two possible hallmarks, and could 
provide part of the basis on which to establish a more suitable epistemology. 
Whether such interconnected knowledge is possible for all the human sciences appears 
to be a distant dream given the inherent personal component of knowledge and knowing 
(Polyani, 1958). This matter is further complicated by the possibility that unlike the natural 
sciences, arguably there is ultimately nothing fundamental to discover (Schriven, 1964), and 
the view that knowledge should be viewed as a process, thus not lending itself to a priori forms 
(Piaget, 1972).  
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Using Polanyi’s idea of tacit knowledge24 as a guide, Martens (1987) suggested that as 
an alternative to orthodox science, a heuristic paradigm should be adopted within sport 
psychology, embracing idiographic approaches and experiential knowledge, and placing the 
scientist at the centre of the process of knowing. Martens (1987) alludes to the need for 
synthesis between research and knowledge but stops short of offering how an idiographic 
approach and the associated methods would allow for a union of subject and object. Writing 
more generally, Langenhove (1995) observed that despite being largely submerged in the 
methods of the natural sciences, psychology in places has not lost connection with the model 
of hermeneutics, which suggests that psychological insight into qualities such as intentionality 
and meaning can be gained from the analysis and interpretation of another person’s written 
word: 
…the natural sciences model is aimed at seeking causality, favours quantitative forms 
of analysis in so-called ‘extensive designs’ that generate universal knowledge, and is 
related to a positivist philosophy of science. The hermeneutic model is aimed at the 
search for meaning, favours qualitative analysis that generate knowledge of particulars, 
and is related to non-positivist philosophies of science. (Langenhove, 1995, p. 15)  
 I do not disagree with the value of learning from others’ experience, focusing on the 
individual, and carefully analysing the meaning of any respective qualitative data. However as 
explored in the previous chapter, I believe that a human science is setting unnecessary and 
unhelpful limits if (a) an epistemological choice is assumed to be necessary, between so-called 
subjective or objective knowledge, and (b) too much emphasis is placed on the importance of 
collecting empirical data at the expense of personal insight. A better philosophy of the psyche 
will require intuition, judgment and insight to play more a central role. Historically, these 
skills are more likely to be associated with philosophers, writers and artists, and as already 
identified the study of the psyche did not start with the formation of psychology as a distinct 
discipline, but dates back to the beginning of human history. Concerning the neglect of history 
in this respect Collingwood (1972) writes: 
To regard [psychology] as rising above the sphere of history, and establishing the 
permanent and unchanging laws of human nature, is therefore possible only to a person 
                                               
24 Tacit knowledge refers to the personal dimension to knowledge and its acquisition. In 
contrast to the doctrine of objectivity, Martens (1987) describes tacit knowledge as our 
subsidiary awareness or intuition, which allows the person to organize and integrate 
information into wholes (i.e., knowledge). 
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who mistakes the transient conditions of a certain historical age for the permanent 
conditions of human life. (p. 224) 
Thus, to avoid becoming merely a legacy of our scientific age and reflecting the current 
cultural epoch, psychology will need to embrace its historically constituted subject matter. 
Psychological questions that are pertinent today often have precedence in centuries of received 
wisdom and ideas. The answers to these questions are likely to be limited as long as we seek 
answers within a pre-existing notion of science and overlook the lessons from history 
(Robinson, 1986). Given Jung’s vision for psychology to be the discipline with which to unite 
all the sciences, Jung sought inspiration and precedent from all areas of human endeavour 
(Shamdasani, 2003). For example, with respect to one of his most well-known contributions, 
the collective unconscious, Jung famously looked for and referred to common elements within 
mythology and comparative religion as evidence of shared pre-dispositions within the psyche 
(Stevens, 1990). As well as looking backwards, there is value in how ideas, psychologically 
based or otherwise, offer the possibility of connections with other branches of science, and thus 
allow for future conceptual integration. Stevens (1990) wrote that for an idea to become 
established, first it has to be conceivable, then topical, and finally effective if it stands the test 
in time. For Jung these shared pre-dispositions were represented in the form of archetypes25 
which find expression irrespective of time and place. Although this scheme in itself does not 
represent a valid criterion for doing science, transcending the conditions of time and place in 
which an idea develops could be one important criterion for judging the fruits of a human 
science (Polyani, 1958). That is, it might allude to some form of objective truth rather than 
solely reflect subjective bias. What will be explored in the following section is how some of 
Jung’s personal insights are now clearly evident in recent developments in psychology and 
cognitive science.  
 
3.4   Unconsciousness~consciousness 
 
Freud’s original idea of the unconscious was that it was a sort of receptacle or 
storehouse for repressed material, infantile wishes, and the like. But the unconscious is 
far more than that: it is the basis and precondition of all consciousness. (Jung, 1966b, 
p. 34) 
                                               
25 “It seems to me that their origin can only be explained by assuming them to be deposits of 
the constantly repeated experiences of humanity” (Jung, 1966a, p.69). 
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…a philosophical opponent of the unconscious makes the very illuminating remark: 
“Once this be admitted, one finds oneself at the mercy of all manner of hypotheses 
concerning unconscious life, hypothesis which cannot be controlled by observation.” It 
is evident that this thinker is not out to recognise the facts, but that for him the fear of 
running into difficulties is decisive. (Jung, 1960, p.163-164) 
 
The idea that we misattribute conscious thought as the primary cause of decision-
making, and by association behaviour, has received considerable support in the psychology 
literature (see Wegner & Wheatley, 1999, for a review). In a challenge to Humean causality, 
Wegner and Wheatley (1999) conclude that “the real causal mechanisms underlying behavior 
are never present in consciousness. Rather, the engines of causation are unconscious 
mechanisms of mind. Much of the recent research suggesting a fundamental role for automatic 
processes in everyday behavior” (p. 490). Furthermore, the question of causation is further 
complicated by the fact that research since the 1940’s has demonstrated that from soon after 
birth, onwards, in order to produce mental schemas, we have a tendency to seek and assume 
linear causal associations based on limited evidence (Kahneman, 2011). 
The unconscious was famously introduced into psychology by the psychoanalytic 
movement, but the idea that the unconscious functions as a complimentary counterpoint to 
consciousness is a central tenet of Jung’s analytical psychology and presents an important point 
of departure from the work of Freud. Although the unconscious itself is increasingly been 
recognised by psychologists as playing a central role in cognitive processes (e.g., Hassin, 
Uleman, & Bargh, 2005; Kihlstrom, 1987; Western, 1998), the relationship between conscious 
and unconscious processes as a basis for thought and behaviour has been neglected until only 
recently (Baumeister & Bargh, 2014). The primacy of the unconscious, or non-conscious 
systems, in this relationship is now being increasingly recognised. Indeed, in a recent review, 
Oakley and Halligan (2017) concluded: 
The proper focus for both research and theory going forward is those neuro-
psychological processes that underlie the personal narrative, which represents a 
continuously updated, self-related, meaningful, and selective account of on-going 
activity created by and within non-conscious systems. (p.13) 
Despite this recent growth in interest, a review of the literature for this chapter suggests 
that psychoanalytic ideas, and in particular those developed by Jung, are rarely cited in articles 
concerning conscious and unconscious processes. It seems, historically speaking at least, 
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psychodynamic thought has not been seen to be compatible with the “cognitive revolution”. 
Reflecting a similar theme, Robins, Craik and Gosling (1994) reported that in the four leading 
general psychology journals, on average psychoanalytic articles were cited a mere 0.015 times 
per year (see Robins & Craik, 1994); which led the authors to conclude in 1999 that 
“psychoanalytic research has been virtually ignored by mainstream scientific psychology over 
the past several decades” (Robins, Gosling, and Craik, 1999, p. 117) . Rather than being merely 
marginalised however, Bornstein (2005) suggests that psychoanalytic ideas have not gone 
away, having been unwittingly adopted and reframed to suit the sensibilities of cognitive 
psychology. An example of which is unconscious memory, now referred to as implicit memory 
(Schacter, 1987). 
In the past 30 years there has been a clear repackaging of the unconscious in the 
language of cognitive science, and more recently a convergence of opinion suggesting that 
conscious and unconscious processes both play a role in cognitive functioning (e.g., Bargh, 
2011; Cleeremans, 2014; Dijksterhuis, & Aarts, 2010)26. What follows are 5 examples of 
different work, all concerned with the dynamic interplay between conscious and unconscious 
processes in psychological functioning; much of which has clear resonance with Jung’s own 
theorising. Whilst not exhaustive, the examples demonstrate the potential importance of 
understanding this relationship for different domains within psychology, including sport 
psychology. 
Neuroscientist David Eagleman has outlined the idea of a “dual process brain” 
described by psychologists: 
In this view, the brain contains two separate systems: one is fast, automatic, and below 
the surface of conscious awareness, while the other is slow, cognitive, and conscious. 
The first system can be labeled automatic, implicit, heuristic, intuitive, holistic, 
reactive, and impulsive, while the second system is cognitive, systematic, explicit, 
analytic, rule based, and reflective. These two processes are always battling it out. 
(Eagleman, 2011, p. 109)  
Eagleman’s view is based on extensive experimental work on neurological activity associated 
with cognitive functioning, and which represents a collaboration “with thousands of scientists 
and historians over the course of centuries” (2011, p. 228). Interestingly, rather than viewing 
the brain as a system of parts acting in coordinated flow; Eagleman views brain activity based 
                                               
26 See Masters (2012) for a literature review of the role of conscious and unconscious 
processes, and their hypothesised impact on learning and performance. 
     62  
on conflict between completing agents, “a team of rivals” (2011, p.109), inevitably leading to 
variability or oscillations in an attempt to satisfy our multiple selves. Indeed, the notion of 
oscillation, or a coordinated biological rhythm, is recognised as an important unifying principle 
for different disciplines interested in the study of complexity and represents a key defining 
feature of a complex system (Stogatz, 2003).  
Similarly, the eminent psychologist Daniel Kahneman (2011) has given a detailed 
exposition on the idea of an unconscious27 system 1 ( which “operates automatically and 
quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control” [p. 20]) and conscious system 
2 (which “allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it” [p. 21]) building 
upon years of work by the author and his collaborators. Both system 1 and 2 serve a purpose 
in tasks requiring quick intuitive judgments or more deliberate attention respectively. Yet 
rather than always function in harmony with one another, conflict between the two is a defining 
feature, given that one is the negation of the other (Kahneman, 2011).  
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) introduced Unconscious Thought Theory which 
“proposes that there are two modes of thought, conscious and unconscious” (My italics; 
Nordgren et al., 2011, p. 509), able to influence judgment and the decision-making process. 
According to the theory, conscious thoughts are more likely to be rule based, suitable for logical 
decision making (Nordgren & Dijksterhuis, 2009), and unconscious thoughts are considered 
effective in organising different sources of information (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). 
Research into the effect of attentional focus on motor performance has consistently 
shown that an external focus of attention is superior to an internal focus of attention (Kal, 
Kamp, & Houdijk, 2013; Marchant, 2008) as predicted by the constrained action hypothesis 
(Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001). The hypothesis suggests that this is due to an external focus 
reducing the conscious control over movement control processes, thus allowing for increased 
automated and reflexive control. Thus, efficient motor performance is said to be dependent on 
unconscious processes overriding conscious control.  
Similarly, peak experiences in sport, as described by flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002), are 
associated with automatic functioning and less conscious control over movement (Hayslip, 
Petrie, MacIntire, & Jones, 2010). Interestingly, although flow states are associated with 
increased automation, this does not mean an absence of conscious processes altogether. Rather, 
the nine dimensions of flow, including complete focus/concentration of the task and sense of 
control (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002), suggest that conscious and unconscious processes cooperate 
                                               
27 My word; Kahneman (2011) avoids using this term. 
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in facilitating peak performance states. Blackmore (2003) has taken this proposition a step 
further in suggesting that flow should be considered “as a state in which the distinctions 
between conscious and unconscious processing disappear” (p. 284).    
Taken together, these developments represent an increasing acknowledgement within 
mainstream psychology concerning the important role of the unconscious. Albeit with a 
reliance on abstract generalisation (or objective representations) for its elucidation, the 
prioritising of adherence to paradigm over adherence to nature (i.e., subject), and the 
assumption of causal relations. Or, to put another way, configuring our understanding of 
conscious and unconscious in an “attempt to force nature into the preformed and relatively 
inflexible box that the paradigm supplies” (Kuhn, 1996, p.24).  
The repackaging of the unconscious for cognitivist sensibilities in this way exposes the 
tension (and subsequent trade off) between the desire for scientific objectivity and the 
possibility of capturing dynamic and complex psychological phenomena. For example, in 
response to a warning by Bem (1972) that recognising unconscious processes within 
psychology risks an epistemological abyss, Bargh observed that this view, when originally 
written, reflected the fact that there were no “objective methods to study unconscious 
influences” (2011, p. 635). Interestingly, both positions, I think, are scientifically flawed for a 
similar reason. The former assumes that restricting the subject matter to ensure scientific 
respectability should be prioritised over lived experience and empirical reality. Specifically, 
this position assumes that even if one accepts the existence of the unconscious, it cannot be 
accepted as a legitimate subject for study because it cannot be accounted for by the chosen 
epistemology. This position is flawed, because the basis for progress and discovery are 
inevitably bound by the diktats of normal science, as opposed to discovery resulting from 
challenges to the paradigm (Kuhn, 1996). Similarly, the latter argument is flawed because it 
implicitly assumes that objective accountability is the only epistemological basis on which to 
accrue scientific knowledge. At least when the unconscious was generally overlooked by 
cognitive psychology it was due to a recognition that it didn’t readily lend itself to objective 
study. 
 The doctrine of objectivity becomes further problematic by the fact that, since the 
Cartesian separation of mind and body, there has been ongoing speculation and uncertainty to 
this day about what consciousness is (Dennett, 1993; Masters, 2012). If a science struggles to 
define its subject, it will struggle to integrate the subsequent fruits produced by normal 
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science28, with fragmentation an inevitable consequence due to differences in interpretation. 
Furthermore, as chapter 2 considered, the potency of discovery associated with so-called 
objective generalisations is also curtailed by their surface, descriptive nature (i.e., abstract 
generalisation, Powers, 1973). Descriptions which  
begin with observations of the visible symptoms of an inner organization and progress 
outward from the organism and upward into verbal abstraction, going farther and 
farther from the source of the symptoms and having less and less to say about any one 
instance of behavior. They represent, in my opinion, at best a temporary measure for 
improving predictions when en masse predictions are needed, and at worst a mechanism 
for creating the illusion of understanding. (Powers, 1973, p. 14) 
A warning which resonates with the observation made by Varela et al. (1991), that when we 
overlook the role of experience, in favour of an insistence of subject/object separation, we are 
left with “the scientific study of ourselves without a subject matter” (p. 13). As a result, as 
outlined in chapter 2, this form of theory building represents a self-serving surface description 
of the phenomena, at the expense of meaningful explanation and mechanism (Powers, 1973)29. 
This view has more recently been acknowledged by Swann et al. (2012) concerning the study 
of flow. Recognising that literature to date has focused on descriptive correlates of flow, Swann 
et al. (2012) suggest that “for knowledge to progress…research should move from such 
description to explaining flow, and explicitly searching for its underlying causal mechanisms” 
(p. 818; also see Kimiecik & Stein, 1992).  
Humean positivist science, assumes causality based on the regularity of relations 
between events. However, Sayer (1992) argues that the social sciences have an unsuccessful 
record at establishing regular, lawful relations, and instead advocates a realist philosophy 
which seeks to establish the qualitative nature of causal processes, as well as acknowledging 
irregularity. Furthermore “critical realism”, as this position is generally known, maintains the 
view that reality exists independently of the perceiver (i.e., ontological realism), but rejects the 
possibility of any form of objective representation resulting from method (i.e., epistemological 
relativism; Maxwell, 2012).  
Albeit at the expense of the maintaining subject and object separation, critical realism 
therefore provides one basis on which to acknowledge both the subjective and objective quality 
to lived experience and has been used to justify a “mixed-methods” approach to research. 
                                               
28 I am indebted to my director of studies for this observation. 
29 This argument will be developed further in chapter 5. 
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Specifically, experimental methods provide the opportunity to establish the existence of causal 
relationships in the form of a casual description, whilst non-experimental/qualitative methods 
provide the opportunity to clarify the causal explanation (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002). 
In this view, qualitative research is therefore assumed to provide the basis on which any 
mechanism associated with a causal process can be elucidated. For example, in response to 
Swann et al.’s (2012) call to focus on explaining flow, Swann et al. (2015) aimed to explore 
how factors, assumed to facilitate flow states, influence the occurrence of flow in elite golfers. 
Based on a realist ontology, and using a thematic and “connecting analysis” methodology (see 
Maxwell, 2012), the study identified six “facilitators” (Psychological skills; the caddie; 
effective practice and preparation; high quality performance; optimal environmental and 
situational conditions; commitment), with the caddie, and effective preparation and practice 
reported by participants as having the highest number of connections to the characteristics 
associated with the experience of flow. In order to consider the possible mechanisms 
underlying these connections the authors drew upon the narrative accounts of the players, and 
existing literature into flow. For example, reporting on the connection between the caddie and 
high confidence, Swann et al. (2015) wrote: 
The caddie was helpful for maintaining the player’s confidence throughout the 
performance which, again, could facilitate flow states. This was especially relevant 
after setbacks: “You hit a wayward shot, or you just 3 putted…that’s where a caddie 
helps you…he tries to keep your confidence levels up and he’s like “next hole, next 
hole is fine”” (Player 2). Lavallee, Bruce, and Gorely (2004) reported that the role of 
the caddie included building and maintenance of the player’s short-term confidence, 
and in this way, caddies seem to be important for maintaining and maximising flow 
states. (p.64) 
Although, as the quote suggests, the caddie was viewed as an important source of confidence 
for the player, and therefore a potential facilitator of flow, it is not made clear what mechanism 
allows this to happen, beyond the hypothesised relationship between confidence and flow. The 
example provided identifies one contextual scenario in which the caddie might influence a 
player’s confidence, but the mechanism is not clearly evident, and it is not made clear how any 
such mechanism might facilitate flow. Even if one was to assume that the example provided 
did allude to a mechanism, it would be at the expense of contextual regress. Specifically, 
speculating on the link between facilitators of flow, characteristics of flow and the existence 
flow states inevitably risks an informal fallacy, because the hypothesised causal relationships 
is predicated on the assumption that the premises (i.e., [1] the caddie can help improve 
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confidence, [2] confidence helps facilitate flow states) will support the conclusion (i.e., 
therefore the caddie can help facilitate flow states). Because the premises in this instance are 
not necessarily true in all cases, one’s ability to extrapolate (in the form of a more general 
mechanism) beyond the individual and context in which the premises is found to be true, 
becomes inherently problematic. For example, in a similar study, Jackson (1992) was interested 
in the antecedent factors associated with flow states experienced by elite figure skaters. Of the 
five “factors perceived as most important for getting into flow” (p. 170) identified by the study, 
only “physical readiness” could be viewed as nominally equivalent to a “facilitator” identified 
by Swann et al. (2015; i.e., effective practice and preparation). This is perhaps not surprising 
given the inherent differences between golf and figure skating, and in turn reveals the challenge 
of identifying what Swann et al. (2015) refer to as “consistent connections which underlie flow 
occurrences across settings” (p. 66). Thus, it would appear that attempting to extrapolate, or 
find “consistent connections”, based on pre-defined abstract generalisations is likely to fail, not 
least due to the role of contextual variables. If contextual variables provide the “rock”, the 
“hard place” could be the suggestion that in instances where stable connections are assumed 
between two events (i.e., confidence is positively associated with positive affect [Vealey & 
Chase, 2008]30), such normative propositions are typically little more than common sense 
truths, and so do not require empirical testing for their discovery and elucidation (Smedslund, 
1991). 
 Another example of the tension between description and explanation, is provided by a 
recent series of qualitative studies into motivation in sport by Keegan and colleagues (Keegan, 
Harwood, Spray, & Lavallee, 2009; Keegan, Harwood, Spray, & Lavallee, 2010, Keegan, 
Spray, Harwood, & Lavallee, 2010; Keegan, Harwood, Spray, & Lavallee, 2014). In a critique 
of the considerable body of quantitative research into the motivational climate in sport, Keegan 
et al. (2014) observed that the reliance on questionnaires has exposed (a) between–stakeholder 
variation in the perception of the motivational climate; (b) the reliance on “generalised and 
abstract perceptions, separated from the reality of what social agents actually do to influence 
athlete motivation” (p. 98); and (c) the difficulty in comparison between different motivation 
questionnaires due to issues with standardisation. In recognising that the motivational climate 
in sport presents itself as a complex phenomenon, Keegan and colleagues have pursued a 
program of qualitative research to identify what they call the “raw ingredients”. The results are 
highly detailed descriptions of the sources and themes associated with the motivational climate, 
                                               
30 The confidence-performance relationship will be considered further in chapter 6. 
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reflecting the multi-faceted nature of the construct. However, in response to the 28 interviews 
conducted with elite athletes regarding how coaches, parents and peers are perceived to 
influence their motivation, Keegan et al. (2014) concluded that  
…there was no discernable one-to-one correspondence between specific behaviours 
and their impact on motivation. Instead, the findings suggest complex contextual 
interactions between the immediate behaviours of social agents and the impact on 
athlete’s motivation. If supported, this finding would necessitate new and novel 
approaches in future research in order to facilitate a more advanced understanding of 
athlete motivation in elite sport. (p. 97; my italics) 
As proposed in this thesis, our understanding of psychological phenomenon such as 
flow and motivation will be fundamentally hindered, as long as a reductive epistemology with 
no reconciliation of subject and object is adopted. As long as there is a disconnect between the 
two, it should be of no surprise that the outcomes of scientific research (i.e., the object) are 
simply incapable of adequately representing its subject matter. In other words, deriving 
knowledge through abstract generalisation resulting in “detached, action-independent, highly 
detailed, [and] static” (Clark, 1997, p. 472) outcomes, is not capable of capturing the essence 
of such complex and dynamic phenomenon, let alone any underlying mechanism(s). If 
knowledge is based on its ability to represent a complex process, and as such cannot be 
adequately theorised in the form of static generalisations, the epistemological basis on which 
such complexity is captured is of primary scientific concern.  
Jung was acutely aware that viewing psychological processes through the lens of 
positivist science was in itself an act of destruction. Specifically, Jung recognised that if the 
subject of psychology represents a separate, indigenous domain to the natural sciences, a 
different means of scientific understanding is required: 
[T]he human psyche is neither a psychiatric nor a physiological problem; it is not a 
biological problem at all but - precisely – a psychological one. It is a field on its own 
with its own particular laws. Its nature cannot be deduced from the principles of the 
other sciences without doing violence to the idiosyncrasy of the psyche…The 
phenomenology of the psyche contains more than the measurable facts of the natural 
sciences: it embraces the problem of mind, the father of all science. (Jung, 1966b, p. 
17) 
Therefore, rather than concede to natural science epistemology, psychology’s defining project 
is to address two fundamentally related projects, namely the nature of human experience and 
the nature of knowledge (Charles, 2013). Rather than scientific dogma placing limits on what 
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is possible to study, and permitting the continued destructive analysis of psychological 
phenomenon, the task is to develop our understanding about what science can become in order 
to allow for human nature to speak for itself. When the failure reflects the assumptions being 
made (e.g., linear casuality, a-temporality), the solution cannot be found through more of the 
same or continual refinement of method, but engagement with the foundations on which 
science is assumed (i.e., ontology and epistemology). This requires a radical re-imagining of 
what science is, and what there is to study. 
 
3.5   Jung’s psyche as process 
Although it is unlikely that any one approach alone is capable of addressing the 
epistemological challenges associated with a human science, analytical psychology, provides 
one new and novel basis for sport psychology to reconcile the development of psychological 
theory with lived experience, and epistemology. In turn it is proposed that, Jung’s wholistic, 
teleological conception of the psyche could make a more prominent contribution to our 
understanding of established phenomena associated with sport psychology, as well as stimulate 
future discovery.  
Echoing William James’s observations on the ephemeral nature of the mind, Jung 
conceived of the unconscious and consciousness (i.e., psyche), as a dynamic process (Jung, 
1995), which therefore cannot be represented as a static entity (Haule, 2011). As such, 
consciousness and unconsciousness primarily represent a teleological rather than deterministic 
system, which does not allow for discovery via reduction and abstract generalisation. The 
mechanism that Jung based the process of the psyche upon was that of individuation, which 
provides the “theoretical background against which all psychic phenomena are interpreted” 
(Haule, 2011, p. 83). Namely the inherent tendency of the psyche towards integration of 
opposing yet complimentary sides of self (i.e., unconsciousness~consciousness) as a means 
towards wholeness. The individuation process is countered by a psychic tendency towards 
equilibrium (see chapter 2) – one is both being and becoming. Whilst notions of individuation 
and wholeness might be jarring for psychologists who favour the scientific method, the 
principle that the psyche represents a purposeful and emergent process has found a voice in 
several areas of psychology and related disciplines: 
•   Maslow (1968) thesis on the psychology of being and becoming assumes a priori the 
tendency towards growth as a counterpoint to homeostatic self-regulation. In his early 
work on motivation, Maslow (1943) adopted the term self-actualisation from 
organismic theory (Goldstein, 1939) to capture the tendency or desire “to become more 
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and more what one idiosyncratically is, to become everything that one is capable of 
becoming” (Maslow, 1954, p. 46). The organismic viewpoint, which regards the person 
as an organised whole, has been applied in a number of human sciences, including 
biology. Regarding the development of personality, the organismic approach stresses 
the defining role of consistency and the tendency towards integration (Roeckelein, 
2006). 
•   Similarly, the eminent biologist Steven Rose argues that organisms exist in a 
continuous state of being and becoming. Rose (1997) observes that all complex 
organisms are purposeful and “active players in their own fate” (p. 17), rather than 
purely homeostatic systems. As such, Rose (1997) proposes the term homeodynamics 
to represent the dynamic interplay between self-regulation and change. 
We need…to be concerned with process, with the paradox of development by 
which any organism has simultaneously to be and become…and with the 
continuous interchange between organisms and their environments. (p. 18) 
Regarding the dynamic nature of the organism, Rose later asks “Why this ceaseless 
flux? Why not build bodies like houses: constructed once, altered, maintained and 
repaired as necessary, but basically unchanging until finally demolished?” (p. 158). The 
answer, according to Rose, is that the ability to adapt to external variation paradoxically 
allows the organism to maintain its integrity, and is therefore fundamental to its survival 
(Rose, 1997).  
•   Evolutionary psychology, founded as an attempt to make psychology compatible with 
the natural sciences based on the shared connection to evolution (Haule, 2011), also 
implicitly acknowledges our existential requirement for being and becoming. 
Predicated on the synthesis of evolutionary biology and our understanding of the 
architecture of the mind, evolutionary psychology posits that (a) universality in human 
nature primarily extends to evolved psychological mechanisms; (b) such mechanisms 
are viewed as adaptations which bestow evolutionary advantage; and (c) the evolved 
architecture of the mind is a product of the pre-historic hunter-gather world (Cosmides, 
Tooby, & Barkow, 1992).31  
                                               
31 See Haule (2011) for an excellent review of how Jung’s conception of the psyche is 
compatible with many recent developments within the natural sciences and the theory of 
evolution. 
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•   Self-determination theory (SDT; Deci, & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000) has attracted 
a significant following from researchers interested in the study of motivation in sport 
and exercise environments (Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2007). Albeit framed in the 
language of humanistic psychology and empirical science, SDT has striking similarities 
with Jung’s notion of the individuation process: 
SDT is an approach to human motivation and personality that uses traditional 
empirical methods while employing an organismic metatheory that highlights 
the importance of humans evolved inner resources for personality 
development…Thus, its arena is the investigation of people’s inherent growth 
tendencies and innate psychological needs that are the basis for their self-
motivation and personality integration. (Ryan & Deci, 2000, p. 68)  
As such, SDT is an attempt to reconcile humanistic and psychodynamic theories, with 
behavioural and cognitive approaches to psychology (Ryan & Deci, 2002). A 
combination which appears to represent a zeitgeist for our current theoretical 
understanding of motivation in sport.  
•   Sport psychology’s interest in performance is concerned with understanding both actual 
performance (e.g., why an athlete performed poorly) and potential performance (e.g., what 
can be done to allow an athlete to fulfill their potential). Rather than actual and potential 
performance representing separate notions, Culbertson (2005) suggests that an athlete 
represents both actuality and potentiality; or, using the terminology appropriated from 
Sartre: facticity and transcendence. The totality of an athlete requires an understanding of 
their being (i.e., facticity) and what they are capable of (i.e., transcendence); and, more 
importantly, their interdependence (i.e., facticity~transcendence).  
In addition to the assumption of the innate tendency towards growth, the notion of the 
wholeness has found a clear voice in the sport psychology literature. Specifically, the idea that 
performance is not merely a function of the athlete, but also the whole person. On the one hand, 
it has been shown that for managing multiple roles (i.e., mother, husband, student etc.) presents 
significant challenges for athletes (e.g., Gledhill & Harwood, 2015; O’Neil, Allen, & Calder, 
2013). On the other hand, many sport psychologists have suggested that a close relationship 
exists between athletes sporting and non-sporting domains. In charting sport psychology’s 
historical focus on developing “performance excellence”, Miller & Kerr (2002) identified a 
philosophical shift in the 1990’s towards acknowledging the personal dimension associated 
which athletic endeavours. Miller and Kerr (2002) suggested that sport psychology needs to 
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adopt a philosophy wherein “sport itself is conceptualized as an experience where personal 
excellence occurs alongside performance excellence” (p. 145). The importance of nurturing a 
“dual career” (i.e., an athletic career together with non-sporting activity, such as education and 
personal relationships) have received recent support. For example, based on semi-structured 
interviews with retired elite athletes from a range of sports, Debois, Ledon, and Wylleman 
(2015) explored the effect of non-sporting developmental domains on athletic development 
through the lifespan. Athletes reported close reciprocal links between their sporting and non-
sporting domain (both facilitative and constraining) throughout the lifespan of an athletic 
career. All athletes where picked for the study based on having a long and successful sporting 
career, with the researchers concluding that the associated good and bad periods were 
“indivisible from other concurrent domains of life development” (Debois et al., 2015, p. 15)32. 
It is perhaps not surprising therefore that a number of sport psychologists report the value of 
adopting a “holistic” approach to consultancy, recognising the reciprocal links between 
sporting performance and non-sporting domains (e.g., Andersen, 2009; Bond, 2002; Gardner 
& Moore, 2006; Nesti, 2004; Friesen & Orlick, 2010; Miller & Kerr, 2002; Ravizza, 2002; Tod 
& Bond, 2010). 
Furthermore, if the performance is viewed as a subset and function of the whole person, 
all that constitutes the latter is of primary concern for a more complete understanding of 
performance itself. As well as mapping the potential contextual factors that mediate between 
the person and the performance, there is an evident need to explore psychologies which offer 
a potential basis on which the intrapersonal level and sporting performance are related to one 
another33. It is one thing to say that there is a relationship between performance and the person. 
It is a wholly different task to outline the psychological basis on which the two are inseparable. 
The latter requires the prioritisation of a more complete understanding of the psyche itself, one 
which seeks to recognise its totality (i.e., conscious and unconscious processes), in order to 
offer the possibility of identifying more general mechanisms underlying the person-
performance relationship. Furthermore, if the function of performance represents something 
greater than the needs of the athlete (i.e., the needs of the person in the form of the individuation 
                                               
32 Similar findings have also been reported in a study by Tekavc, Wylleman, and Erpič 
(2015) concerning elite swimmers and basketball players.   
33 A Jungian account of the relationship between the intrapersonal level and sporting 
performance will be considered in chapters 4 and 8.  
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process), then performance itself has to be viewed as part of a wider process occurring within 
the psyche, not solely bound and serving the demands of the sport. 
As such, I believe that in addition to an unhelpful reliance on the epistemology and 
methods of the natural sciences, a general neglect of depth psychologies, which includes Jung’s 
analytical psychology, in the development of theory in sport psychology has resulted in a clear 
deficit in our understanding of the intrapersonal dimension of performance. Ironically, as long 
as we continue to adopt the epistemological principles of nomothetic (normal) science, we are 
likely to be continually confronted with increasingly ideographic contextual outcomes. The 
subject (i.e., psyche) will not conform to the preformed and relatively inflexible box, as long 
as the totality of the psyche (i.e., Unconsciousness~consciousness) conceived as a process does 
not form the basis for our discoveries. Thus, what is proposed is that the development of an 
analytical sport psychology presents one basis on which to explore the underpinning basis for 
the dialectical relationship between personal excellence and performance excellence.  
 
3.6   Conclusions 
In addition to the idea of subject~object complementarity introduced in the previous 
chapter, the first part of this chapter explored another epistemological basis for an analytical 
sport psychology. Namely, the proposition that an analytical sport psychology ought to be 
guided by the complimentary principles of separation, from scientific orthodoxy (i.e., 
positivism), and integration, with the idea of science (e.g., conceptual integration). In light of 
this, the second half of this chapter identified emergent threads within psychology and 
associated disciplines which are consistent with two theoretical contributions made by 
analytical psychology: (1) A dynamic psyche regulated by the complementarity of opposites 
(i.e., consciousness~unconsciousness), and (2) the view that the psyche operates as a process 
(i.e., being~becoming), and so cannot meaningfully be accounted for based on static objective 
representations. Furthermore, limitations associated with attempting to capture psychological 
processes in sport based on the latter (i.e., abstract generalisations) were briefly considered 
with respect to two phenomena within sport: flow and motivation.  
With respect to sport psychology, this position would suggest that an understanding of 
the psychological basis for performance necessitates a fuller understanding of psychic 
functioning itself. Performance is viewed as representing part of a bigger psychological 
process, rather than merely an end in itself. Whilst the notion that other aspects of an athlete’s 
life will have an impact on performance is already recognised in the literature (i.e., dual career), 
the theoretical implications of this position have yet to be fully realised. Specifically, because 
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if performance is viewed, in part, as a function of the person, then an understanding of 
performance necessitates an understanding of the nature of the intra-psychic world. What is 
being proposed is that an analytical sport psychology offers one additional basis on which to 
explore the intra-psychic world, and by extension the relationship between person and athlete 
based on a more dynamic conceptualisation of the psyche. 
In the previous chapter it was proposed that the development of a mature psychology, 
and by extension sport psychology, necessitates a more active rationalisation of lived 
experience and epistemology, subject and object. By acknowledging the unique position of the 
psyche as both the object and subject of study (Jung, 1969b), Jung knew that its path towards 
becoming a science was not clear-cut, Yet, rather than shirk the unique challenge associated 
with psychology’s subject matter, Jung’s psychology embraced it; and in doing so questioned 
scientific orthodoxy rather than being led by it. 
Recognising whether or not the inner dynamic structure of the psyche can be captured 
scientifically, perhaps goes to the heart of the argument concerning the legitimacy of analytical 
psychology as one basis on which to construct scientific knowledge. To concede that the 
psyche represents a holistic, complex and dynamic process is, in itself, to suggest that change 
is the only constant. Should we concede that such subject matter does not lend itself readily to 
orthodox scientific analysis and therefore give up on the hope of a science? Or should we stay 
faithful to what the subject is and challenge our science to find the most appropriate 
epistemological basis for its representation?  
As a behavioural scientist, Jones (2013) echoes the doubts Jung had regarding the 
seemingly non-scientific basis on which his analytical psychology was developed and suggests 
that his legacy be best judged based on the applicability rather than its scientific credentials. I 
agree with the central importance of applicability and conceptual integration but disagree with 
the implication that the idea of science, which emphasises subject/object separation, isolation, 
control and prediction, is the gold if not defining standard for doing human science. I recognise 
the apparent contradiction between Jung’s search for the organisation of the psyche, and his 
understanding that “this inner structure is in constant flux like the proverbial river” (Jones, 
2013, p. 412). However, I concur with Smith et al. (1995) that the notion of science, within the 
human sciences, cannot be based on “the limited and static premises of a Newtonian scientific 
paradigm” (p.2). For a truly human science, the conversation between subject and method 
would require the latter to recognise all aspects of the phenemona (Giorgi, 2000); including the 
role of the unconscious and the psyche as a process rather than a static entity. The alternative 
is the veneer of science which masks a continued destructive analysis of the subject.   
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Through my lived experience, I subscribe to the view of the psyche as a system engaged 
in a continual process of dynamic self-organisation34 and emergent, adaptive change – being 
and becoming - which in turn can manifest itself in a multitude of ways. In the work of Jung, I 
have found a voice for this view, and in his approach I recognise what I consider to be an 
authentic attempt at representing the psyche for what it is, rather than be restricted to what 
scientific orthodoxy allows us to see.  
Clearly, scientific consensus cannot be predicated solely on individual judgment and 
insight of one or a few people. The question therefore becomes, on what basis should such a 
consensus be arrived upon? If it is accountability and faith in the methods, then one has to ask, 
to what are the methods accountable? As proposed in the previous chapter, accountability 
should extend to the subject - the extent to which the methods are capable of capturing its true 
nature – and not just to the hope of a science. As proposed in this chapter, such scientific 
accountability should in part be tied to the extent to which individual judgment and insight is 
consistent with future work, and in turn promotes conceptual integration (Polanyi, 1958). 
Underpinning this new approach is idea that the development of legitimate knowledge 
within sport psychology cannot be restricted to serving the dominant epistemology, with its 
tendency for subject and object separation, and the conflation of derivative developments with 
discovery. Instead, analytical sport psychology necessitates knowledge to be based on a 
commitment to a critical ongoing rationalisation of theory with epistemology and lived 
experience. An increased appreciation of epistemology, in order to improve the quality of 
methodological and theoretical developments within the sport sciences is not a new idea (e.g., 
Mcfee, 2010). What is being proposed in this thesis is that the development of robust 
psychological science requires a dialogue with epistemology to be placed at its heart. From this 
perspective, so-called discovery is not an end in itself but just another step in this process.  
Viewing performance as only one part of an ongoing psychological process (i.e., 
being~becoming; individuation) suggests that constructs such as flow, anxiety, confidence, and 
motivation, cannot be meaningfully understood in isolation, and represented as static 
cognitivist states. Rather, their elucidation is dependent on situating such constructs in relation 
to the superordinate processes to which they belong. In addition to the brief consideration of 
current work into motivation and flow in this chapter, the remaining chapters will begin to 
                                               
34 This notion will be explored further in chapter 6 (‘The psychology of performance 
variation in sport: correction theory’). 
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explore in more depth the implications of the epistemological and theoretical position outlined 
in chapters 2 and 3 with respect to the development of an analytical sport psychology,   
In order to demonstrate how Jung’s dynamic view of the psyche offers an original 
perspective on established psychological phenomena, the next chapter will examine the 
implications of libido theory (Jung, 1960) with respect to momentum, a poorly understood 
phenomenon in sport (Crust & Nesti, 2006). The chapter will begin by considering how 
limitations in the theoretical accounts of this phenomenon are primarily a function of the 
underpinning epistemological assumptions made (e.g., linear causality), which fail to capture 
the nature of a dynamic and complex phenomenon. In contrast, the Jungian account of 
momentum in sport outlined is based on the epistemological criteria outlined in these first two 
chapters (i.e., subject~object, consciousness~unconsciousness, psyche as a process). Whilst a 
number of different phenomena currently being discussed in the sport psychology literature 
would be suitable for such consideration, momentum was chosen primarily because it offers a 
clear example of how the development of theory is a function of, and limited by, the 























The psychology of momentum in sports: A Jungian analysis 
 
The way up and the way down are one and the same. (Heraclitus) 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 Despite Martens (1987) call to look beyond the dominance of positivism within sport 
psychology, Whaley and Krane (2011) argue that the field has since moved little in this respect. 
In part, this could be due to the observation that Martens call was largely interpreted by the 
sport psychology community as a methodological, rather than epistemological challenge 
(Dewar and Horn, 1992). Dewar and Horn (1992) suggested that alternative epistemologies 
were needed to counter what has more recently been referred to by Stelter (2005) as a “a 
theoretical and methodological monoculture, which is still too dominant in our field” (p. 15).  
Given the privileged position afforded to positivism and post-positivism within sport 
psychology as the gold standard for doing science (Whaley and Krane, 2011), the reliance on 
quantifying subjective cognitive processes creates “a false dichotomy between quantitative and 
qualitative approaches in psychological research” (Brustrad, 2008, p. 35). False, because any 
understanding of so-called objective quantitative data, ultimately relies on subjective 
interpretation (Brustrad, 2008), and the observation that “humans are both the objects and the 
subjects of inquiry” (Nesti, 2004, p. 56). Nesti (2004) advocates the need to explore alternate 
approaches with respect to our understanding of psychological phenomenon in sport and 
suggests that existential phenomenology offers “a middle ground between purely objective and 
purely subjective approaches” (p. 55). However, beyond the work of Nesti and colleagues (e.g., 
Nesti, 2004; Ronkainen & Nesti, 2017; Ronkainen, Tikkanen, Littlewood, & Nesti, 2015) on 
the application of existential phenomenology within sport, a review of the sport psychology 
literature for this thesis suggests that, to date, there is limited engagement with respect to 
exploring the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. The perceived choice between 
qualitative and quantitative research methods reflects an implicit acceptance of subject and 
object separation as the basis for good science. 
 This thesis in part represents a personal frustration with a discipline that adheres to an 
epistemology still overly influenced by the natural sciences, and largely intent on subject and 
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object separation. In response, I believe that analytical psychology, originated by Jung, offers 
a fruitful alternative, and a meaningful basis on which to further explore subject-object 
reconciliation within sport psychology. Despite the strong historical dominance of positivism 
and, by association, the cognitive-behavioural paradigm within sport psychology (Nesti, 2004), 
the discipline has already been influenced and shaped to some extent by other traditions such 
as Humanistic psychology and Psychoanalytic theory (Hanrahan & Andersen, 2010; Hill, 
2001; Poczwardowski, Sherman, & Ravizza, 2004). Theoretical contributions of analytical 
psychology have also been considered elsewhere within the sport literature35 (e.g., Beauchamp, 
Maclachlan, & Lotian, 2005; Stein & Hollwitz, 1994). However, to my knowledge, within 
European and American academia, the systematic exploration of the implications of analytical 
psychology, founded on the epistemological considerations outlined in this thesis, has yet to 
be undertaken within the discipline of sport psychology.  
In chapters 2 and 3, part of the epistemological and theoretical foundation for an 
analytical sport psychology has been briefly considered. Namely:  
•   An approach based on the complementarity of subject and object (subject~object) 
•   An approach based on the complementarity of consciousness and unconsciousness 
(consciousness~unconsciousness)  
•   An approach wherein the psyche is conceived as a dynamic, teleological process, rather 
than static entity (being~becoming) 
Furthermore, this thesis proposes that these foundations can provide a new basis on which to 
address the epistemological challenges facing sport psychology. Namely, that human 
psychology is complex, dynamic, and non-linear, which cannot be adequately captured through 
objectivist, and static, representation (Clark, 1997; Varela et al., 1991). 
In the previous chapter it was proposed that sport psychology, as a maturing science, 
necessitates the exploration of integration with other disciplines (i.e., conceptual integration, 
Comides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992), as part of the basis for the establishment of its own domain 
(i.e., differentiation~integration). Therefore, the value of any new approach is dependent on 
the contributions made being inclusive and consistent with ideas from other associated 
disciplines. This consistency cannot be predicated on method alone, particularly if the method 
is at best, limited in scope, and at worst, unfit for purpose. A further contribution of this thesis 
                                               
35 Psychoanalytic theory commonly refers to the Freudian school, whereas analytical 
psychology commonly refers to the Jungian school (Jacobi, 1962). 
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is the proposition that a human science (e.g., Giorgi, 1970), based on subject-object 
reconciliation, requires the appropriation of suitable methods to be balanced with the elevation 
of value afforded to ideas derived from personal insight, thought and wisdom. Belief in the 
importance of the human dimension, as a necessary counterpoint to method, is based in part on 
the recognition that the study of psychological phenomena did not begin with the advent of the 
discipline (Robinson, 1986; Chung & Hyland. 2012; Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014). Basing 
the value of personal contributions on the potential for conceptual integration, in turn provides 
an alternative basis on which to judge so-called objective value. 
Whilst Jung’s analytical psychology represents a clear epistemological departure from 
mainstream approaches adopted in sport psychology (i.e., predicated on subject~object 
reconciliation), many of his central ideas have been shown to be compatible with other 
associated areas of science (e.g., Haule, 2011). Furthermore, Jung viewed the fault lines 
between psychology and other areas of science as ultimately arbitrary and unhelpful, and whose 
own psychology was predicated on the realisation of his dream of moving “towards a synthesis 
of sciences” (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 17). Because Jung himself sought inspiration from a wide 
range of disciplines, as well as believing that psychology could be the basis on which all the 
sciences could be united; to work in his spirit requires that psychological phenomena are 
considered and explored beyond arbitrary academic borders, rather than being confined and 
defined by them. In other words, an analytical sport psychology requires that scientific 
differentiation is in part dependent on conceptual integration, with the conversation between 
disciplines providing one basis on which to establish and nurture a credible discipline in its 
own right. 
Given the broad scope of the previous two chapters, in which part of the 
epistemological and theoretical underpinnings of an analytical sport psychology were outlined, 
this chapter will explore in greater depth the implications of one aspect of Jung’s work with 
respect to a well-established phenomenon in sport – momentum. Specifically, libido theory 
(Jung, 1960) will be considered as a new basis on which to account for this lived experience 
which, as will be shown, is poorly understood. As well as representing an important departure 
from Freud, libido theory has been chosen as it provides the basis for Jung’s account of the 
process of the psyche. In order to examine the expediency of this theory for psychological 
processes in sport, momentum has been chosen because it represents a dynamic and complex 
phenomenon (e.g., Gernigon, Briki, & Eykens, 2010). Secondly, because a shift towards 
understanding the psychological basis for performance variation provides a meaningful 
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departure from the general failure to isolate linear cause and effect relationships between 
psychological variables and performance itself36.  
Having considered current conceptualisations of momentum in the sport psychology 
literature, libido theory, based on the recent observation that psychological momentum is likely 
to represent a circular process (Moesch & Apitzsch, 2012), will then be examined as a new 
basis on which to account for this poorly understood phenomenon. In the final part of this 
chapter, the broader implications of libido theory will be considered with respect to the 
relationship between athlete and person.  
Although the initial focus of this chapter is to illustrate the efficacy of Jung’s ideas for 
our understanding of complex processes within sport, the rationale for broadening the 
discussion away from momentum itself is to illustrate how such phenomena, cannot be fully 
understood from within – i.e., an understanding of the ultimate value of abstract representations 
cannot be achieved by continued elucidation and refinement of the concepts themselves. 
Instead, the dynamic conceptualisation of the psyche developed by Jung suggests that 
momentum, like other abstractions appropriated by sport psychology, represent part of a 
superordinate, teleological process; wherein psychological processes and goals associated with 
sport ultimately cannot be separated from the process of the psyche itself (i.e., individuation). 
Thus, the goals of sporting endeavour are assumed to be inextricably linked with other 
developmental plains, as has been recently suggested by current sport psychology literature 
into the notion of dual career (Wylleman & Lavallee, 2004). Associated themes, such as 
identity and anxiety, provide a starting point to explore the process of the psyche, and by 
extension the lived experience of momentum. However, what is being proposed is that by 
primarily focusing on the nature of the superordinate processes themselves, a new perspective 
is possible with respect to the lived experience of psychological phenomenon within sport. 
Thus, as well as the recognition of subject~object, and consciousness~unconsciousness 
complementarity, a holistic sport psychology requires consideration of the basis for psychic 
growth (i.e., individuation) to be placed at its heart. 
 
4.2   Current conceptualisations of momentum in sport 
 The perception of momentum in sport is an enduring part of players, coaches and 
commentators lived experience (Den Hartigh, Van Geert, Van Yperen, Van Yperen, Cox, & 
Gernigon, 2016), and is frequently associated with winning and losing (Stanimirovic & 
                                               
36 The psychology of performance variation will be further explored in chapter 6. 
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Hanrahan, 2004). Academic interest into momentum in sports spans over thirty years, yet it 
still remains an elusive phenomenon (Crust & Nesti, 2006; Jones & Harwood, 2008; Moesch 
& Apitzsch, 2012; Taylor & Demick, 1994). Iso-Ahola & Mobily (1980) defined psychological 
momentum as, “an added or gained psychological power which changes a person’s view of 
himself or of others” (p. 392), which Adler and Adler (1978) suggested was initiated by 
“momentum starters”, or key moments during a competition. Adler (1981) developed the 
concept further, stressing its fragility, and recognising the possibility of negative momentum 
(failure leading to further failure) as well as positive momentum (success leading to further 
success). More recently, momentum has been described as “an unpredictable and ethereal 
force” (Taylor & Demick, 1994), and “…the force which dictates the flow of a 
match…invisible because it comes from the flow of energy between competitors” (Higham, 
Harwood, & Cale, 2005, p. 5).  
Moesch, Bäckström, Gráner & Apitzsch, (2014) identified the development of two 
distinct approaches to understanding and operationalising momentum in sport: The first has 
considered the individual psychological responses associated with perceived winning and 
losing streaks (psychological momentum). Specifically, whether athletes attribute the 
perception of fluctuations in performance to either positive or negative momentum. The 
perception of momentum is a consistent finding and has been found amongst soccer players 
(Jones & Harwood, 2008), basketball players (Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985), spectators 
(Burke, Aoyagi, Joyner, & Burke, 2003) and coaches (Moesch & Apitzsch, 2012). The second 
approach has attempted to provide empirical support for the associated behavioural indicators 
(behavioural momentum); and which operationalises momentum based on the dominance of 
reinforces (e.g., winning, confidence) over disrupters (e.g., improved opponent performance; 
see Moesch et al., 2014).  
If success primes the athlete for further success, and failure increases the likelihood of 
subsequent failure, one would expect to observe long winning and losing streaks over the 
course of a season (Vergin, 2000). Yet consistent and conclusive empirical support for the 
momentum-performance relationship has not been forthcoming (Bar-Eli, Avugos, & Raab, 
2006; Avugos, Köppen, Czienskowski, Raab, and Bar-Eli 2013). Furthermore, research has 
shown that the perception of momentum is not significantly associated with its occurrence 
(Kerrick, Iso-Ahola, & Hatfield, 2000; Miller & Weinberg, 1991). Where behavioural 
momentum has been identified, low prevalence and short duration has been found (Moesch, 
Bäckström, Gráner & Apitzsch, 2014). All of which is inconsistent with the theoretical premise 
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that success, or momentum starters, will lead to further success, theoretically resulting in 
extended winning streaks beyond that which might be expected by chance.  
Early definitions have been criticised for being vague and inadequately operationalised 
(Stanimirovic & Hanrahan, 2004; Taylor & Demick, 1994). In response, Taylor & Demick 
(1994) introduced the multi-dimensional model of momentum, which incorporated cognitive 
components (i.e., self-efficacy, motivation) of psychological momentum. The model assumes 
that changes in cognitions leads to changes in behaviour, and therefore performance. Thus, 
cognitions are afforded casual properties which are assumed to influence the ebb and flow of 
a match. Research (e.g., Stanimirovic & Hanrahan, 2004; Cornelius, Silva, Conroy, & 
Peterson, 1997) however has shown that whilst success and failure can influence affect and the 
perception of momentum, as suggested by the multidimensional model (Taylor & Demick, 
1996), cognitions were not significant predictors of subsequent performance. This led 
Cornelius et al. (1997) to suggest that psychological momentum, as conceptualised, merely 
serves as a labelling process to describe fluctuations in performance around a mean level. A 
view supported by Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky (1985) who suggested that there is a tendency 
to infer a pattern (i.e. a winning streak) in what can ultimately be a random, independent 
sequence of events. 
The failure to provide consistent empirical evidence, based on existing 
conceptualisations, has led to researchers questioning whether or not psychological momentum 
is a real phenomenon or a cognitive illusion (Bar-Eli, Avugos, & Raab, 2006; Moesch et al., 
2014). Moesch et al. (2014) suggested that the inconsistent and inconclusive nature of evidence 
surrounding momentum in sports exposes a gap between belief and reality. One has to question 
however, on what basis is this reality constructed. What will be explored in this chapter is the 
idea that this failure to find empirical evidence is in part due to the inadequate conceptualisation 
of momentum in sport based on flawed epistemological assumptions. Specifically, the reliance 
on abstraction and extrapolation, based within a cognitive-behavioural paradigm, which does 
not allow for the possibility of theoretically capturing the dynamic and complex nature of 
psychological processes (Clark, 1997; Powers, 1973). Thus making it unsurprising that 
momentum continues to be recognised as one of the least understood phenomena in sports. 
Commenting on the failure to find support for the “hot hand” phenomena – a term to 
describe the perception in basketball that a string of successful shots makes the player more 
likely to succeed with the following shot (Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985) – Bar-Eli et al. 
(2006) suggested that the focus on actual or simulated data has been almost entirely at the 
expense of theoretical developments. Furthermore, given the failure of statistical testing to 
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adequately detect the phenomenon (Bar-Eli et al., 2006), one is compelled to revisit the 
underlying epistemological assumptions on which our conceptualisation of psychological 
momentum is based and to reflect on the value afforded to different forms of empirical 
evidence, be they statistical or phenomenological in nature (Hales, 1999). In particular, whether 
the absence of evidence reflects the non-existence of the phenomena, or a fundamental failure 
in the epistemological assumptions and empirical methods used to reflect athletes, spectators 
and coaches lived experience. Writing in relation to the hot hand phenomenon in sports, Hales 
(1999) observed that by “making ‘success breeds success’ a requirement for having hot hands, 
the critiques have established a previously undefended and barely articulated account of hot 
hands, only to demolish it” (p. 85). Instead, Hales (1999) suggested that the failure of the 
empirical data to verify the a priori criteria for its existence does not preclude the possibility 
that it is a real phenomenon. Rather we are required to explore our assumptions concerning the 
basis for this lived experience. If the assumption of linear causal relations between events (i.e., 
success breeds success) falls short in providing a basis for this phenomenon, it is the 
assumptions themselves which need to be considered. 
Thus, the construct of momentum in sport becomes primarily an epistemological 
concern, given that question of its existence is dependent upon the underpinning assumptions 
made which provide the criteria for its potential elucidation. Scientific understanding is bound, 
limited, and therefore shaped by one’s epistemological assumptions; which if not critically 
examined is likely to place destructive limits on the scope of science (i.e., destructive analysis, 
Polanyi, 1958). As such, the importance of asking epistemological, alongside methodological 
questions (e.g., Crust & Nesti, 2006), becomes essential in order to allow for the opportunity 
to better understand what is likely to be a complex psychological phenomenon. 
An epistemology which defines psychological phenomena as being theoretically static 
and linear, obeying cause and effect regularity, will inevitably be unable to capture the true 
nature of dynamic, complex psychological processes (Boker, 2002). With recent research 
suggesting that psychological momentum has properties associated with nonlinearity37 (Briki, 
Den Hartigh, Markman, & Gernigon, 2014; Gernigon, Briki, & Eykens, 2010), it is likely that 
performance variation, as well as the maintenance of success or failure (i.e., positive 
                                               
37 I.e., Associated with fluctuations which do not conform to linear, cause and effect 
hypothesised relationships. Instead momentum, due to the associated complexity, is assumed 
to have properties associated with a dynamic system (i.e., emergent behaviour; see Gernigon 
et al., 2010). 
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momentum and negative momentum respectively), represent important components of this 
phenomena. On this basis, psychological momentum cannot represent a fixed state but is likely 
to be part of a complex dynamic process, which Moesch & Apitzsch (2012) suggested is likely 
to be circular in nature, not attributable to any single causal mechanism, and thus conclude that 
future research should reflect this. In the next section I will explore some of the implications 
of these propositions in relation to Jung’s analytical psychology, paying particular attention to 
his work on the energetic standpoint and libido theory (Jung, 1960).  
 
4.3   Libido theory 
…every process is a phenomenon of energy, and…all energy can only proceed from 
the tension of opposites. (Jung, 1966a, p. 29) 
 
4.3.1 Psychic and physical energy 
Jung viewed the psyche (consciousness~unconsciousness) as a system in constant flux, 
with psychic energy used as a concept to represent and account for the activity that occurs 
within. Unlike Freud who limited libido to sexuality, for Jung the term libido represented 
psychic energy in general (Storr, 1998). Jung recognised that the concept of psychic energy is 
fundamentally different to physical energy - the former, an invention to account conceptually 
for relations of movement in the psyche (Jung, 1960), whereas the latter has a direct relationship 
with matter. Thus, whilst in physics, energy and matter are equivalent, energy represented to 
Jung an expedient theoretical basis on which to account for the dynamic nature of psychic 
activity: “The idea of energy is not a substance moved in space; it is a concept abstracted from 
relations of movement” (Jung, 1960, p. 4). In other words, rather than conceive of the psyche 
as static - captured in the form of abstract representations – psychic activity is the observation 
of change that occurs, as symbolically represented by the movement of energy.   
The difference between physical energy and psychic energy can also be understood in 
terms of their epistemological basis. Jacobi (1962) distinguishes between what he calls the 
formative principle of energy in physics (i.e., the laws of thermodynamics which represent 
immutable premises), and the “a posteriori principle of order” (p. 52; i.e., a concept used to 
represent experience) which applies to the term libido. In other words, despite Jung recognising 
that psychic energy does not clearly equate to any form of objective truth, the principle offers 
heuristic value with respect to our understanding of psychological processes. Furthermore, 
Jung believed that the concept of energy represents an archetype which resides in the collective 
unconscious (Jung, 1966a, see p. 68) – an idea, the meaning of which transcends time and 
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place. Despite these differences between physical and psychic energy, Jung believed that there 
were similarities in the laws which govern them (Robinson, 2005). 
 
4.3.2   The principle of equivalence 
The energetic standpoint developed by Jung, is based on the conservation of energy, or 
the principle of equivalence; which states that in a closed system, energy can be transformed, 
but not destroyed. Unlike the Freudian view wherein the principle of equivalence is evident in 
relation to concepts such as “repression” and “sublimation”, Jung understood it as the basis for 
psychic transformation and growth (i.e., individuation; Robinson, 2005). Jung viewed the 
psyche as a “relatively closed system” (Jung, 1960, p. 7), and believed a posteriori that psychic 
energy conformed to this principle. The way the principle of equivalence manifests itself within 
the psyche can be understood in terms of the tendency towards one-sidedness, which refers to 
psychic energy being directed towards one half of a pair of opposites at the expense of the 
other. For example, at any given time, the tendency to express one’s masculine side (i.e., 
animus) at the expense of one’s feminine side (i.e., anima).  
 “Compensation by opposites” (Jung, 1966a p. 54) is a prominent feature of Jung’s 
work, and serves to maintain overall balance within the system. The psyche is thus viewed as 
a self-regulating system based on the observation that “sooner or later everything runs into its 
opposite” (Jung, 1966a, p. 72). Furthermore, given that “these opposites, may, in fact, be facets 
of the same reality” (Storr, 1998, p. 25), one can only deny a complimentary opposite for so 
long: “Whoever builds up too good a persona for himself naturally has to pay for it with 
irritability” (Jung, 1966a, p. 193). In sport, just as rest and recovery will be required following 
an extended period of activity, any extreme state (e.g., peak performance, euphoria), 
necessitates a counter-state (e.g., non-peak performance, quiet reflection) to maintain the 
equilibrium of the system38. This principle is also evident in the practice of Periodization 
(Bompa & Haff, 2009) used by coaches and athletes to manage the cyclical nature of training 
prescription. 
                                               
38 The regulatory function of opposites in relation to performance variation will be further 
considered in chapter 6. 
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Given the necessity of one-sidedness, in the form of an attitude or an adaptation, in 
order for directed action to occur (Jung, 1960)39, a tension between one-sidedness and the 
individuation process (i.e., being~becoming) becomes inevitable: “The point is not conversion 
into the opposite but conservation of previous values together with recognition of their 
opposites. Naturally this means conflict and self-division” (Jung, 1966a, p.76). 
 
4.3.3   Entropy 
The law of entropy provides the complimentary principle to the conservation of energy; 
both of which Jung based the movement of the libido (Jacobi, 1962; Robinson, 2005). Entropy 
represents the tendency of complimentary opposites in the system to move towards a state of 
equilibrium, or balance. Thus, the law of entropy provides the theoretical basis for the 
movement of energy and the self-regulation of the psyche, given that “[t]ransformations of 
energy are possible only as a result of differences in intensity” (Jung, 1960, p. 25). Jung 
theorised that a potential difference between a pair of complimentary opposites (i.e., 
consciousness~unconsciousness; extraversion~introversion; external~internal) results in a 
movement of energy based on the gradient, or potential difference, between the two (Jacobi, 
1962). Rather than end up in a state of absolute entropy, a healthy psyche, conceived as a 
relatively closed system, necessitates the continual engagement with the external world. The 
complimentary tension between the need for adaption to the external world on the one hand, 
and “adaptation to the conditions of the inner world” (Jung, 1960, p. 39) on the other (i.e., 
Personality No.1, and personality No.2 respectively), provides the basis for the continual 
circular flow of energy40.   
The teleological nature of the energetic standpoint means that a functional or adaptive 
value of any given part of the process is assumed (i.e., final cause), as well as the belief that 
such tendencies attributed to these processes constitute part of the essence of the being-in-itself 
(i.e., formative cause) given “the vital need for such adaption” (Jung, 1960, p.39). In the 
following section, the basis on which this inner movement occurs will be considered. With 
regard to the energetic standpoint, Jung proposed two fundamental concepts, central to his 
libido theory, which in part account for the dynamic organisation (formative) and adaptive 
                                               
39 The paradox of being, associated with the necessity of one-sidedness is beautifully 
reflected in the following epigraph by Oscar Wilde: “The man who sees both sides of a 
question, is the man who sees absolutely nothing at all”. 
40 Or life movements of the libido (Jung, 1960). 
     86  
nature (final) of the psyche: Progression and regression (Jung, 1960). What will now be 
considered is the idea that these terms, as conceptualised, provide an expedient basis on which 
to capture the formative and final nature of momentum in sports. 
  
4.3.4   Progression and Regression 
Jung (1960) defined progression as “a continual process of adaptation to environmental 
conditions”, and regression as “an adaptation to the conditions of the inner world” (p.39). 
Whereas, progression represents our capacity to accommodate and adapt to our external world, 
regression “confronts consciousness with the problem of the psyche as opposed to the problem 
of outward adaptation” (p. 36). By addressing our inner needs, regression provides a necessary 
energetic counter-pole to progression, thus serving a restorative homeostatic function 
(Fordham, 1966). Taken together, they represent the dynamic tension between the tendency 
towards self-organisation or “psychic equilibrium” (i.e., being), and the tendency towards 
growth (i.e., the individuation process; or becoming).  
 
4.3.4.1   Progression  
According to Jung, progression requires the ‘(1) attainment of an attitude, [and] (2) 
completion of adaptation by means of the attitude’ (p.32, 1960). From this perspective, 
attitude-types represent an individual’s particular response to internal and external experiences 
(Jacobi, 1962). Jung (1971) identified two attitude-types:  Extroversion, wherein the individual 
“lives in a way that is directly correlated with the objective conditions and their demands” (p. 
333), and introversion wherein the individual “thinks, feels and acts in a way that clearly 
demonstrates that the subject is the prime motivating factor” (p. 452). Thus, extroversion and 
introversion represent an individual’s tendency to either direct psychic energy towards the 
external (objective) world or internal (subjective) world respectively.  
When the task of sport is defined, in part, by the mastery of an external environment, 
progress within is predicated on an extroverted attitude type which affords this outward focus. 
If one assumes that the athlete has the pre-requisite skill, emphasis is placed on the ability to 
be able to react, and adapt, most effectively to that which is presented to the athlete by the 
outside world. Progression is therefore made possible, at least initially, by means of an 
extroverted attitude at the expense of introversion. 
When performance is viewed as part of a dynamic process, the value of an attitude, or 
a so-called optimal psychological state, becomes a function of the adaptive advantage it 
bestows on a continually changing fitness landscape (Kauffman, 1995). Given the dynamic, 
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complex environments in which most athletes compete, the inevitable transient value of these 
states makes it very difficult to determine in advance what, at any given time, an optimal 
strategy might be (Davids & Araújo, 2010). Thus, the prediction and thereby prescription of 
an optimal strategy (i.e., fitness peak) to be aimed for becomes a relative misnomer, given the 
need to adapt to the continually changing fitness landscape. From this point of view, 
psychological states become little more than causal bystanders in a competition for limited 
resources, wherein optimality is defined by the ongoing interaction between the performer and 
the environment (Araújo, Davids, and Hristovski, 2006; Davids & Araújo, 2010). 
However, Jung suggested that an “attitude” is extraordinarily persistent, whilst at the 
same time recognising that “…it may easily happen that an attitude can no longer satisfy the 
demands of adaption because changes have occurred in the environmental conditions which 
require a different attitude” (Jung, 1960, p.32). For example, a player or team may arrive upon 
and therefore stick with a winning (macro) strategy, which proves to be successful over 
successive matches. The dilemma then becomes, for how long should one persist with this 
strategy given the trade off against the need for subsequent adaptations? Even if one has a 
successful strategy, in dynamic sporting environments, skilled and successful performance is 
also predicated on the ability to make continual micro adjustments or adaptations (Jackson & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Ravizza, 2002) in response to the changing fitness landscape.   
Writing in relation to momentum, Cornelius et al., (1997) observed that “[c]ompetitors 
will often adjust to opponents extremely good or poor performances. They may change 
coverage, alter tactics, or increase concentration in reaction to opponents unusually good 
performance” (p. 483). Similarly:  
Passing the ball to the player that is “hot” is a common strategy endorsed by basketball 
players. It is also anticipated by the opposing team who can concentrate on guarding 
the “hot player”. If another player, who is less “hot” on that particular day, is equally 
skilled, then the less guarded player would have a better chance of scoring. Thus the 
belief in the “hot hand” is not just erroneous, it could also be costly’ (Gilovich et al., 
1985, p. 313) 
The coupling between the athlete and their environment reveals a performance paradox: 
Whether to stick with a successful strategy in the knowledge that it might lead to short term 
gains, or twist, knowing that the longer the strategy is maintained the more time your opponents 
have to adapt and gain competitive advantage.  
Early theories of skill acquisition (e.g., Fitts and Posner, 1967) suggest that 
performance is a function of practice because the latter allows for increasing specialisation or 
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automation, which in turn bestows competitive advantage41. However more recently, theorists 
have suggested that the relationship between performance and automatic processing is more 
complex, in part, because skilled performance is dependent on both conscious and unconscious 
processes. For example, Toner, Montero, and Moran (2015) argue that an over-reliance on 
automatic processing impairs “performers’ ability to react flexibly in dynamically unfolding 
performance environments” (p. 432). Instead, the authors conclude that “skilled performance 
requires the dynamic interplay of automatic processing and cognitive control in order to avoid 
performance errors and to meet the contextually contingent demands that characterise 
competitive environments in a range of skill domains” (p. 432). Even in sports which involve 
the execution of closed skills it has been shown that effective performance is still dependent 
on the need to make continual corrective adjustments. For example, Hauw and Durand (2004) 
analysed the routines of elite trampolinists, and unsurprisingly found that the quality of the 
performance was in part dependent on the ability to make temporal adaptations to avoid errors 
(also see Hauw & Durand, 2007).  
Thus, whilst automation provides speed and energy efficiency in the form of efficient 
neural models of the external world (Eagleman, 2011), in dynamic environments, success 
requires the ability to adapt which requires flexibility (or plasticity) within our neural circuitry. 
On this basis there exists a direct trade-off between the speed and efficiency of a mental model, 
and its ability to be flexible in the face of an ever-changing environment (Kahneman, 2011). 
Given that automation (allowing for speed and energy efficiency) requires unconscious mental 
processing (Eagleman, 2015), and flexibility also requires conscious awareness, a dynamic 
interplay between efficiency and flexibility results (Kahneman, 2011).  
Kahneman (2011) wrote that “skill and heuristics are alternative sources of intuitive 
judgements and choices” (p.11). We oscillate between the two, continually trading one off 
against the other. We work hard to develop skill associated with successful performance and 
turn it into a heuristic (for greater efficiency) potentially at the expense of adaptability: “In the 
economy of action, effort is a cost, and the acquisition of skill is driven by the balance of 
benefits and costs. Laziness is built deep into our nature” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 35). On this 
basis, success isn’t just defined by gaining competitive advantage, or winning, but also in the 
increased efficiency in the act of doing so: Evident in the phenomena of coasting, wherein the 
perception of being close to a goal results in a reallocation of resources to other perceived needs 
(Carver, 2003; Louro, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2007).  
                                               
41 See Williams & Ford (2008) for a review in relation to sporting domains. 
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In summary, it is evident that the variability in the environments experienced by athletes 
means that successful performance is dependent on an exquisite balance between the effective 
utilisation of specialist automatic processes and flexibility (Christensen, Sutton, & McIlwain, 
2016; Toner, Montero, & Moran, 2015). In the following section, the idea to be developed is 
that sustained performance excellence (i.e., progression) cannot be predicated on an 
‘extroverted’ attitude type alone but requires the coordinated expression of conscious and 
unconscious processes (i.e., consciousness~unconsciousness) that occur within the subjectivity 
of the individual. The direct implication for sport psychology is that a more complete 
understanding of performance itself requires it to be situated in relation to the dynamic intra-
psychic, subjective world (i.e., performance~person). 
 
4.3.4.2   Regression 
 
The deliberately bad decisions are made in a dark place, far below the surface. You 
don’t do those tiny things you need to do. You don’t run the extra few feet, you don’t 
lunge. You’re slow to come out of stops. You hesitate to bend or dig. You get handsy, 
not using your legs or hips. You make a careless error, compensate for the error with a 
spectacular shot, then make two more errors, and slowly but surely you slide backward. 
You never actually think, I’m going to net this ball. Its more complicated, more 
insidious. (Agassi, 2009, p. 227) 
 
 When the individual becomes unable to adapt to the existing environment due to the 
failure of the dominant attitude, a stoppage occurs, the libido ceases, and psychic tension 
ensues (Jung, 1960). This “tension leads to conflict, the conflict leads to attempts at mutual 
repression, and if one opposing force is successfully repressed a dissociation ensues, a splitting 
of the personality, or disunion with oneself” (p. 33).  
   If winning represents a successful coupling between the athletic and the respective 
environment in the form of successful adaptations, the significance of losing extends beyond 
just the competitive loss itself. Losing represents the realisation that the sense of completeness 
associated with success, based on progression, is one-sided, partial, and therefore does not 
constitute the totality of self. Losing, in part, represents a neglected inferior function (Jung, 
1971); that is, psychic activity which resides in the unconscious and has been overlooked 
during the process of progression. Critically, this activity is “momentarily useless from the 
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standpoint of adaptation, and for this reason…(is) invariably kept at a distance by the directed 
psychic function” (Jung, 1960, p. 34).  
However, the addition of this unconscious psychic material results in a struggle 
between opposites (i.e., progression and regression) which in turn has the effect of de-
potentiating their respective values: “This loss of value steadily increases and is the only thing 
perceived by consciousness” (Jung, 1960, p. 33). In sport, a phenomenon evident in an athlete 
or team who experiences the momentum slipping, is in “the doldrums”, feels flat, stuck, or has 
lost drive and direction. 
Despite the individual not being immediately aware as to the significance of the 
exposed inferior function, it “contains not merely incompatible and rejected remnants of 
everyday life…but also the germs of new life and vital possibilities for the future” (Jung, 1960, 
p. 34-35). This is because progression requires an “inner consistency” that excludes all psychic 
contents which might compromise the “integrity of direction” (Jung, 1960 p. 35). Yet:  
If we remember that the stoppage of the libido was due to the failure of the conscious 
attitude, we can now understand what valuable seeds lie in the unconscious contents 
activated by repression. They contain the elements of that other function which was 
excluded by the conscious attitude and which would be capable of effectively 
complementing or even of replacing the inadequate conscious attitude. (Jung, 1960, p. 
35-36) 
In other words, as already stated, there is a direct trade-off between consistent directed 
action (i.e., progression) which requires a narrowing of being (i.e., for heuristic value), and the 
ability to adapt. One cannot easily do both at the same time, if at all. Instead, a period of relative 
stillness is required to counter the forwards movement of the libido, and in such time, a 
potentially superior directed function can be established. Thus, true growth and transformation 
is ultimately dependent on the backwards movement of the libido (i.e., regression). 
In summary, in contrast to the one-sidedness of progression, Jung (1966b) equates one’s 
true nature to being in “a state of fluidity, change, and growth where nothing is eternally fixed 
and hopelessly petrified” (p. 46). The resolution, according to Jung, occurs due to the process 
of regression, the backwards movement of the libido, which amounts to a reallocation of energy 
to previously neglected unconscious psychic processes, in which “transformations of energy 
leads to an equalization of differences” (Jung, 1960, p.26). Rather than seeing such 
developments as divisive, Jung (1960) recognises “the possibilities of new life that lie in the 
repressed contents” (p.35). More specifically, rather than focussing on the “problem of outward 
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adaptation” (offered by progression), regression allows the client to focus on the “problem of 
the psyche” neglected during the process of progression. 
 
4.3.5   Positive momentum~negative momentum 
Within sport psychology literature, the idea that there are regulatory forces acting upon 
positive momentum and negative momentum is not a new one. Silva, Hardy, and Crace (1988) 
introduced the construct positive inhibition to describe “the process whereby success may 
actually result in the loss of momentum and thus increase the possibility of subsequent failure” 
(p. 346); and negative facilitation which “defines those situations whereby failure increases the 
probability of subsequent success” (p. 347). The Projected Performance Model of momentum 
(Cornelius, Silva, Conroy, & Peterson, 1997) also suggests that performances above and below 
mean levels are subject to inhibitory and facilitative “forces” respectively (see figure 1). 
Furthermore, Cornelius et al. (1997) speculate that the “momentum effect” itself represents the 
resistance to these forces resulting in the prolonged maintenance of extreme levels of 
performance. On this basis, momentum can be viewed as representing greater consistency in 
extreme performance levels (Cornelius et al., 1997) where one might usually expect greater 
variation around a mean level.  
From the energetic standpoint, the characteristic ebb and flow associated with 
momentum in sport (see Higham, Harwood, & Cale, 2006) is viewed as an inevitable and 
necessary periodic cycle. In the same way that biological rhythms can cycle from periods 
ranging from seconds to years, the same is evident with respect to the trajectory of performance 
over time, given that one can witness these shifts within a match, or over the course of an 
athlete’s career. Thus, the energetic standpoint has an important implication for our 
understanding of momentum, and the notion of finality requires us to reassess our 
understanding of performance variation itself. Specifically, changes in performance levels are 
viewed as the manifest result of self-organisation and therefore can be considered to be a 
functional part of an on-going cyclical process (Cowen, Nesti, & Cheetham, 2014)42. Whilst 
much of the variation can be attributable to objective factors such as injury and a change of 
strategy, libido theory would suggest that the subjective perception of momentum (i.e., 
psychological momentum) and the objective indicators of momentum (i.e., behavioural 
momentum) are also by-products of an on-going teleological process. 
                                               
42 This point will be considered further in chapter 6 (‘The psychology of performance 
variation in sport’). 




















Figure 1. The Projected Performance Model (Cornelius et al., 1997) 
 
This alternate epistemological position allows for questions such as “what is the 
purpose of performance fluctuation?” (i.e., Performative epistemology, Pickering, 2010) to 
complement the questions concerning what causes performance fluctuation. For the former 
question, the goal of the directed action in effect becomes the cause, but based on a different 
meaning (i.e., means to an end)43. From this perspective, positive inhibition and negative 
facilitation are both assumed to represent a functional part of an on-going process, wherein a 
                                               
43 However, it is also important to be mindful that any subsequent answer is framed by, and is 
in part a function of, the question we ask. This compels us to consider, when making 
epistemological choices, our reason for asking the question in the first place, given that “the 
reason for asking the question will ultimately determine the most useful type of answer” 
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drop in performance represents the self-organisation of the system (Cowen, Nesti, & 
Cheetham, 2014); as well as contributing towards the maintenance and growth of the person 
and athlete. In the final section of this chapter, the implications of the view that performance 
itself is a purposeful, emergent phenomenon will be considered with respect to current 
literature which assumes a close relationship between the athlete and other developmental 
domains.   
 
4.4   Person~Athlete 
This new approach to our understanding of performance, and its variation, is based on 
the assumption that there exists an intrapersonal, subjective dimension to performance, given 
the central role afforded to the principle of regression. In response, one might reasonably ask: 
Does sustained success in sport necessarily require ongoing consolidation with the subjective 
intrapsychic world, given the objective nature of competitive sport? The response to that 
question is very much dependent on whether one feels that such subjective and objective 
processes are connected or not, and if so, to what degree? Are subjective and objective 
processes separate but casually connected, or two sides of the same process? If one assumes 
the latter, then our understanding of psychological phenomena in sport, such as momentum, 
necessitates a greater appreciation of the intra-psychic world; if for no other reason than the 
fact that the objective purpose (i.e., to win) of elite sport is not generally in question, at least 
for most sport psychologists! Whereas, an analytical sport psychology would suggest that the 
subjective purpose of sport (i.e., what psychological function does it serve to the individual) is 
worthy of further consideration. Furthermore, analytical sport psychology is ideally placed to 
examine this subjective, personal component (i.e., the intrapsychic processes) of performance, 
and its variation, in order to better understand its relation to the associated objectivity (i.e., the 
performance itself).  
The central importance of subjectivity in accounting for performance and its variation 
is now being recognised. As outlined in the previous chapter, recent literature has embraced 
the idea that an athlete’s professional career is tied up in the holistic development of the person. 
For example, the importance of nurturing both an athlete’s personal and professional life is 
captured in the concept of the dual career (Wylleman & Lavallee, 2004), which also 
acknowledges the interaction between sporting endeavours and other areas of development. 
Research by Debois and colleagues (Debois, Ledon, Argiolas, & Rosnet, 2012; Debois, Ledon, 
& Wylleman, 2015; Debois, & Leseur, 2013) into the role of dual careers in elite sport has 
found that athletes personal development interacts directly with their sporting career (Debois 
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et al., 2012), to the extent that the experience of an athletic career is “indivisible from other 
concurrent domains of life development” (Debois, Ledon, and Wylleman, 2015, p. 15). Taken 
together, dual career research suggests the existence of reciprocal links between an athlete’s 
career development, and the multiple other developmental domains, as reflected in recent 
literature into athlete development (e.g., Collins and MacNamara, 2012 Gledhill and Harwood, 
2015; Stambulova, Engström, Franck, Linner, & Lindahl, 2015; Ronkainen, Tikkanen, 
Littlewood, & Nesti, 2015; & Wylleman, Reints, & De Knop, 2013). The holistic links between 
athlete development and other developmental domains will be of no surprise to anyone who 
has worked closely with athletes over a period of time or read autobiographical accounts of 
their histories. What has been proposed in this chapter is that libido theory, and by association 
the process of individuation, offers an additional theoretical basis on which to explore the inter-
dependence of both person and athlete development.  
 
4.4.1   Individuation (being~becoming) 
 Jung viewed the process of individuation as the centrepiece of his analytical psychology 
(Jung, 1995). Individuation itself represents the transformation of personality into the 
“complete actualization of the whole human being” (Jung, 1966b, p. 160), and accordingly 
represents one’s defining project. As outlined in chapter 2, the individuation process is 
characterised by the dialectical interplay between opposing sides of our nature (e.g., 
extroversion~introversion; anima~animus) – the purpose of which is to move towards greater 
integration of self and wholeness. Thus, the process of individuation requires recognition of 
who we are now (i.e., being) and who we can become in the form of self-realisation (i.e., 
becoming) – we are both being and becoming. 
 Similarly, Maslow (1968) wrote, “…the greatest attainment of identity, autonomy, or 
selfhood is itself simultaneously a transcending of itself, of going beyond and above selfhood” 
(p. 105), alluding to a paradoxical, two-fold nature of being. Considered by European 
existentialism, humanistic psychology, and the psychology of Jung, the person can be 
conceived as being simultaneously both who they are (actuality) and who they could become 
(potentiality; Maslow, 1968). Thus, from this perspective, a full consideration of human 
psychology requires any consideration of who we are to be in part based by who we can 
become; whilst avoiding any arbitrary separation between the two. 
This dynamic conceptualisation of being offers a radical departure from positivist 
psychology (Maslow, 1968). Yet, support for the notion that our psychology is defined by both 
being and becoming is evident in recent discoveries in neuroscience which have demonstrated 
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that the brain exists in a state of plasticity, based on a dynamic interplay between biology and 
experience (Eagleman, 2015). Plasticity, which recognises the brains ability to adapt through 
the formation of new neural connections, is a clear representation of the idea that who we are 
(i.e., being) isn’t fixed, but can develop and adapt. Sport itself provides a medium for people 
to realise potential through adaptation, whilst at the same time reminding us of that within 
ourselves which limits us.  
 
4.4.2   Athlete development 
With respect to athlete development, a central implication of a holistic perspective is 
that an athletes career and their respective performances is ultimately inseparable from all that 
constitutes the athlete (e.g., Henschen, 2001). An athlete has dreams which transcend sport, yet 
sport offers a potential means for their realisation. For example, Andersen and Speed (2010) 
suggest that most of their applied sport psychology work, even that concerned with 
performance enhancement, is ultimately concerned with the realisation of love, be it self-love 
(e.g., increased self-esteem) or receiving love from others (e.g., from coaches, parents). 
Furthermore, literature into the spiritual dimension of sport participation (e.g., Mosley, 
Frierson, Cheng, & Aoyagi, 2015; Parry, Robinson, Watson, & Nesti, 2007; Watson & Nesti, 
2005) stresses the importance of the personal component of performance – specifically, the 
idea that the person and performance are often viewed as one and the same thing. As Andersen 
(2006) observed on his work with athletes: “Performance is a deeply personal issue, and 
counselling athletes on performance touches areas of their lives that go to the core of their 
being” (cited in Andersen & Speed, 2010, p. 6) 
If one assumes a priori an organismic tendency towards growth, then sport offers one 
basis on which personal growth can be realised. Yet growth, through the lens of the 
individuation process, is represented as the continual process of integration of the personality 
(Moacanin, 2003). Thus growth, and by extension fulfilment, is dependent and predicated on 
the coordinated expression of different parts of oneself, which cannot be represented by the 
realisation of athletic potential alone, unless one assumes that athletic potential represents the 
totality of self. On this basis, true success within sport doesn’t represent the realisation of 
athletic potential, but athletic potential allowing for and expressing the realisation of self44. 
When performance is assigned this purpose – as opposed to focusing upon its reductive causal 
basis - it then goes without saying that true athletic success is also co-dependent on healthy 
                                               
44 This point will be explored further in chapter 7. 
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development of other parts of self. Equally, a lack of athletic success is deemed to have purpose 
when it allows for the possibility of new potential to be realised.  
According to libido theory, the “inferior function” contains within it the seeds for future 
growth, as well as representing part of one’s totality45. Yet, the subjective component of 
performance (i.e., its subjective purpose) is in stark contrast to the degree of specialisation 
ultimately needed to be successful in elite sport. Furthermore, within elite sport, losing is 
generally considered to be an anathema - fundamentally inconsistent with any goals set - but, 
as suggested by libido theory, it potentially represents an important facilitator of personal and 
professional growth. Thus, there appears to be a potential conflict between the objective 
demands of elite sport (where winning is the defining project), and the subjective demands of 
individuation (where realisation of self is the defining project).  
 To ultimately triumph in this conflict is to avoid the one-sidedness which goal directed 
behaviour typically demands of us (i.e., progression). Rather than the goal becoming 
transcendence itself - in the name of becoming “super-human”- the true goal is for all that is 
associated with progression to become reconciled with the opposites within ourselves (i.e., 
regression). Indeed, libido theory suggests that how we work through such conflicts helps 
define who we are and who we can become46. For example, an athlete’s response to the 
inevitable challenges they will face (e.g., losing, injury, deselection, retirement) represents part 
of their defining project, rather than a problem to be negated. The full realisation of self cannot 
exclude that which appears as an obstacle to the realisation of athletic potential, but requires it 
to be integrated into the whole. 
How the “problem of opposites” expresses itself in sport can find many forms (e.g., 
motivation~amotivation, anxiety~confidence), and is clearly evident in the ongoing 
performance of an athlete. As outlined in this chapter, the Jungian account of momentum 
suggests that variation in performance can in part be attributed to the complimentary expression 
of progression and regression. Progression accords with the objective demands of sport, 
whereas regression allows for the more complete expression of subjectivity. Yet, in elite sport, 
when winning represents the defining goal, the pressure on one-sidedness in the form of 
                                               
45 “How can I be substantial without casting a shadow? I must have a dark side too if I am to 
be whole” (Jung, 1966b, p. 59). 
46 “The problem of opposites, as an inherent principle of human nature, forms a further stage 
in our process of realisation” (Jung, 1966a, p. 59). 
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progression becomes seemingly inevitable. This apparent necessity for such one-sidedness 
cannot be without consequences. 
 
4.4.3   Identity foreclosure and fear of success  
Ideally, sporting excellence would always correspond with personal excellence (e.g., 
Miller & Kerr, 2002). Yet, particularly during the early stages of an athletic career, sacrifice is 
inevitable given the pressure to specialise being viewed as increasingly important for athletic 
success (Côté, 2009). A seemingly inevitable result is that for those aspiring to become elite 
athletes, the focus on their athletic identity will take priority over exploring alternate identities 
during adolescence (see Petitpas and France, 2010). 
Marcia (1966) recognised 4 identity statuses (see table 1) with can result from the 
identity crisis experienced during adolescence (Erikson, 1959). Of these statuses, athletes could 
be forgiven for viewing identity foreclosure as being a seemingly necessary developmental 
step in order for athletic success to be realised. In comparison, Erikson (1959) suggests that the 
healthy development of identity (i.e., identity achievement) is dependent on the active 
exploration of different identities during adolescence (i.e., identity moratorium; Marcia, 1966). 
Interestingly, there now exists a wealth of research which suggests that early specialisation, 
before puberty, is not necessary to become an elite athlete (see Hastie, 2015, for a review). 
Instead, it has been found that delayed specialisation and participating in multiple sports from 
an early age is a better predictor of a future career in elite sport (e.g., Bridge & Toms, 2013; 
Ginsberg et al., 2014). Furthermore, athletes with a one-dimensional identity resulting from 
too much focus on sport from an early age can lead to burnout (Coakley, 1992), and are more 
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Table 1: Adapted from Marcia (1966) 
 
Athletic success, when perceived to be predicated on identity foreclosure, is likely to 
lead towards athletic success or failure itself becoming the primary, if not sole basis for 
determining one’s identity, and by implication one’s sense of self-worth. In the absence of the 
development of a dual career, the perception of progression will become increasingly tied to 
the relatively uncontrollable ebb and flow of performance over time. To counter this perceived 
lack of controllability, an athlete might see no other choice but to keep digging and increasingly 
invest in their athletic role in an attempt to mitigate against the deeply painful subjective 
consequences of failure. In the end however, when identity is tied to the athletic role, the 
dichotomy of failure and success, when conceived as such, represent the limits and one-
sidedness associated identity foreclosure. Specifically, the athlete is confronted with the 
paradox that failure and success, when considered separately, both potentially represent an 
obstacle in the way of the individuation process. Whilst an athlete might experience great joy 
following success, this joy is ultimately contingent on the association of success with failure. 
For if failure was not possible, are strong positive emotions associated with success as likely? 
Thus, success and failure, and the emotions associated with them, are mutually dependent 
constructs. As well as the seemingly inevitable fear of failure, we are therefore confronted with 
the vexing phenomena of fear of success, given that both success and failure in their own right 
represent the same one-sided state. 
The term “fear of success” is generally credited to Horner (1968), but accounts within 
the psychoanalytic tradition are suggestive of a complex aetiology (see Klafter, 2018, for a 
review). One of the first accounts in the sport literature was a paper by Ogilvie entitled “The 
unconscious fear of success” (Ogilvie, 1968). Based on 12 years of clinical practice with elite 
 
Identity statuses Description 
Identity achievement When an individual has gone through an exploration 
of different identities and made a commitment to one 
Moratorium The status of a person who is actively involved in 
exploring different identities, but has not made a 
commitment. 
Foreclosure When a person has made a commitment without 
attempting identity exploration. 
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athletes, Ogilvie (1968) identified 5 different sources of stress (or “syndromes”) associated 




A Social and emotional isolation 
B Unconscious guilt in response to the 
requirements for athletic success 
C 
 
The use of rationalisation to avoid the reality of 
one’s true potential 
D Unconscious resentment in response to the 
exaggerated external demands imposed 
E Unconscious fear of the responsibility 
associated with maintaining excellence 
 
Table 2: 5 syndromes associated with success (adapted from Ogilvie, 1968)  
 
Although all of the sources of stress identified by Ogilvie resonate with the one-
sidedness associated with success, of particular interest here is syndrome C: 
Syndrome C is the most subtle form of fear of success and has its roots deep in 
developmental history…Basically his social conditioning over-emphasized the pain of 
failure at the expense of the pleasure of success. Rewards or recognition for partial 
success or moderate improvement are absent from his life experience. The only social 
reward or positive parental recognition has been for winning or for showing excellence. 
Any performance short of these standards has been treated as failure. Often the parent 
communicates this attitude by his failure to respond to any performance which has not 
reached the parents arbitrary standard of achievement. The end effect of such social 
conditioning is a personality structure with an inordinate fear of failure. The athlete 
unconsciously internalizes the unrealistic standard for human performance, and he 
studiously avoids the conscious experience of failure. He, therefore, learns to 
overdevelop his powers of rationalization and unconscious denial. He becomes expert 
at avoiding the ultimate truth by developing self-deceptive ways of justifying the 
quality of his performance. This is frequently expressed by falsely denying the meaning 
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of success or victory. Somehow, in some way, the “moment of truth” is avoided in order 
not to have to face the reality of an absolute test of ability and then to be made to feel 
unworthy.  (Ogilvie, 1968, p. 37)  
This rather perplexing passage raises a number of questions concerning our relationship 
to success and failure. According to Conroy, Poczwardowski and Henschen (2001) this 
syndrome results from athletes generalising the fear of failure, associated with the “unrealistic 
standard for human performance”, onto success, given that both are two sides of the same coin. 
Furthermore, beyond the more obvious interpretation that the “ultimate truth” refers in some 
way to the introjected unrealistic standard for human performance: 
•   Is the “ultimate truth” also referring to the idea that in the experience of pleasure 
associated with success, the pain of losing is created, and vice versa, given that they are 
viewed as two sides of the same coin? 
•   Based on a Jungian interpretation, is the “ultimate truth” recognition that performance 
excellence alone does not represent the totality of self? That is, basing personal growth 
solely on sporting success paradoxically reflects the fact that sporting success is often 
at the expense of personal growth. A fact which could be subject to “unconscious 
denial”. 
•   Does the “moment of truth” also refer to being confronted with an opportunity to 
demonstrate one’s true potential, which in turn raises to consciousness the “unrealistic 
standard for human performance”? In other words, the polarisation of success and 
failure ultimately results in a reality gap between introjected beliefs/values concerning 
what it means to be an athlete (and by extension a person), and a more realistic appraisal 
which acknowledges that totality of being is based on all of who we are and what we 
do.  
Whatever one’s interpretation of the second half of this passage, it would appear that 
fear of failure and fear of success, when taken together, ultimately represent fear of the same 
thing. Namely, an awareness that defining one’s identity primarily on such polarised outcomes 
represents a polarisation, rather than integration, of self. The end result is “a splitting of the 
personality, or disunion with oneself” (Jung, 1960, p. 33). Integration of self has been described 
     101  
from an existential perspective as ontological security, by the psychoanalyst and psychiatrist 
R.D Laing in The Divided Self (1959)47, someone who 
may experience his own being as real, alive, whole; as differentiated from the rest of 
the world in ordinary circumstances so clearly that his identity and autonomy are never 
in question; as a continuum in time; as having an inner consistency, substantiality, 
genuineness, and worth (p. 41). 
In contrast, according to Laing, the ontologically insecure person is subject to three forms of 
anxiety: 
 
Anxiety type Description 
Engulfment “In this the individual dreads relatedness as such, with anyone 
or anything or, indeed, even with himself, because his 
uncertainty about the stability of his autonomy lays him open to 
the dread lest in any any relationship he will lose autonomy and 
identity” (p. 44) 
Implosion “The individual feels that, like the vacuum, he is empty. But this 
emptiness is him. Although in other ways he longs for the 
emptiness to be filled, he dreads the possibility of this happening 
because he has come to feel that all he can be is the awful 
nothingness or just this very vacuum” (p. 45-46) 
Petrification and 
depersonalisation 
“The dread, that is, the possibility of turning, or being turned, 
from a live person into a dead thing, into a stone, into a robot, an 
automaton, without personal autonomy of action, an it without 
subjectivity (emphasis added; p. 46) 
 
Table 3: Types of anxiety associated with ontological insecurity (Laing, 1959)  
 
If the expression of individuation is a state of fluidity, change, and growth where 
nothing is eternally fixed and hopelessly petrified, then ontological insecurity can be viewed 
                                               
47 Although the premise of the book is to provide a study on schizophrenia, the description of 
the process of alienation from one’s real self has much to offer those interested in identity 
and anxiety in sport. 
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as the antithesis of this position. When one’s identity is based on an introjected ideal, then 
anything associated with this, be it success or failure, has the potential to provoke a deeper 
sense of existential insecurity. Within sport, success becomes as much of a threat as failure, 
when it comes to represent a “disunion with oneself”. The internal agency contributing towards 
performance variation (i.e., progression~regression, positive momentum~negative 
momentum), or “momentum shifts” is then viewed as an ongoing attempt at reconciliation 
between one’s objectivity and subjectivity. In this context, objectivity represents the objective 
rules which govern the sport played, the imposed demands of others (i.e., parents, coaches, 
teammates, competitors), and the performance outcomes (success, failure). Whereas 
subjectivity represents the “being for oneself” (Laing, 1959, p. 47) as opposed to a being-for-
others. Laing (1959) acknowledges that objectivity and subjectivity are in tension with each 
other given that 
[I]f one experiences the other as a free agent, one is open to the possibility of 
experiencing oneself as an object of his experience and thereby of feeling one’s own 
subjectivity drained away. One is threatened with the possibility of becoming no more 
than a thing on the world of the other, without any life for oneself, without any being 
for oneself. (p. 47) 
Taken together, in the context of sport, athletic potential allowing for and expressing the 
realisation of self is therefore dependent on a union of: 
•   subjectivity and objectivity 
•   being-for-oneself and being-for-others 
•   person and the athlete 
In summary, the goal is not success itself, but, at least as far as the individuation process 
is concerned, for success to represent another step in the path towards individuation, based on 
a union of subjectivity and objectivity. When there exists a trade-off between one’s 
commitment to one’s athletic role (i.e., identity foreclosure) and the individuation process, 
sporting success will be at the expense of personal growth, anxiety and performance variation. 
In contrast, sporting success predicated on the reconciliation of subjectivity and objectivity 
allows for athletes to use sport as a basis on which to make individuation possible. 
 
4.5   Conclusions 
This chapter can be considered in two parts. In the first, implications of Jung’s Libido 
theory for our understanding of momentum in sport were considered. From this perspective, 
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the characteristic ebb and flow of performance can be seen to symbolically represent the 
dynamic tension between the desire for outward adaptation (i.e., progression) and the 
requirement of consolidation with the intra-psychic world (i.e., regression). Therefore, this 
approach is based on the assumption that momentum represents a circular process (Cornelius 
et al., 1997; Moesch & Apitzsch, 2012), of which the ultimate, superordinate goal is 
individuation. In the second part of the chapter, the discussion was broadened to consider the 
implications of this circular process with respect to the one-sided objective purpose of elite 
sport. Specifically, the apparent trade-off between the ability to satisfy the objective demands 
of elite sport, and the ability to acknowledge the inferior function; the latter necessary in the 
process of regression (and by extension individuation itself). Implications of this trade-off were 
considered briefly with respect to identity and anxiety within sport.  
Taken together, this chapter suggests that performance itself, and its variation, can be 
legitimately viewed as symbolically representing both the person and the athlete. In other 
words, from an analytical sport psychology perspective, performance represents the person’s 
subjectivity in that it is an expression of intrapsychic processes. In addition, performance 
represents in its purest form the athlete’s objectivity (i.e., their behavioural response to the 
objective demands their sport). Thus, rather than be viewed merely as an object measure, 
performance itself offers an important intersection between subject~object, and person~athlete, 
wherein the associated variation represents the oscillation between these opposing poles.  
Another contribution of this approach is the proposition that the psychological basis for 
performance variation would be better understood based on the assumption of circularity rather 
than linear causation. It has been suggested that the recognition of circularity is an 
epistemological necessity that implies interdependence between mind, body and environment 
(Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). In contrast, linear causation implies separation and linear 
(or sequential) dependence, a consequence of separating “causes” from “effects”. 
Conceptualising psychological momentum based on its relationship to performance results in 
the issue of causation, given that psychological momentum can be viewed as both the cause 
and effect of improved performance (Vallerand, Colavecchio, & Pelletier, 1988). Furthermore, 
Spaulding (1995) suggested that focusing on isolated relationships allows for the possibility of 
linear causality to be established, but on a systems level exist as an “explanatory fiction”, given 
that (a) other processes are overlooked, and (b) the interactive and reciprocally causal nature 
of systems.  Spaulding (1995) goes as far as to observe that “observed temporal contiguity of 
a predictable sequence among arbitrarily selected events doesn’t prove ‘cause’…We label it 
causality when it suits our purposes” (p. 281). 
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Varela, Thompson, & Rosch (1991) suggested that a circularity, or structural coupling 
exists between cognitive processes, behaviours and the environment. That is, one can never 
extricate mental processes and behaviours from the affecting and effected environment of 
which they are a part (Bohm, 1980). In this chapter it has been proposed that momentum is 
best conceptualised as a complex dynamic process which is circular in nature (Moesch & 
Apitzsch, 2012) based on a structural coupling between opposing, yet complimentary 
processes: Positive momentum~negative momentum, progression~regression, and 
person~athlete. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the energetic standpoint provides an 
effective epistemological basis on which to account for this process. In the previous chapters 
it was suggested that a credible psychological science necessitates more active rationalisation 
with epistemology. By adopting the energetic standpoint, this chapter has demonstrated how 
theoretical developments are ultimately derived from the epistemological assumptions made. 
In the next chapter I will consider two theoretical developments within psychology - 
Idiographic science (Molenaar, 2004) and the cybernetic-systems paradigm (Vancouver, 2000) 
- which have responded to the epistemological challenges identified in this thesis. Furthermore, 
these developments have been chosen as they offer a point of convergence with analytical 
psychology (e.g., subject~object), and prove important implications for the future of sport 
psychology as a science. In doing so I will build upon an idea that sport psychology can make 
a more meaningful contribution to our understanding of the nature of performance variation 
itself, rather than the epistemologically flawed quest to document the psychological correlates 
(e.g., mental toughness, confidence etc.). Taken together these developments suggest a shift 
towards an “ontology of becoming” (Pickering, 2010, p. 107) to reflect the dynamic, temporal 














Towards an epistemology of being and becoming 
 
5.1   Introduction 
Husserl (1970) observed that the problems of reason (i.e., what can be considered true, 
rational knowledge) and the associated meta-physical questions belonged to philosophy. In 
contrast, facts, or, that-which-is, were the domain of the natural sciences. Yet, Husserl (1970) 
asked “[c]an reason and that-which-is be separated, where reason, as knowing, determines 
what it is?” (p. 11). Thus, the “history of crisis” which Husserl believed has defined the history 
of psychology (Husserl, 1970), owes much to the separation from philosophy (Mammen & 
Mironenko, 2015). Ironically therefore, if psychology aspires to become a mature science, it is 
required to confront the philosophical (i.e., epistemological) challenges it faces as the basis for 
its development. 
In the previous two chapters, I have explored some of the philosophical challenges that 
I believe psychology, and by extension sport psychology faces if it is to become, in the Kuhnian 
sense, a mature science. Namely, a move away from the reliance on positivist epistemology, 
subject and object separation; and in turn the necessary development of a paradigm capable of 
capturing the unique nature of the subject matter which is consistent with other branches of 
science (i.e., conceptual integration). This view has been strongly influenced by Jung’s 
analytical psychology, to which this thesis is indebted. However, I do not believe that a 
paradigm can be created merely by following the vision of one person alone. To do so would 
repeat the mistake of the pre-paradigm stage wherein the tendency is to “force nature into the 
preformed and relatively inflexible box” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 24) - that in this instance analytical 
psychology offers. I have no doubt that analytical psychology, in itself, can make an important 
contribution to our understanding of sporting phenomena, as I attempted to demonstrate in the 
previous chapter with respect to our understanding of momentum in sport. However, it is 
important to acknowledge that these ideas represent in part the situated, personal knowledge 
of the originator. Thus, any application risks objectifying a personal vision rather than working 
in its spirit.  
The more pressing task is to learn from the epistemological method, or methodology it 
provides, in order to determine how nomothetic knowledge can be generated in such a way that 
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it can potentially rise above the personal, idiographic dimension. In other words, to establish 
what are the lessons that can be learnt with respect to the development of a legitimate 
psychological science. In this respect a number of epistemological criteria have already been 
identified in this thesis which could form part of the basis for this method:    
•   Placing personal ontology (i.e., one’s subjectivity) at the centre – by elevating the role 
of individual judgement, insight and wisdom, as a complimentary counterpoint to 
method. 
•   Determining the value of subjectivity based on (a) its potential to reconcile subject and 
object; (b) its ability to promote conceptual integration; and (c) its ability to stimulate 
future work.  
In this chapter, an additional criterion will be proposed:  
•   The prioritisation of theory, as a complimentary counterpoint to data – given the 
idiographic nature of psychological processes 
In light of the epistemological challenges outlined in the previous two chapters, this 
chapter will consider two separate developments within psychology which stress the 
importance of epistemology for the development of psychology as a science, and place great 
importance on the role of subjectivity. Acknowledgment of the personal, subjective component 
of knowledge (e.g., Polanyi, 1958), precludes the possibility of discovery as ever being final. 
Rather, for a psychological science, the next section will introduce idiographic science, 
developed by a core of distinctly non Anglo-American psychologists who have proposed that 
discovery, or knowledge creation, can be viewed as the ongoing complimentary process of 
understanding what makes us individual and what we have in common (idiographic 
subjectivity~nomothetic objectivity). This represents an important departure from the dominant 
historical view that in order to position itself as a true science, psychology is required to 
conform to the nomothetic, empirical, and inductivist tradition (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010).  
In the second section of this chapter I will introduce the cybernetic-systems paradigm 
which emerged in the same era as cognitivism but developed in parallel, due to their 
irreconcilable epistemological differences (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). I believe that 
these more recent developments in psychology offer an important point of convergence with 
analytical psychology, and therefore offer one basis on which to address a defining 
epistemological challenge identified in this thesis. Namely, the emergence of a theoretical 
position predicated on subject and object complementarity (subject~object). 
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5.2   Towards a new epistemological method 
 
Scientific education is based in the main on statistical truths and abstract knowledge 
and therefore imparts an unrealistic, rational picture of the world, in which the 
individual, as a merely marginal phenomenon, plays no role. The individual, however, 
as an irrational datum, is the true and authentic carrier of reality, the concrete man as 
opposed to the unreal ideal or normal man to whom the scientific statements refer. 
(Jung, 2002, p. 7)  
 
Psychology has become an arena for a complex social game of a fashion of appearing 
“scientific” at the expense of alienation of the data from the phenomena and the data 
makers from the theoretical and philosophical issues that were fundamental concerns 
for their predecessors. (Valsiner, 2014, p. 4) 
  
The terms idiographic and nomothetic were introduced over a century ago by 
Windelband (1894/1980) to differentiate between sciences “concerned with the unique, 
immanently defined content of the real event”, and sciences “concerned with what is invariably 
the case” (p. 175) respectively. Despite Windelband conceiving these perspectives as 
complimentary, in psychology they have been largely interpreted as an oppositional dyad 
which has contributed towards the fragmentation of modern psychological science (Salvatore 
& Valsiner, 2010). This fragmentation is reflected in the assumed choice between doing human 
science and natural science; interpretivism and positivism; and qualitative and quantitative 
methods as means of acquiring knowledge.  
Instead Salvatore and Valsiner, (2010) point out that, as conceived, both perspectives 
are ultimately concerned with developing generalised knowledge. Why, because 
… remembering the inevitability that any experience of anything is a singular 
phenomenon (as it unfolds for the living individual in irreversible time), the basis for 
all human knowledge is inevitably idiographic – all that is is experienced once…Thus, 
all science is idiographic as it strives towards generalization about its phenomena 
through time – yet the outcomes of such efforts can become nomothetic in the sense of 
generalisation based on evidence that “once was” and “another time as well”. (p. 819)   
Furthermore, Salvatore and Valsiner (2010) argue that given the human sciences are 
concerned with self-organising, open systems, no two individuals will ever present in the same 
way, yet it is the general laws governing the system which make this possible: “Generality in 
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uniqueness is not a contradiction in terms, but the basic operating principle in all nature, 
psyche, and society” (p. 4, italics original).  
This new approach, termed idiographic science (Molenaar, 2004), rejects the use of 
inductive reasoning used by empirical science to make generalisations because it overlooks the 
fundamentally idiographic nature of the observed events (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). In other 
words, “evidenced based” aggregation does not provide a meaningful route to generality 
(Lamiell, 1998), and any attempt at allocating individuals into discrete populations or samples 
will result in an infinite regress, due to the fundamentally idiographic nature of psychological 
processes48. Therefore, the epistemological position of idiographic science is that general 
knowledge is only possible by studying the singularity of psychological phenomenon 
(Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010), with the emphasis on temporal variation unique to each case 
(Molenaar, 2007). In contrast, inductive science assumes that meaningful generalisations can 
be made based on the aggregation of data from a finite sample. The difference concerning the 
level on which variation needs to be understood is therefore epistemological in nature: 
Inductive science assumes that variation can be meaningfully understood on the inter-
individual (i.e., group) level, whereas idiographic science argues that variation can only be 
understood on the intra-individual (i.e., individual) level (Molenaar, 2004; Salvatore & 
Valsiner, 2010).  
The current “replication crisis” in psychology is at least in part attributable to the denial 
of the idiographic quality (i.e., intra-individual variability) of psychological processes; and as 
such, the “crisis” is epistemological rather than methodological in origin. Why, because when 
individuals are viewed as self-organising open systems, variation, not aggregation becomes the 
defining feature (Maruyama, 1963; Powers, 1973). To rely on central tendency of an assumed 
representative group for knowledge construction (i.e., inductive generalisation) conveniently 
overlooks the non-ergodic49 nature of psychological processes (Molenaar, 2004; Molennar & 
Campbell, 2009; Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). The criteria for ergodicity are that (a) each 
person within a defined group should act according to the same governing dynamical laws, and 
(b) the dynamic laws will manifest in the same way over time (Molenaar, 2007). However most 
                                               
48 The problem of infinite regress has been demonstrated with respect to current research into 
motivation in sport in chapter 3. 
49 Ergodicity relates to individual phenomena which does not vary as a function of time. 
Where variation occurs on an individual level and as a function of time (i.e., irreversible) 
then non-ergodicity is assumed (Valsiner, 2014). 
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psychological processes are considered non-ergodic because they do not conform to these 
criteria (Molenaar, 2004). Specifically, the behaviour of one person over time (intra-individual 
variation), cannot be used to determine the behaviour of a group of people over time (inter-
individual variation), and vice versa (Molennar & Campbell, 2009; Salvatore & Valsiner, 
2010). Yet research continues to be based on these flawed assumptions. Namely, that 
psychological processes do not manifest as a function of time, and inter-individual variation 
can be extrapolated from intra-individual variation. 
For example, say you want to determine whether a group of athletes’ performances are 
affected by a new coach, one could either compare the average groups performances in the 
period before and after their arrival (i.e., between person/inter-individual variation). 
Alternatively, one could track the performances of one or a few individuals over time (i.e., 
within person/intra-individual variation), with a view to generalising the pattern of variation to 
the group. However, when such behaviour (i.e., performance) is considered to be non-ergodic, 
by definition any observed temporal variation on the between person level cannot be used to 
accurately determine temporary variation on the within person level, and vice versa.  
An example as to what happens when researchers attempt to extrapolate from the intra-
individual to the inter-individual level was considered in chapter 3 concerning a recent series 
of qualitative research studies undertaken by Keegan and colleagues. In attempting to address, 
amongst other things, the inter-individual variation in the perception of the motivational 
climate revealed by the previous reliance on questionnaire based studies, Keegan et al. (2014) 
suggested, rather tenuously, that the adoption of the interview method (i.e., intra-individual) 
would help overcome some of the issues identified with the previous reliance on inter-
individual, quantitative based research into motivation (e.g., inter-individual variation, low 
ecological validity). Despite providing a highly detailed and extensive account of the intra-
individual “raw ingredients”, the researchers inevitably found no motivational sources which 
consistently impacted on motivation in the same way on the inter-individual level. 
These findings do not represent a failure of method - the method did its job - but a 
failure to appreciate how the results obtained also reflect the flaws in the epistemological 
assumptions made (in this case the lazy assumption that intra-individual variation can be 
generalised to the inter-individual level, and therefore behaviour can be meaningfully 
represented as being ergodic). In the end the subject will resist conformity to the inflexible box 
provided by the paradigm, when the paradigm is unable to accurately represent it – nature, not 
science, holds all the cards! 
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In sum, idiographic science rejects the assumption “according to which the individual’s 
variability of the psychological flow over time is structurally identical to the inter-individual 
variation within a given population” (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010. p. 5). Given the a priori 
assumption that humans are self-organising open systems, taking generality (i.e., nomothetic) 
as the starting point, overlooks intra-individual temporal variation that occurs (Molenaar, 
2004). In contrast, psychology in its recent history has primarily focused on variation between 
individuals or populations (i.e., inter-individual variation; Molenaar, 2004) - an approach 
which implicitly assumes that a data set can be extrapolated to make predictions about an 
equivalent future event (i.e., ergodic). This allows researchers to study a group without having 
to consider the role of time, process or context on the intra-individual level (Molenaar & 
Valsiner, 2009), To accept this assumption requires one also to assume that individuals can be 
meaningfully subsumed within a population or representative sample (Salvatore & Valsiner, 
2010). One of the problems with the notion of a population is that one is required to assume a 
priori a shared set of characteristics which define it (i.e., essentialism), and in turn will 
determine the nature of psychological processes over time on the inter-individual level.  
The consequence of relying on discrete populations for empirical testing has far 
reaching consequences for empirical psychological science. Firstly, to assume the possibility 
of discrete population requires the assumption of essentialism - that is, each group are assigned 
set of essences which in turn define it. Secondly, populations are chosen for study on the basis 
of their pre-determined essences. When the study is conducted, either (a) not everyone 
conforms to the set of essences which was assumed to define them, resulting in the need for 
another subgroup, or (b) the results merely confirm that which was already known about the 
population, thereby “pretending to prove empirically what is already presumed in the 
conceptual framework of the researchers” (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010. p. 6).  
By placing faith in a different method over a different epistemology, and implicitly 
assuming ergodicity over non-ergodicity, psychology researchers will inevitably be confronted 
with the same outcome - infinite regress. The problem is not whether qualitative or quantitative 
methods will best elucidate psychological phenomena. Rather, the problem is how we can best 
understand the underlying nature psychological phenomena itself – this requires knowledge to 
be more closely wedded to the assumptions (concerning its nature) themselves, rather than the 
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5.2.1   Do psychological processes have an underlying (sub-personal) nature? 
If one assumes there is no underlying nature, or theoretical general laws which govern 
the human psyche, then it is likely that the hope of a science is lost, as, rather than searching 
for general laws, we become limited to ultimately documenting individual events – as 
suggested by idiographic science. Paradoxically therefore, the hope of a science requires 
researchers to be less concerned with serving a science which values the arbitrary accumulation 
of data (i.e., normal science), and more concerned with the more fundamental questions about 
the underlying nature of such phenomena. Questions such as: Is the psychological phenomena 
under consideration ergodic or non-ergodic in nature? Is it best to think about psychological 
phenomena as relative bystanders in an ongoing superordinate process (i.e., an 
epiphenomenon)? Or, is it fair to assume that abstractions, such as motivation, have any 
objective characteristics (i.e., essentialism) and causal properties, which in turn allow for 
generalisation (i.e., the cognitivist hypothesis; Varela, Rosch, & Thompson, 1997)? And, which 
of these positions would constitute a more legitimate basis on which to assume scientific 
knowledge? 
Such questions are inevitably epistemological in nature and are unlikely to be addressed 
when one is led primarily by method. Indeed, a central contribution of idiographic science is 
the recognition that the development of psychology as a scientific discipline will be predicated 
on a closer dialogue with epistemology: “the idiographic imperative moves research from the 
logic of the confirmation to the logic of the construction of the knowledge” (Salvatore & 
Valsiner, 2010, p. 14). Addressing epistemological questions therefore requires a shift away 
from the primacy of data, towards a renewed emphasis on the development of general theory 
as the basis for knowledge construction (Toomela, 2007): 
The social practice of methodology has lost its conceptual status as the theoretical 
bridging between the general theory and the procedures of data construction. 
Contemporary psychology conceives of methodology in technical terms: as a repertoire 
of procedures of measurement and data analysis. And in doing so legitimates its 
empiricism…pretending as if the findings produced by the studies had an inherent and 
self-evident theoretical meaning. In sum, the population-ization of psychology has 
paved the way to the system of mass production of data of which contemporary 
psychology consists. (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010, p. 6) 
If interviews are effective in capturing rich descriptive data concerning subjective 
experiences - what do they have to offer the researcher who views the associated structure (or 
underlying nature) of psychological phenomena as belonging not solely to experience itself, 
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but to an interplay of conscious and unconscious processes based within a teleological self-
organising open system? When one assumes the latter, subjective experience provides 
potentially useful raw material, but will not alone, in-itself, elucidate the respective nature to 
which it is assumed to belong. When the mind is conceived as a self-organising system, the 
unconscious processes or mechanisms associated with it belong to the sub-personal level 
(Dennett, 1969), or hypothesised sub-systems (Powers, 1973), which are outside of conscious 
awareness. Idiographic science itself is predicated on establishing the general laws associated 
with these systems which make generality in uniqueness possible (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010).  
To assume the existence and explanatory importance of this sub-personal level, 
precludes the possibility of empiricism alone being the starting point for its elucidation. Rather, 
knowledge concerning the nature of the sub-personal level is dependent in the first instance on 
the development of an accurate representation in the form of theory:   
We might assume that perceptual experiences of some kind are directly accessible to 
an observer, but observation statements certainly are not. The latter are public entities, 
formulated in public language, involving theories of various degrees of generality and 
sophistication. Once attention is focused on observation statements as forming the 
alleged secure basis for science, it can be seen that, contrary to the inductivists’ claim, 
theory of some kind must precede all observation statements and observation 
statements are as fallible as the theories they presuppose. (Chambers, 1978, p. 28) 
Thus, if explanatory reality (in this case the sub-personal level) is not directly observable, then 
knowledge is dependent on a progressive circularity between theory and observed events 
(Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010) in order to verify it. This process is known as abductive 
reasoning: 
Guided by evolving research problems…sets of data are analysed in order to detect 
robust empirical regularities, or phenomenon. Once detected, these phenomena are 
explained by abductively inferring the existence of underlying causal mechanisms. 
Here, abductive inference involves reasoning from phenomena, understood as 
presumed effects, to their theoretical explanation in terms of underlying causal 
mechanisms. (Haig, 2005, pp. 372-373) 
Abductive reasoning shifts the emphasis of knowledge construction away from a 
reliance on methods and the accumulation of data, towards a dialogue between “empirical 
regularities” and theory. This dialogue requires what Mirza, Akhtar-Danesh, Noesgaard, 
Martin, and Staples (2014) call a creative inference, as the basis for knowledge construction. 
Whereas method and data appeal almost exclusively to the desire for objectivity, the emphasis 
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on the development of theory, via abductive reasoning, requires an increased acknowledgement 
of the subjective component of knowledge for phenomena not directly observable (i.e., sub-
personal level) – both for that which is being observed, and the theoretical interpretation made 
by the observer. Whilst a renewed emphasis on theory might appear like psychological science 
having to concede to subjectivism, Polanyi (1958) suggested that knowledge which relies more 
on theory offers the possibility of greater objectivity than knowledge which relies more on 
sensory experience (i.e., empiricism); because (a) a theory can be seen to exist outside its 
creator and offers a potential map for others to verify or correct; (b) when articulated a theory 
becomes impersonal given its rigidity is not affected by subjective fluctuations; and (c) theories 
can be developed which look beyond “one’s normal approach to experience” (Polanyi, 1958, 
p. 4).  
Taken together, if one assumes a priori in the idea of the sub-personal level (i.e., the 
unconscious), then theory in itself offers a potentially more objective basis for its elucidation. 
It is perhaps no surprise therefore that the pioneers of the psychodynamic movement (i.e., 
Freud and Jung), unencumbered by the “science envy” that is pervasive in modern 
psychological science, valued the primacy of theory as the basis on which to account for their 
experiences in order to objectify the sub-personal level. An important contribution of this 
movement was the idea that scientific knowledge about psychological phenomena, in order to 
acknowledge its idiographic (non-ergodic) nature, is predicated on subject/object 
reconciliation (i.e., empirical observations~theory, idiographic~nomothetic), and wherein 
insight in the form of theorising is afforded its rightful place. It seems that parts of 
contemporary psychological science are beginning to come full circle.  
   
5.2.2   Variables in psychology: An epistemological dead-end? 
 Implicit within the current form of scientism that pervades psychology and by extension 
sport psychology is the continued faith placed in the primacy of variables or abstract 
representations (i.e., confidence, motivation, mental toughness…) as a meaningful basis on 
which to develop our understanding of complex psychological phenomenon. This is despite 
warnings from within sport psychology that a continued emphasis on the measurement and 
elucidation of such variables represents a dead-end for the discipline (e.g., Nesti, 2004, Salter, 
1997). In this section I will briefly explore the proposition that the current reliance on this form 
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of objectivist representation is hindering the development of sport psychology as a science due 
to the flawed epistemological premise on which this type of theorising is based50. 
In the previous section I outlined a proposition made by idiographic science that 
grouping people into populations (population-ization; Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010) is a futile 
enterprise because it is unable to account for the non-ergodic nature of psychological processes, 
and the associated intra-individual variation that occurs. An associated challenge to nomothetic 
science is the observation that psychological variables, and their measurement, offers merely 
surface descriptions of the observed effects of the sub-personal level (variable-isation?). 
Variables have clear heuristic value for psychological science, given their ability to allow for 
measurement and comparisons to be made; as well as to allow researchers to collect data and 
draw statistical inference on an endless array of psychological phenomenon. Yet, the 
proposition to be considered herein is that variables are typically based on little more than 
common-sense assumptions which offer no real explanatory power. 
Implicit within the process of induction is that variables can be constructed based on 
existing notions of a phenomenon, and which in turn can be measured in order that inductive 
generalisations can be made (Valsiner, 2014). Yet Smedslund (1988, 1991, 1995, 2016) has 
consistently argued that this approach to psychological science is pseudo-empirical because it 
relies on drawing inferences based on common-sense assumptions which does not therefore 
require data to be collected for their verification: 
Take, for example, the following observation: a person has a certain facial expression 
and bodily stance leading to the interpretation that the person is surprised. One may 
assume that the person is surprised because something unexpected has happened, and 
one may test this hypothesis empirically by determining whether or not surprised 
persons have in fact experienced something unexpected. If the hypothesis is confirmed, 
this could be regarded as an empirical finding. However, the inference from being 
surprised to having experienced something unexpected is also logically necessary (you 
cannot be surprised without having experienced something unexpected) and this is 
knowable without collecting data. The described example is what I have labeled 
pseudo-empirical, that is, a finding falsely treated as empirical. (Smedlund, 2016, p. 
190) 
 Given mental processes cannot be directly observed, their measurement is necessarily 
based on a construction (i.e., abstract representation), which in turn is based on a shared version 
                                               
50 A brief critique of the use of abstraction as a form of theorising was outlined in chapter 2. 
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of common-sense for their development. The flaw in this form of theorising according to 
Valsiner (2014) is the assumption that the observed phenomena have actually been 
operationalised for the purpose of empirical testing. Instead Valsiner points out that  
[i]n reality, we have not ‘‘operationalized’’ the concept—that does not exist other than 
in common language—but we have created the concept based on our common sense, 
through the ‘‘objective’’ act of ‘‘measurement.’’ The process is precisely the reverse—
we have entified a common language notion, turned it into a thing—and projected as a 
presumed entity into the minds of the ordinary persons. (2014, p. 5)51 
The consequence of objectifying common-sense notions for the sake of homogeneity 
and generalisation, is that one ultimately finds heterogeneity and variation (i.e., infinite regress) 
on the inter-individual and intra-individual level. Take, for example, the recent academic 
interest in the notion of mental toughness, which continues to be an elusive phenomenon for 
sport psychology researchers (Gucciardi, Gordon, & Dimmock, 2009). Jones, Hanton, and 
Connaughton (2002) in attempting to seek a more coherent conceptualisation of the construct 
suggested that the “lack of scientific rigor that has been applied in addressing mental toughness 
may be the key to the general lack of conceptual clarity within this area” (p. 206). To address 
this scientific and conceptual deficit, the researchers conducted focus-groups and interviews 
with “ten international performers” in order to establish a definition and identify the attributes 
of mental toughness (12 were identified). Quite how this study addresses the issue of scientific 
rigour is not made clear. The paper refers to personal construct theory (Kelly, 1955) as the 
theoretical justification for the qualitative methodology used; but exactly how asking ten elite 
athletes to solve the mental toughness riddle equates to a scientific advance is left to the 
imagination: 
Initially this approach does not sound like a bad idea, but what task are the researchers 
really asking the experts to do? They are asking them to construct fantasies (socially 
constructed cultural ideals), and then come up with definitions and attributes that stem 
from those fantasies. And this is where the problem of absolute language comes in. For 
example, some descriptions of mental toughness contain the words “unshakable belief,” 
insatiable desire,” fully focused,” and so forth. That’s the problem when you ask “ideal” 
sort of questions. You get an ideal (not real, not human) result. Absolute fantasy 
                                               
51 See Kristjánsson (1993) and Smedlund (1978) for consideration of this argument with 
respect to cognitive-evaluation theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985) and self-efficacy theory 
(Bandura, 1977) respectively. 
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language is not science; it may be the language of imagination, but it is not science”. 
Andersen (2011, p. 73)52 
In his thoughtful and sustained critique of the mental toughness literature, Andersen 
(2011) lists 76 (and counting) attributes, behaviours, cognitions etc. identified by researchers 
as being associated with mental toughness, and surmises that the process involves “reifying 
popular phraseology into suspect psychological constructs…[which are] used substantiate what 
has probably been established, in other terms, years ago” (p. 70). 
Even if one assumes that “mental toughness” is a thing in its own right, and is associated 
with high levels of performance, are we therefore to believe that it manifests in the same way 
at all times on the intra- and inter-individual level? As Crust (2008) points out, “ignoring such 
differences is to the detriment of knowledge development, and this is dangerous as it might 
lead researchers down a metaphoric “blind alley’” (p. 578). If we accept that mental toughness 
manifests ideographically, is it possible to believe that when represented in any objectivist 
form, it is an actual part of the lived experience of athletes when things are going well? Or does 
it represent, as Andersen (2011) suggests, the fantasy language of the researcher’s collective 
imagination? Associating the language of mental toughness with fantasy might appear far-
fetched, but as Caddick and Ryall (2012) suggest, the term belongs to the romantic ideals of 
the researchers rather than having any sound epistemic basis. Why, because as conceived 
mental toughness can only be assigned in hindsight and on the basis of winning: “An athlete 
who has unshakable self-belief (and therefore according to the description, is mentally tough) 
but who ultimately fails in her sporting goal is considered self-deluded or arrogant” (p. 140). 
The conceptualisation of mental toughness, or any other sport related construct, will 
remain flawed as long as the epistemological basis for its elucidation remains flawed. 
Specifically, the assumption that there is even an objective thing to be captured - a thing which 
resides solely in the psyche of the subject, as opposed to in the collective imaginations of all 
concerned. As suggested by this thesis, any meaningful understanding of mental toughness 
requires it to be situated within a robust epistemological framework, not one that merely 
panders to the notion of objectivity.  
Without a sound epistemological footing, constructs such as mental toughness will 
ultimately rest on shifting sands due to methods incapable of accounting for individual 
                                               
52 Similarly, Caddick and Ryall (2012) have described mental toughness as a 
“pseudoscientific rhetorical construction, characterized by romantic notions of sporting 
idealism, elitist values, and metaphorical images of triumph and victory” (p. 139). 
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differences and temporal variation, but inadvertently reflecting it. How can it be any other way 
as long as researchers attempt to represent fluid and dynamic subjectivity in the form of static 
objectivist representations that are independent of context, time, or process? Yet such practice 
represents a form of blind obedience, the following of assumed scientific orders - taking the 
lead from the guiding principles, language and tools of psychological science (i.e., objectivity, 
causality, operationalisation, generalisation etc.) which offer no help with respect to the 
idiographic, non-ergodic nature of psychological phenomena. In direct contrast to non-
ergodicity is the notion of ontological invariance which assumed that observed phenomena are 
independent of space and time. A principle which, whilst the natural sciences is beginning to 
relinquish, psychology has been historically reluctant to do so (Greenwood, 2009). To give it 
up, would lead to the redundancy of many of the tools which psychological science has so 
heavily invested in order to stake its claim for scientific legitimacy.  
 When the guiding epistemological principles are inconsistent with the nature of 
psychological phenomena under consideration, and when the idea of science is lost, an 
unbridgeable gap is created between the associated methods used, be they qualitative or 
quantitative, and subject. And when bound by these conditions, it should come as no surprise 
that the researchers themselves will continue to attempt to fill the void between the subject 
itself and objective science - in the form of limitless variables and data which continue to 
preoccupy psychological science (see Valsiner, 2014). 
What will be explored in the remainder of the chapter is the proposition that an 
understanding of the psychological basis for performance, and its variation, requires a move 
away from the reliance on variables, or abstract representations, towards a renewed focus on 
theory associated with the sub-personal level. 
 
5.3   Cybernetics – an alternate epistemology and ontology53 
The development of the “scientific” half of psychology (i.e., natural-science as opposed 
to the human-science branch) can be viewed as attempts (e.g., introspectionism, behaviourism, 
and more recently cognitivism) to square the subject of psychology with the object of science. 
Whereas introspectionism and behaviourism represented the dream of an empirical science, 
cognitivism, with its increased emphasis on subject (i.e., the mind), was “more concerned with 
the kind of science psychology was to be” (Fuchs & Milar, 2003, p. 20).  
                                               
53 For excellent and more comprehensive introductions to cybernetics and its place in the 
history of psychology, see François (1999), Pickering (2010) and Scott (2016). 
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Although sport psychology is being increasingly influenced by alternative paradigms 
and disciplines within psychology, a cursory review of literature reinforces the suspicion that 
a theoretical monoculture (e.g., Stelter, 2005) still exists, with cognitive-behavioural 
psychology the default, go-to approach for (pseudo-) scientific respectability (Nesti, 2004). 
More specifically, the continued reliance on abstracting cognitive representations (i.e., 
confidence, mental toughness, anxiety) of psychological phenomena within sport, at the 
continued expense of systematic epistemological debate. If so much academic endeavour 
within sport psychology is (seemingly unquestionably) grounded in cognitivism, then the 
necessity of critique becomes even more acute, in order to examine the efficacy of this 
approach for the development of the discipline. Epistemological challenges to cognitivism are 
evident in the psychology (e.g., Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) and philosophy of sport 
literature (e.g., Moe, 2005), yet are noticeable by their absence within sport psychology itself. 
Cognitivism, which emerged from the formative years of the “cognitive revolution”, 
assumes causal relations between cognitivist states and behaviour, and that “cognition consists 
of acting on the basis of representations that are physically realised in the form of symbolic 
code in the brain or a machine” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 40). However, cognitivism itself 
represents only one part of the early cognitive revolution. The movement from which 
cognitivism emerged was cybernetics-systems paradigm (Vancouver, 2000) - “the science of 
the adaptive brain” (Pickering, 2010, p. 8) - which commenced over a decade before. 
Cybernetics adopts a functionalist position, given the assumption that mental processes are 
“functions of the biological organism in its adaptational efforts to influence and control its 
environment” (Sullivan, 1984, p. 12). In contrast, cognitive psychology is less interested in the 
regulation or purpose of behaviour, and more concerned with how knowledge structures are 
organised (Carver & Scheier, 1981). Furthermore, cybernetics is based on a “non-modern 
ontology of unknowability and becoming” (Pickering, 2010, p. 390). Non-modern, because it 
avoids the positivist tendency to reduce, enframe and thereby capture. Unknowable, because 
cybernetics views humans as being an exceedingly complex system (Beer, 1959), not bound by 
linear cause and effect relations and subject to reductionist laws. And becoming, because 
cybernetics views humans as purposeful, adaptive systems, wherein behaviour itself is 
emergent, and where “nothing present in advance determines what entities will turn out to be 
in the future” (ontology of becoming; Pickering, 2010, p. 107). This is not to suggest an 
ontology without rules and guiding principles; rather Pickering (2010) goes as far as to suggest 
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that the cybernetic viewpoint requires a fundamental reassessment of what is there for science 
to study with respect to what he calls situated knowledge54: 
The shift from a representational to a performative idiom for thinking about science, 
and from epistemology alone to ontology as well, is the best way I have found to get to 
grips with the problematic of situated knowledge. (Pickering, 2010, p. 26) 
In other words, by believing a priori that humans are complex, adaptive, and purposeful 
in nature, also requires the development of an alternate ontological language - one which is 
teleological, based on a performative epistemology (Pickering, 2010). Thus, first and foremost 
the task becomes one of finding the most suitable archetypes, formal language and metaphors55 
(Sullivan, 1984), which in turn offer the starting point for the representation of complex and 
dynamic sub-personal psychological processes. Furthermore, as proposed in chapter 3, any 
such language is also required to be compatible, both ontologically and epistemologically, with 
other areas of science in order to promote conceptual integration.  
 
5.3.1   The language of cybernetics and beyond 
 As conceived, cybernetics was premised on being an interdisciplinary movement, with 
the goal of transdisciplinary unity (Scott, 2016). Thus, the language of cybernetics is not only 
accountable to subject, but is also required to help bridge the gap between psychology and the 
other sciences.   
As proposed in their seminar paper, “Behavior, purpose and teleology”, Rosenblueth, 
Wiener, & Bigelow (1943) conceived behaviour, and its variation, as being either purposeful 
or non-purposeful. Whereas non-purposeful behaviour from this perspective is viewed as being 
random, purposeful behaviour implies action which is goal directed (i.e., teleological). Goals 
or reference values represent that which the system is working towards. For cybernetics 
therefore, goals are not arbitrary aims but, as with biological systems, determine the continued 
                                               
54 Which “…seeks to recognize that the scientific observer is part of the system to be studied, 
and this in turn leads to the recognition that the observer is situated and sees the world from a 
certain perspective, rather than achieving a detached and omniscient ‘view from nowhere’” 
(Pickering, 2010, p. 25-26). 
55 Sullivan (1984) used the terms formal language and metaphor (rather than paradigm) to 
reflect the observation that “[t]hough there are many attempts at systematic formalization of 
theory in psychology, none of these adds up to or commands the allegiance of the paradigm 
in the Kuhnian sense” (p. 2). 
     120  
existence of the system in its current form. The realisation of goals requires the system to 
provide information about the current state in relation to the goal itself, in order that 
adjustments can be made. This information provided by the system which potentially results in 
a change of behaviour is termed feedback (Richardson, 1991). Feedback that results in a 
structural coupling between states and goals is known in cybernetics as circular causality 
(Scott, 2016) which in turn allows for the self-regulation of the system.  
For cybernetics, given the complexity of the human system (i.e., hierarchical 
interconnected, open, and dynamic) - feedback, and by extension circular causality, offers the 
ontological basis on which existence itself becomes possible. Thus, an account of cybernetics 
cannot be complete without an acknowledgment of its biological precursor – homeostasis. This 
term, originally coined by Cannon (1932), refers to “the notion that living organisms can 
apparently react automatically to counter disturbances from a preferred or normal status quo” 
(Richardson, 1991, p. 48). In turn, homeostasis therefore allows for the stability of the system 
to be maintained in the face of variable internal and external conditions (Richardson, 1991). 
Although cybernetics became marginalised in the 1970’s as a distinct discipline (Scott, 
2016), the language of cybernetics continues to find a voice in different areas of science. For 
example, in complexity science, feedback now is recognised as a fundamental ingredient which 
allows for complex systems to exist. To illustrate this point Johnson (2007) uses the example 
of balancing a ruler upright in the hand: 
…the only reason that you can balance the ruler on your hand as opposed to the desk, 
is because your eye notices the movements of the ruler, and then feeds this information 
to your brain which then feeds back the information to your hand in the form of a 
movement. (Italics original; p. 26) 
Indeed, the centrality of feedback to the emergent behaviour of complex systems, cannot be 
overstated: “It is this intrinsic feedback generated by these objects both individually and as a 
whole, which ultimately is the source of the Complexity which arises in collections of all living 
objects” (Johnson, 2007, p. 68).  
Furthermore, the use of information by the system to adjust and adapt to variable 
external conditions is central to the idea in complexity science that order in nature is a product 
of self-organisation of the system (Kauffman, 1995). In contrast to Newtonian mechanics, 
complexity science acknowledges the uncertainty, irregularity and disorder inherent within 
nature (i.e., chaos). Self-organisation represents the tendency for life (or complex non-linear 
systems), in the face of chaos, to display emergent order in a seemingly spontaneous manner 
(Kauffman, 1995).  
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  For some physicists the acknowledgment of chaos requires a fundamental realignment 
concerning what there is to study, towards a “science of process rather than state, of becoming 
rather than being” (Gleick, 1997, p. 5). Similarly, with respect to biological systems, Rose 
(1997) wrote “[w]e need instead to be concerned with process, with the paradox of 
development by which any organism has to be and become…and with the continuous 
interchange between organisms and their environments (p. 18). 
Because living systems exist as a function of their environment and self-organisation, 
as well as being active agents rather than passive responders, Rose (1997) argues that 
homeostasis has to be replaced by homeodynamics to account for the ability of living systems 
to be able to maintain themselves in the face of environmental variation. Self-organisation 
therefore does not represent a state of equilibrium, but a dynamic, and fluid ongoing response 
to variation (internal and external). The paradox being that at any point in time a complex 
dynamic system is said to be in a state of disequilibrium (or instability; Strogatz, 2003), yet it 
is this very state which allows for the emergence of ordered behaviour. Thus, the existence of 
life, including all that is associated with it (i.e., psyche), is dependent on its ability to self-
organise in response to dynamic environments in which they are situated. The responses 
themselves can be viewed as both who we are and what makes life possible. 
 
5.3.2   William Powers’ control theory 
 
  ...the comprehensive understanding of the human mind requires an 
organismic perspective; that not only must the mind move from a nonphysical cognitum 
to the realm of biological tissue, but it must also be related to a whole organism 
possessed of integrated body proper and brain and fully interactive with a physical and 
social environment. (Damasio, 2006, p. 252) 
 
A common thread that runs throughout the development of the cybernetic movement is 
the attempt to understand how systems in dynamic environments self-reference, self-organise 
and self-change (Richardson, 1991). Control theory (Powers, 1973) outlines a conceptual 
model of processes in the brain which allowed for these self-governing processes to take place. 
Critically, Powers model was principally based on the concept of feedback, but unlike previous 
efforts within the cybernetics movement which applied feedback in order to model behaviour, 
control theory represents an attempt to develop a conceptual model of the brain which makes 
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observable behaviour possible; whilst at the same time being consistent with neural physiology 
(Richardson, 1991): 
[T]here is a certain amount of confusion extant about the difference between a model 
for cause of behaviour and a model for consequences of organization…One often sees 
block diagrams of behavioral organization, but a close inspection usually shows that 
blocks are not sub-systems inside the behaving system, but subdivisions of its 
externally observable behaviour. As long as one is only dividing observable behavior 
into units that seem to hang together in some way, he has the problem that many 
different ways of subdividing the same whole will result in a self-consistent description. 
What is needed to build a compelling model of internal causes of behavior is some hint 
from nature, some suggestion that will point the theorist in the right direction and tell 
him how to look at what little of the insides of the nervous is known. (Powers, 1973, p. 
17; latter italics inserted) 
In other words, by not focusing on the internal organisation of the system (i.e., sub-
personal level), one is confronted with an infinite regress with respect to its manifestation. The 
consequence being that all descriptive accounts of psychological phenomena are, in 
themselves, valid, but will offer little explanatory power. Why, because the multitude of 
outward manifestations reflect but do not reveal the mechanisms (i.e., sub-personal level) 
which make cognition and behaviour possible. This premise is consistent with idiographic 
science which views variability on the intra-individual level as one of its defining features 
(Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). Because intra-individual variation cannot be generalised to the 
inter-individual level, idiographic science, like control theory, is concerned with general laws 
governing the system which make this possible (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010).  
 Powers (1973) is deeply critical of previous attempts in psychology which develop 
theory based on the conflation of abstract generalisations and extrapolation with model 
building. Specifically, as the basis for theory development, abstraction and extrapolation in 
themselves (a) do not allow for theory to extend beyond the description of observable 
behaviour; (b) are unable to account for the effect of internal and external variation and change; 
and (c) are unable to provide a basis on which to account for the inner organisation (i.e., sub-
personal level) which makes the observable behaviour possible.  
In other words, theoretical abstraction unrelated to a mechanism represents a separation 
from the inner workings of its source (i.e., the nervous system), rather than providing a basis 
for integrating our understanding of psychological processes with respect to their biological 
counterparts. This is not to argue for the necessity of a fundamental materialist position. Rather, 
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to suggest that an epistemological criterion for the scientific credibility of a theoretical position 
within psychology is predicated on consistency with other domains on which the existence of 
psychology relies (i.e., conceptual integration; Comides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992). If the brain 
itself can be meaningfully characterised as an exceedingly complex, self-organising system, it 
stands to reason that a scientific account of any hypothesised psychology processes (and 
associated subsystems) are subject to the same ontological criteria.  
As with idiographic science, Powers (1973) believed that models were required to 
represent the inner organisation of the system which allows for the associated outward 
manifestations in the intra-individual level. The concept of negative feedback is one of the hints 
from nature that Powers (1973) draws upon to account for the underlying properties of the sub-
personal level. A negative feedback loop is described by Vancouver (2005) as “one that 
through its operation reduces the difference between the level of a variable and the reference 
(i.e., goal) level for the variable” (p. 49). Critically, according to control theory, feedback 
occurs on a perceptual rather than behavioural level wherein the purpose of the system is to 
reduce error between a desired state (i.e., performance goal) and the current perceived state 
(W. Powers, 1973).  
To illustrate how feedback is best understood on the perceptual rather than behavioural 
level, Powers (1973) uses the analogy of a control task wherein the person is required to track 
a moving target using a cursor. If the task was simply to keep the cursor as close to the moving 
target as possible, then error reduction (i.e., using negative feedback) alone would explain the 
associated behaviour (i.e., its purpose). However, if the person then decided to keep the cursor 
just to the left of the moving target, they would be able to do so not based solely on the notion 
of error per say, but due to the difference between the perceived current state of the system in 
any given moment (i.e., where the cursor is in relation to the target), and the desired state which 
Powers calls the reference condition. Critically, what this analogy demonstrates is that:  
(a)  On a purely objective level, error reduction per se is not a given. Error becomes 
relative to the reference condition as the person understands it. A person who 
successfully keeps the cursor just to the left of the target would see no error, 
therefore;  
(b)  the reference condition represents an interplay between the subject and the object - 
which by definition is the perceived state which requires no response (Powers, 
1973). For example, if one was required to balance a ruler on their hand, wherein 
the reference condition is for the ruler to be perfectly horizontal, a response is only 
required when the person perceives the ruler deviating from this position.   
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(c)  The internal organisation that determines the reference condition, goes relatively 
unnoticed compared to the perceived errors manifest in the detail of the situation as 
it develops (Powers, 1973). Thus, the internal organisation represents unconscious 
processes guiding goal-directed behaviour. This position is consistent with the 
“constrained action hypothesis” (McNevin et al., 2003; Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 
2001) which contends that conscious control disrupts automatic movements 
necessary for the successful execution of complex motor skills.  
(d)  The purpose of behaviour is not primarily as a response to the objective conditions 
that one is presented with, but the perception of the current state of the system in 
relation to the reference condition. For example, a defending football player makes 
adjustments based on their perceived optimal strategy (e.g., staying close to the 
player they are marking), but for an observer who perceives a different optimal 
strategy (e.g., keeping a bit of distance from the player they are marking) will view 
the errors, and by association the behaviours, differently.  
(e)  Thus, as Powers (1973) eloquently summarises: “behaviour is the control of 
perception” (p. xi).   
As an example of how this process works, take another exceedingly complex system: 
the financial markets. As Johnson (2007) points out, financial markets operate as complex 
systems because, like the weather, there is no perfect model of prediction which can inform 
decision making. Instead, variations within stock markets results from localised decisions on 
whether to buy or sell, which is dependent on perceptual feedback from within the system 
regarding whether stock is over or undervalued. Inherent within the system is a degree of 
uncertainty on the part of the individual agents (i.e., brokers) regarding the decision whether 
to buy or sell. The paradox being that if there was a perfect prediction model every agent would 
be using it, resulting in the system breaking down – all agents would sell in response to stock 
being overvalued making it worthless (Johnson, 2007). Thus, when viewed as a complex 
system, the financial markets existence, like the organisation of the brain, is predicated on not 
just feedback but also localised perceptual error.  
Furthermore, the behaviour of the stock market itself (i.e., fluctuations in stock value) 
is a function of a self-perpetuating cyclical process between the fluctuations being fed back to 
the agents and the decision to either buy or sell (Johnson, 2007) - wherein the behaviours of 
the agents become both the cause and effect of the market fluctuations (i.e., circular causality). 
What this analogy reveals therefore, is that for a complex system, reference conditions cannot 
by definition be fixed states because that would result in the breakdown of the system. Rather, 
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reference conditions and by association behaviour, are necessarily dynamic, subject to circular 
causality, external variations and perceptual error. 
In sum, rather than represent little more than a mechanistic view of human psychology 
akin to the principle of homeostasis, as suggested by some psychologists (e.g., Bandura & 
Locke, 2003), the appropriation of feedback by Powers as a perceptual mechanism represents 
a meaningful attempt to account for the process of becoming (being~becoming; subject~object) 
of self - more consistent with the notion of homeodynamics. Whereas feedback itself represents 
the objective mechanism, its function according to Powers (i.e., the control of perception), 
results in a dynamic structural coupling (i.e., circular causality) between behaviour and 
perception: “What an organism senses affects what it does, and what it does affects what it 
senses” (1973, p. 41, italics original). Thus, feedback serves as one theoretical basis for the 
regulation and development of self (i.e., being and becoming respectively) in the face of being 
situated in complex and dynamic environments. 
 
5.4   Conclusions 
 
Every other science has so to speak an outside; not so psychology, whose object is the 
inside subject of all science (Jung, 1960, p. 223) 
 
The psychology of becoming outlined in this chapter suggests that attempts to model 
psychological processes based on static, abstract representations is ontologically and therefore 
epistemologically flawed. Within this frame, the purpose of examining psychological 
processes is to help towards elucidating the objective structures which help to shape subjective 
experience (i.e., sub-personal level); structures which are consistent with other branches of 
science in order to allow for conceptual integration. It is this basis (i.e., subject~object) on 
which a hope of a science is based, not the continued mining of psychological constructs 
associated with lived experience; constructs which don’t require science for their elucidation.  
In this chapter I have considered theoretical developments in psychology consistent 
with notion of the psyche as a dynamic process based within a teleological system. Jung centred 
his ontology of becoming on the idea of individuation, a holistic term used to represent the 
total project of the psyche: the integration and realisation of “self” through the paradox of 
becoming who we are (being~becoming). Influenced by the natural sciences, Jung believed 
that psychic activity was based on rules which had equivalence in nature (Stevens, 1990), 
wherein the regulation of psychic activity, and by association the individuation process, is 
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based on maintaining a dynamic equilibrium between opposing parts of oneself (i.e., being) - 
whilst at the same time engaging in continual synthesis between the “adaptations to the 
conditions of the inner world” (Jung, 1960, p. 39), and adaptation to the environmental 
conditions (i.e., becoming).  
Control theory (Powers, 1973), attempts to model the inner organisation of the brain 
based on the concept of feedback, wherein behaviour occurs in response to a perceptual error 
between the so-called reference condition (i.e., what the system is working towards) and the 
perceived current state of the system. Rather than represent a relatively closed system, 
analogous to homeostasis, feedback regulates an emergent thread between the structural 
coupling of behaviour and perception in the face of environmental variation (i.e., 
homeodynamics). 
The language of control theory has distinctly non-humanistic quality, to which Powers 
himself was acutely aware. In the preface to his book, Powers (1973) argues that the elucidation 
of a mechanism does not deny the idiographic quality associated with psychological processes. 
Rather, in anticipating this potential challenge to his theory, Powers (1973) argues that equating 
mechanism with a view that humans are little more than automatons reflects the implicit 
acceptance of a dualism between the idea of a mechanism and humanism. Instead, Powers 
suggests that the seemingly irreconcilable views of humanists and mechanists can be overcome 
by the reciprocal process of understanding how mechanism in itself allows for understanding 
the totality of what it means to be human (i.e., experience), and vice versa: 
This process puts experience before theory but paradoxically shows that much which 
seems uniquely human is after all only acquired mechanism. The human remainder, the 
factor distinguishing man from animal or machine, is visible in the model only as a 
ghost, through its transcendent effects on the model itself…Whatever its nature, and I 
am sure it has a nature, it is adequately understandable through its effects on experience 
– and incidentally, on learning. Adequately, that is, for any purpose I can now conceive 
(1973, p. x). 
 Thus, Powers epistemological position is consistent with the premise of idiographic 
science. Namely, to study the interdependence of what makes us individual and what we have 
in common (i.e., idiographic subjectivity~nomothetic objectivity; experience~nature; 
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person~subpersonal; empirical regularities~theory; subjective~objective), and to base theory 
thereon56. 
Furthermore, Powers (1973) offers one basis on which to capture the intra-individual 
variability of psychological processes. This basis is not primarily the mechanism itself, despite 
its importance, but the suggestion of an interface between subjectivity and objectivity, which 
in turn offers an approximation towards their reconciliation. When knowledge is viewed as a 
process rather than state (e.g., Piaget, 1972), no theory in psychology can ever be considered 
final and therefore should not be held to that account. To do so would be absurd, as it would 
suggest that all questions concerning psychology can be reduced to a single formula. Rather, 
mechanisms such as perceptual feedback, should be judged on the extent to which they 
contribute towards the development of psychology as a mature science. As suggested in this 
chapter, this contribution relates to (a) the extent to which it develops the possibility of 
establishing general laws concerning a deeper underlying nature; (b) its ability to account for 
empirical regularities (i.e., abductive reasoning); and (c) its consistency with other 
developments in science (i.e., conceptual integration). Taken together, all are ultimately 
concerned with the reconciliation of subject and object.  
Jung believed that the establishment of psychology as a science was predicated on unity 
within, and with the other sciences (Shamdasani, 2003). This establishment should not be 
understood as “catching up” but, as we begin to lose the certainties associated with classical 
theories of knowledge, being part of the dialogue about what science is (Piaget, 1972). Thus, 
to consign to history the perpetual state of crisis in psychology requires epistemology to be 
placed at its heart. When knowledge cannot be considered final, the process of continual 
clarification concerning what knowledge is, as opposed to the unquestioning accumulation of 
data, becomes central to the process of doing science. Only then is it likely that the conditions 
be right for a unifying paradigm to emerge out of disciplinary fragmentation driven by vested 
self-interest.  
Despite apparent differences in language, scope and perspective, a closer reading of the 
work of Jung and Powers reveals that the spirit of unification underpins their respective 
                                               
56 The fundamental epistemological importance of circularity has been recognised in 
cognitive psychology (Varela et al., 1991), complex systems theory (Füllsack, 2016), and, 
cybernetics and general science (L. Kauffman, 2016). The time seems right to consider the 
implications of circularity with respect to the theory and practice of sport psychology (see 
chapter 7 for some preliminary consideration). 
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psychologies. Furthermore, what emerged from both is a shared set of theoretical assumptions 
which help define their work and which could guide the way towards a theory of being and 
becoming: 
•   The psyche functions as a teleological self-regulating system, governed by a dynamic 
inner organisation. 
•   Experience is, in part, shaped by the inner organisation of the psyche (i.e., sub-personal 
level/unconscious), and vice versa (i.e., circular causality). 
•   The organisation of the system, and any associated mechanisms, cannot be understood 
based on abstract generalisations due to their idiographic quality. Thus suggesting that 
when viewed a priori as a teleological system, the manifestations represent 
epiphenomena unique to the individual. 
•   Consistent with the premise of idiographic science, it is the establishment of general 
laws, consistent with the other sciences, and capable of capturing experience which are 
of primary concern for the establishment of a mature discipline.  
The implications of these epistemological and theoretical developments will be 
considered in the next two chapters with respect to sport psychology. Based on the notion that 
the psyche represents a dynamic system, in the next chapter a new approach to our 
understanding of peak performance and dysfunctional performance in sport - Correction theory 
(Cowen, Nesti, Cheetham, 2014) - will be outlined. The central idea to be developed is that 
with respect to performance, understanding the psychological basis for its variation, rather than 















The psychology of performance variation in sport57 
 
Life is like riding a bicycle. To keep your balance you must keep moving (Einstein) 
 
The finish line at the end of a career is no different to the finish line at the end of a 
match. The objective is to get within reach of that finish line, because then it gives off 
a magnetic force. When you’re close you can feel that force pulling you, and you can 
use that force to get across. But just before you come within range, or just after, you 
feel another force, equally strong, pushing you away. Its inexplicable, mystical, these 
twin forces, these contradictory energies, but they both exist. I know, because I’ve spent 
much of my life seeking the one, fighting the other, and sometimes I’ve been stuck, 
suspended, bouncing like a tennis ball between the two. (Agassi, 2009, p. 7) 
 
If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster 
      And treat those two impostors just the same (Kipling, ‘If…’) 
 
 
6.1   Preface  
 
The theory to be outlined in this chapter was the result of an ongoing reflection into my 
own ontology. Specifically, the idea that the notion of balance offers a useful conceptual and 
metaphorical basis on which to account for order/existence on all levels. On a macro level I 
viewed the so-called “Goldilocks zone” for planets – the requirement of a planet to be not too 
far or too near to its star in order to support life – as evidence for the interdependence of human 
existence and balance. Similarly, on a micro, or psychological level, I repeatedly observed how 
psychological processes, and the associated states were dependent on, and defined by, the 
                                               
57 The wording and content of this chapter is a modified version of the paper entitled “The 
psychology of dynamic balance and peak performance in sport: correction theory” (Cowen, 
Nesti, & Cheetham, 2014).  
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dialectical interplay of opposing poles. For example, the experience of happiness does not just 
represent the negation of unhappiness, but also is dependent on it. In other words, I could only 
make sense of a psychological state, through its structural relationship with its complimentary 
opposite. What emerged was a fundamental belief in the regulatory function of opposites as 
the basis for the organisation and manifestation of psychological functioning. This position 
represents my subjectivity, or the “personal equation”, and therefore in itself, cannot make a 
claim to objectivity. Whilst my thoughts on this matter were in their infancy, I was interested 
in whether this idea had found expression within science and philosophy. Frustration with the 
dominance of positivist thought within psychology during my undergraduate studies led me to 
read more widely upon graduation. What quickly came apparent was that there was no 
originality in my position. 
I learnt that interest in the regulatory function of opposites was a fundamental aspect of 
Eastern philosophy. Furthermore, the Eastern worldview recognised that nature was 
intrinsically dynamic, subject to change as a function of time (Capra, 1975; Lent, 2017). In 
pre-Socratic philosophy, Heraclitus held similar views about the laws of nature, and again, 
recognised the regulatory function of opposites a fundamental ordering principle in nature. 
Reading about Heraclitus led me to Frieda Fordham’s An Introduction to Jung’s Psychology 
(Fordham, 1966), and the following passage in the introduction: 
Jung’s conception of the psyche is of a system which is dynamic, in constant movement, 
and at the same time; he calls the general psychic energy libido…The libido flows 
between two opposing poles…Jung usually refers to the opposing poles as ‘the 
opposites’. The greater the tension between the pairs of opposites the greater the energy; 
without opposite there is no manifest energy…The opposites have a regulating function 
(as Heraclitus discovered many hundred years ago), and when one extreme is reached 
libido passes over into its opposite…To Jung the regulatory function of opposites is 
inherent in human nature and essential to an understanding of human nature (p. 17-18)  
On subsequently reading Two Essays on Analytical Psychology (Jung, 1966a) I was struck by 
how Jung’s view of the psyche, based on the regulatory function of opposites, underpinned all 
of analytical psychology. Jung already had developed a highly sophisticated global vision of 
the psyche, and beyond, based on ideas that I had only started to grapple with!  
Although the constructs outlined in this chapter were initially derived from the notion 
of balance within an open system (i.e., dynamic balance, imbalance, correction), they have 
already been explored throughout Jung’s extensive collected works (i.e., equilibrium, 
disequilibrium, compensation) as the basis for understanding the dynamics of the psyche and 
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its manifestation. Rather than give up on my thesis (my first inclination), it became apparent 
the importance of ideas which appeared to transcend individuals time and place58, and this led 
to one of the epistemological criteria considered in this thesis. Namely, there is a the need for 
ideas and theoretical developments to transcend individuals, and be consistent with 
developments across difference scientific disciplines (i.e., conceptual integration, Comides, 
Tooby, & Barkow, 1992).  
 
6.2   Introduction 
 
A psychological theory, if it is to be more than a technical makeshift, must base itself 
on the principle of opposition; for without this it could only re-establish a neurotically 
unbalanced psyche. There is no balance, no system of regulation without opposition. 
The psyche is just such a self-regulating system. (Jung, 1966a, p. 61) 
 
Aphorisms such as success out of failure and triumph over adversity are commonplace 
within sport. One regularly hears coaches and players talk about expecting a reaction following 
defeat, and warning against complacency after victory; alluding to a possible interdependent 
relationship between success and failure rarely explored within the academic literature. The 
pursuit of achieving sustainable peak performances in competition is arguably one of the 
defining goals and challenges for elite athletes (Nesti, Littlewood, O’Halloran, Eubank, & 
Richardson, 2012), and for those who seek to support them. Yet variation in performance is a 
certainty for athletes, including at elite levels, making success and failure an inevitable part of 
elite athletes lived experience (Gilbourne and Richardson, 2006)59.  
Privette (1981) defined peak performance as “behaviour in any activity that transcends 
what normally could be expected in that situation” (p. 51). Based on this definition, peak 
performance refers to a higher level of functioning within any given activity (Privette, 1983), 
which is by definition quantitatively and/or qualitatively different to a “normal” level of 
performance.  
                                               
58  Jung used the term archetypes to describe universal pre-dispositions for patterns of 
thought.  
59 The final version of this paragraph is indebted to input by one of the co-authors. 
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The qualitative nature of the subjective experiences associated with peak performance 
in sport has attracted significant attention in the literature (i.e., Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; 
Jackson, 1992, Privette, 1981; Ravizza, 1977, 1984). Many of these findings suggest that peak 
performance is an ego-transcending experience (Maslow, 1968) consistent with the construct 
of flow (Young & Pain, 1999), which Jackson et al. (2001) described as an optimal mental state 
theoretically associated with optimal athletic performance. Csikszentmihalyi (1990) identified 
9 characteristics of flow, including total concentration, a sense of personal control, and the 
merging of action and awareness. Jackson & Csikszentmihalyi (1999) give the following 
account of a runner reportedly in a state of flow: “I felt very in control…I felt very strong. I 
was able to run as I had planned…I felt really focused. I just felt like, you know, like athletes 
say, ‘It clicked’; it felt great the whole way” (p. 4). 
However research into the association between flow and performance in sport settings 
reveals an inconsistent picture (see Schuler & Brunner, 2009). Even if one is to assume that 
flow is positively associated to performance, research has suggested that it is not experienced 
frequently by athletes (Jackson, 1992) despite a relatively high proportion of athletes reporting 
to have perceived control of factors affecting flow occurrence (see Swann, Keegan, Piggott, & 
Crust, 2012, for a review). Ravizza (1977, 1984), however, found that most athletes 
interviewed reported that peak performance states were involuntary and temporary in nature. 
 As considered in chapter 3, Swann et al. (2012) concluded that whilst we have a fairly 
comprehensive understanding of what it is like to experience flow, “research should move from 
such description to explaining flow” (p. 818). If one is not to confuse description with 
explanation, it is likely that any explanation of optimal mental states will require an approach 
which moves away from static taxonomy, or abstraction, towards acknowledging the dynamic, 
temporal nature of performance itself. 
Idiographic science would suggest that theoretical attempts to understand peak 
performance in sport have been impaired by focusing on its qualitative nature based on a 
between-person (i.e., inter-individual) level of analysis. A between-person level of analysis 
allows researchers to assess cross-sectional (single time point) variation on a particular 
measure; and has typically been used to capture the subjective experience of peak performance 
states such as flow (i.e., Jackson, 1992; Ravizza, 1977). However Vancouver, Thompson, and 
Williams (2001) proposed that within-person (i.e., intra-individual) level of analysis is better 
able to conceptualise change in performance levels over time, and thus allow for the possibility 
of temporal precedence to be established (Curran & Bauer, 2011). 
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For example, confidence is considered by many researchers as one of the most 
important psychological influences on athletic performance (e.g., Bandura, 1997; Jones & 
Hanton, 2001; Vealey, 2001). According to Bandura (1986, 1997), confidence, conceptualised 
as self-efficacy, is most strongly influenced by previous accomplishments. In turn, self-efficacy 
is assumed to exert a positive causal influence on future performance (Bandura & Locke, 
2003). Indeed, there is considerable empirical support for a positive linear relationship between 
self-efficacy and performance on a between-person level of analysis (e.g., Moritz, Feltz, 
Fahrbach & Mack, 2000; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998). However, Vancouver and colleagues 
(Vancouver, Thompson, & Williams, 2001; Vancouver, Thompson, Tischner, & Putka, 2002; 
Vancouver & Kendall, 2006) have suggested that the significant effect of previous performance 
on self-efficacy could conceal a negative effect of self-efficacy on future performance. In 
support of this Vancouver et al. (2001) reported that studies which utilise a within-person 
approach suggest that a successful performance increases the probability of poorer subsequent 
performance. 
For example, Mizruchi (1991) studied National Basketball Association playoff data 
between 1947 and 1982, and found that “winning the previous game increased the probability 
of losing the present game by about 12%” (p.186). Mizruchi (1991) hypothesised that in team 
competition, success breeds failure because it can lead to overconfidence which reduces the 
urgency for future success. Furthermore, Mizruchi (1991) also suggested that prior failure 
could increase the likelihood of success because it increases the motivation for achievement in 
the future.  
 In order to account for the temporal, idiographic nature of performance variation in 
sport, a new theoretical framework will be outlined – correction theory. Correction theory is 
based within a dynamic systems perspective, in an attempt to capture the variable, complex 
nature of athletic performance. When judged from this perspective, the individual is viewed as 
a non-linear open system of which one of the defining characteristics is the spontaneous 
emergence of self-organisation (Kauffman, 1995; Strogatz, 2003) and indeterminacy on the 
cognitive-behavioural level (Schall, 2004).  
In relation to the development of research and theory within the sport sciences over the 
last three decades, Balague, Torrents, Hristovski, Davids & Araújo (2013) observed that a 
mechanistic view of human organisms has dominated the development of research and theory. 
Given the tendency within sport science to overlook the dynamic organism-environment 
relationship in favour of reductive internal (mental) mechanisms (Davids & Araújo, 2010), 
Balague et al. (2013) suggested that complex systems approaches provide a more ecological 
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basis on which to conceptualise sport related phenomena. Furthermore, I believe that a dynamic 
systems approach is a promising way to develop theory with regard to the psychological basis 
for sporting performance. 
 Correction theory also utilises control theory (W. Powers, 1973), based within a class 
of theories referred to as the cybernetic-systems paradigm (Vancouver, 2000, 2005). As 
outlined in the previous chapter, control theory theorises that in complex environments, control 
is exerted on the system based on the concept of negative feedback, which W. Powers (1973) 
viewed as the “central and determining factor in all observed behavior” (p. 44).  
Based on these perspectives, two constructs, or metaphors, are outlined which form the 
basis of correction theory: 
•   Dynamic balance - A state in which a robust complex system will self-correct in 
response to imbalance (resulting from perceived variation/challenge) in order to 
maintain functional organisation; or, a naturally occurring phenomenon which occurs 
due to the necessity of robust, stable complex systems to self-organise through 
correction; or, the individual and coordinated expression of balance and imbalance60 
•   Correction - The response of the system to a source of imbalance or challenge 
Correction theory views the individual as a system, and assumes that dynamic balance 
underwrites individual functioning. It will be argued that such a view of balance allows a new 
perspective on our understanding of peak performance and performance variation in sport. The 
central thesis is that we can no longer view peak performance61 and dysfunctional 
performance62 as unrelated occurrences. Thus, instead of viewing dysfunctional performance 
as an anathema, it paradoxically forms a necessary part of or understanding of peak 
performance in sport. Peak performance and dysfunctional performance are viewed as two 
sides of the same naturally occurring phenomenon; a dynamic self-correcting system.  
 
                                               
60 The latter is based on Kelso’s (2008) notion of meta-stability, which is described as "the 
simultaneous realisation of two competing tendencies: the tendency of the components to 
couple together and the tendency for the components to express their intrinsic independent 
behavior” (p. 186). 
61 For consistency, the term peak performance will be used in this paper to describe any 
performance which is significantly above what can normally be expected (Privette, 1981). 
62 Conceptualised as a below average performance. 
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6.3   Balance – Conceptual meaning 
The ubiquitous nature of the term balance opposes a universal definition. The Concise 
Oxford English Dictionary (Soanes & Stevenson [Eds.], 2008) lists seven definitions for 
balance (noun), not including related terms such as balanced and on balance. Definitions 
include “a counteracting weight or force” and “mental or emotional stability” (p. 100). The 
metaphor of the weighing scales has endured, and is reflected in Aristotle’s golden mean, and 
Camus’ philosophy of limits. Metaphysically, balance can also be considered in terms of 
recognition and/or acceptance of both sides of a particular dichotomy, and their inter-relation. 
As outlined in chapter 2, Jung developed a model of the psyche governed by the principle of 
dynamic opposition (Stevens, 1990) between opposing, yet complimentary systems (e.g., 
consciousness~unconsciousness; progression~regression). When reflecting on the lessons 
from history with respect to the boundaries of human existence, van Deurzen (2002) suggested 
that the “struggle between opposites” (p.52) is one of the defining characteristics, in which the 
existential goal is to avoid one-sidedness. 
Considered dynamically, balance cannot be seen as a stable ideal, but a constant shifting 
of sand, taking on new forms. In relation to a non-equilibrium self-organising (open) system, 
absolute balance is a misnomer which doesn’t allow and account for imbalance, and therefore 
variation and change. Non-equilibrium ordered systems are said to be maintained and regulated 
by the continuous dissipation of energy, where the constant flux of energy through the system 
allows for order (Kauffman, 1995). Thus for a dynamically balanced system, and in light of 
Kelso’s (2008) notion of meta-stability, balance necessitates imbalance, and imbalance 
necessitates balance. 
Although the idea of the complementarity of opposites is a new departure for sport 
psychology, it has lineage within the parent discipline of psychology (e.g., Jung’s depth 
psychology), as well as in the natural sciences (see Kelso & Engstrøm, 2006) and philosophy 
(e.g., Heraclitus’s notion of the unity of opposites). In reviewing such developments, Kelso & 
Engstrøm (2006) suggested that Neils Bohr’s notion of complementarity could be a starting 
point to consider broader human concerns. Kelso & Engstrøm (2006) introduced the term 
complementary nature, which they defined as “a set of mutually dependent principles 
responsible for the genesis, existence, and evolution of the universe relating to or suggestive 
of complimenting, completing, or perfecting relationships and being complimented in return” 
(Kelso & Engstrøm, 2006, p. 39). This definition implies that the existence of the universe, and 
that which inhabits it, is dependent, and defined by its ability to organise itself based on the 
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complementarity of opposites. Thus implying that the study of any phenomenon is incomplete 
without a consideration of its relationship with its complementary opposite.  
 
6.4   Balance and sport performance 
Within elite sport, temporal variation in performance is a reality for all athletes. This 
chapter will argue that these different performance levels are inter-related, and that peak 
performances are dependent on psychological and systemic sources of imbalance within elite 
sport. For example, Balague (1999) has observed that elite athletes have to make major 
sacrifices in other aspects of their lives in order to fulfil the demands of their sport, as well as 
being required to give an extreme level of commitment to the activity itself. Similarly, Miller 
and Kerr (2002) have suggested that there is a cost of pursuing performance excellence at the 
expense of the overall development of the person, which they suggest could be due to over-
identification with their athletic role. 
From a more philosophical perspective, the work of Loland (2000) considered the effect 
of the logic of quantifiable progress, whereby progress is characterised by quantification of 
performance, and the breaking of records. The flaw that Loland identifies within this logic is 
that the goal of being citius, altius, fortius (faster, higher, stronger) doesn’t take into account 
our limitations as biological beings. Our “phylogenetic potential is stable” (Loland, 2000, p. 
43), but this is ultimately incompatible with our insatiable appetite for improvement. Whilst 
peak performance is a defining goal of elite sport, the possibility of continuous peak 
performances appears an elusive dream. Ravizza (1977) found that peak performances are 
viewed by athletes as the exception rather than the norm, suggesting that athletes rarely perform 
to their full potential. Furthermore, Loland (2000) suggested that there could be a human cost 
for the pursuit of continual improvement, including the use of doping and genetic engineering 
within sport.  
Culbertson (2005) suggested that such logic also has psychological implications for the 
athlete that can be encountered on an almost daily basis. Culbertson (2005) argued that to take 
part in record sports where quantifiable progress is the goal, promotes the need for self-
deception on the part of the athlete. Drawing upon Sartre’s notion of bad faith, Culbertson 
(2005) suggested that there is a fundamental contradiction between the endless pursuit of 
records (striving for transcendence), and human facticity. The latter he describes as “their past, 
their current situation, and their body – in short, that which is a given fact of their existence” 
(Culbertson, 2005, p. 67). 
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An athlete in pursuit of progress denies this contradiction yet is fully aware of it. The 
athlete believes that continual progress is possible (and conducts his or her life entirely 
in accordance with this belief) yet knows that it is not. This self-deception is bad faith. 
(Culbertson, 2005, p. 73) 
In short, for those who strive for perfection, bad faith or imbalance is the price that most 
elite athletes will pay. Miller & Kerr (2002) alluded to this imbalance when they suggested that 
performance excellence is often at the expense of personal excellence, compromising the 
development of the whole person, and arguably increasing the likelihood of athlete burnout 
and/or psychopathology. This imbalance has also been considered within research 
investigating the deleterious effects of perfectionism in sport (e.g., Gould, Udry, Tuffey, & 
Loehr, 1996; Lemyre, Hall, & Roberts, 2008). What hasn’t been considered is the possibility 
that notions of balance and imbalance, in relation to a dynamically balanced system, might 
provide a new theoretical framework to help develop our understanding of performance 
variation and peak performance in sport.  
 
6.5   Correction theory 
 
The psyche is a self-regulating system that maintains its equilibrium just as the body 
does. Every process that goes too far calls forth compensations, and without these there 
would be neither a normal metabolism nor a normal psyche. In this sense we can take 
the theory of compensation as a basic law of psychic behavior. (Jung, 1966b, p. 153) 
 
The genesis of correction theory is in part indebted to Jung’s dynamic view of the 
psyche, which assumes that the regulatory function of opposites underpins psychic functioning 
(Stevens, 1990). Jung based his theory of compensation on the principle of equivalence which 
states that “for any given quantity of energy expended or consumed in bringing a certain 
condition, an equal quantity of the same or another form of energy will appear elsewhere” 
(Jung, 1960, p. 18).63 
It is worth noting that the principle of compensation has been discussed in relation to 
sport psychology by Ravizza (2002). Drawing on humanistic and existential psychology to 
explain his role with professional athletes over many years, Ravizza claims that teaching skills 
                                               
63 See chapters 2 and 4, and Jung (1960) for a more detailed outline of his ideas concerning 
the energetic standpoint.  
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that allow performers to compensate and adjust mentally has been a cornerstone of his applied 
work. The notion of compensation, or correction, is also an implicit element in W. Powers 
(1973) control theory.  
Correction theory is based on the central assumption that dynamic balance is a 
naturally occurring phenomenon which occurs due to the necessity of robust, stable complex 
systems to self-organise through correction. Two associated propositions will be considered in 
relation to sport, as well as with respect to the implications for performance variation and peak 
performance in sport. 
 
6.5.1   Proposition one  
Challenges will require corrections in order to maintain the robustness of a 
dynamically balanced system. 
We view a correction as the response (accommodation) of the system to a source of 
imbalance or challenge; the mechanism of which is to retain function, and allow for the 
required oscillations driven by the tension between balance and imbalance.  
With few exceptions, corrections are evident in athletes who continually strive for peak 
performance within their sport, and can present on different levels (i.e., physical, 
psychological, interpersonal etc), but will typically manifest in the form of a cost to another 
aspect of the athletes’ lived world (Balague, 1999). These costs can include constraints placed 
on social life, added pressures in relationships with coaches, family and friends, and physical 
fatigue. In psychological terms, costs may involve emotions such as anxiety and anger, and 
cognitions about failed expectations, confidence issues and doubt (Nesti, 2011). Whether a 
correction can manifest in the form of a performance correction is yet to be explored in the 
literature, but some potential evidence will be considered later in the chapter. 
Whilst an athlete might not show any outward consequences of their endeavour, the 
necessity for redress means they, and/or others, will almost always pay a personal price. This 
interrelation between the person and athlete makes it unsurprising that an increasing number 
of applied sport psychologists report using a holistic approach to consultancy (e.g., Andersen, 
2009; Bond, 2002; Friesen & Orlick, 2010; Henschen, 2001; Lindsay, Breckon, Thomas, & 
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6.5.2   Proposition two  
Imbalance is a requisite aspect of dynamic balance.  
Human systems are continuously being exposed to external influences, resulting in a 
dynamic form of self-organisation (Bertalanffy, 1950). At any given point in time, a 
dynamically balanced system will be in a state of imbalance, but is considered robust as long 
as it maintains the ability to correct itself. On this basis, negation rather than imbalance is 
diametrically opposed to balance.  Imbalance represents a challenge to the balanced system but 
not a total negation of the existing state. Therefore imbalance represents an open system in a 
state of flux, but the system is (paradoxically) considered balanced because of its inherent 
tendency to correct itself, and its capability to adjust. Rose (1997) recognised this paradox in 
observing that the stability and self-organisation of an open system is dependent on the 
individual components being in a state of constant flux: “Change is virtually the only 
constancy. Stasis is death” (Rose, 1997, p. 140). If the stability of an open system is dependent 
on continual change, or variation, this has important implications for our understanding of the 
nature of performance variation and peak performance in sport. 
 
6.5.2.1   Implication one 
This proposition provides a theoretical basis for observation that peak performances are 
intermittent and temporary in nature (Ravizza, 1977, 1984). A central tenet of this approach is 
that there is a dynamic tension between the tendency of the system to self-organise in order to 
remain robust (balance), and the desire to achieve continual peak performances (imbalance). 
On this basis, peak performance states by their very nature are considered inherently unstable 
and therefore unsustainable. 
 
6.5.2.2   Implication two 
This proposition supports the observation that athletes have limited conscious control 
over the psychological states associated with peak performance (Jackson, 1992). Jackson 
(1992) gives the following account of a figure skater commenting on the perceived 
controllability of flow: 
Yeah, I think you can increase it…It’s not a conscious effort. If you try to do it, it’s not 
going to work. I think maybe through trying you turn off the switch so it can’t 
happen…I think there are things, factors you can lessen, to make it happen more often. 
I don’t think it is something you can turn on and off like a light switch. (p. 174) 
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The idea that we misattribute conscious thought as the primary cause of behaviour, has 
received considerable support in the psychology literature (see Wegner & Wheatley, 1999, for 
a review). Wegner and Wheatley (1999) conclude that “the real causal mechanisms underlying 
behaviour are never present in consciousness. Rather, the engines of causation are unconscious 
mechanisms of mind.” (p. 490). If peak performance states are subject to unconscious as well 
as conscious processes, it is likely that deterministic predictability is an impossible dream. 
When viewed as a feature of a complex system, we suggest that peak performance states are 
an emergent phenomenon; order at the edge of chaos (Kauffman, 1995; Waldrop, 1992), and 
therefore not subject to mechanistic laws. 
 
6.5.2.3   Implication three 
This proposition suggests an interdependent relationship between peak performance 
and dysfunctional performance states. As previously stated, corrections are viewed as the 
response of a system to a challenge (proposition 1). Given that the tendency of any dynamic 
system is to maintain its robustness and integrity through self-organisation (Kelso, 1995), the 
response to any form of imbalance is to compensate (correct) to avoid negation. It is therefore 
theoretically possible that, in some instances, a dysfunctional performance could be, in part, a 
self-regulatory (involuntary) response to peak performance(s); and a peak performance could 
be, in part, a self-regulatory (involuntary) response to dysfunctional performance(s). One 
would therefore expect to find the foundation for a peak performance in the psychological 
response to dysfunctional performance(s); and the seeds of a dysfunction performance in the 
psychological response to peak performance(s).  
 
6.5.3   Dysfunctional performance and peak performance: An interdependent, 
circular relationship?  
Although correction theory is a new departure for sport psychology, there is a growing 
body of literature which suggests that a circular relationship exists between dysfunctional and 
peak performance states. As outlined in chapter 4, Silva, Hardy, & Crace (1988) introduced 
two constructs to describe how momentum can be lost or gained: 
Positive inhibition - “the process whereby success may actually result in the loss of 
momentum and thus increase the probability of subsequent failure” (p. 346).  
Negative facilitation - “whereby failure increases the probability of subsequent 
success” (p. 347).  
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Cornelius, Silva, Conroy, Petersen (1997) developed the Projected Performance 
Model, based around these two constructs, to explain how shifts in momentum could be related 
to the perception of increased or decreased performance levels. Specifically, the Projected 
Performance Model suggests that performance fluctuations around the mean are in part due to 
inhibitory forces (e.g., over-confidence and complacency) when the athlete has a positive 
perception of the performance, and facilitative forces (e.g., increased motivation) when the 
athlete’s perception of the performance is negative (Cornelius et al., 1997).  
Poczwardowski and Conroy (2002) interviewed eight elite athletes and eight 
performing artists about their coping responses to success and failure. Interestingly, it was 
found that coping responses to failure included facilitative steps to improve future 
performances. For example, 69% of participants reported enhanced motivation after failure; 
and 69% of participants reported to having learnt from previous failures, and had subsequently 
improved (Poczwardowski and Conroy, 2002). Similarly, in a study of academy football 
players, Sagar, Busch, and Jowett (2010) found that all players interviewed, adopted at least 
one problem-focused coping strategy in response to failure, including increased effort and 
determination to prove their ability.  
Carver (2003) suggested that the feelings associated with things going well on a specific 
task (i.e. winning) can result in a shift of resources to other perceived needs; a process Carver 
(2003) referred to as coasting. In three studies involving multiple goal pursuit, Louro, Pieters, 
& Zeelenberg (2007) found that positive emotions associated with being close to achieving a 
goal did result in a reallocation of effort towards other goals. Similarly, W. Powers (1991) 
suggested that when an individual has optimistic beliefs about their current performance level 
(i.e., overconfidence), the perceived discrepancy between the observed level and desired level 
diminishes, resulting in less resources being allocated. On the other hand, optimism in relation 
to higher goals being set, results in an increase in effort due to the perceived discrepancy 
between current performance level and goal level (W. Powers, 1991). Thus, according to 
control theory (W. Powers, 1973), it is not psychological variables (e.g., self-efficacy) 
themselves which determine the level of effort, but discrepancies between perceived current 
and ideal states. This proposition has been supported in a recent study by Woodman, Akehurst, 
Hardy, & Beattie (2010) who found that inducing self-doubt in participants perceived ability, 
resulted in higher performances on a skipping task. Woodman et al. (2010) concluded that “a 
decrease in self-confidence (i.e., an element of self-doubt) may increase participants’ perceived 
discrepancy between their current performance standard and their goal (potential) standard, 
which leads them to increase on-task effort” (p. 469).   
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Even if high levels of motivation are maintained, an athlete’s internal world cannot 
always match the external reality (the desire to win alone is not enough). Positive thinking, 
generally believed to be essential for peak performance, cannot control variations in external 
factors, such as weather, playing surface, and opponents ("He played better than me. There's 
not a whole lot more to it."  - British tennis player Andy Murray, on his third-round exit to 
Stanislas Wawrinka in the 2010 US tennis open). Such factors will inevitably vary, and so 
therefore will the performance and the outcome. Positive emotions in sport are therefore in 
themselves unstable because they do not entirely reflect all aspects of an athlete’s lived reality 
(Nesti, 2004). Inevitable challenges to this state potentially result in the experience of emotions 
such as anxiety and possibly depression. In turn, subsequent feelings of joy and adulation are 
duly heightened. Similarly, a football coach, who compromises the balance of the team in 
favour of attack, increases the likelihood of scoring a goal; but also increases the likelihood of 
conceding a goal. As long as an athlete lives in bad faith, and aspires to produce a peak 
performance in every competitive event (here facticity is affirmed as being transcendence), 
performance corrections in the form of choking (Baumeister, 1984), catastrophe effects (Fazey 
& Hardy, 1988), and yips etc. are inevitable.  
Whilst negative performance corrections might appear to have little value, Vealey and 
Chase (2008) suggest otherwise: 
Successful people often reduce their attention because they have no reason to change 
strategies or standards. Thus self-correcting spirals are more beneficial than upwards 
spirals because a person who analyses performance can make adjustments in future 
efforts and reverse the previous decrease (or increase) in performance. (p. 95) 
 
6.6   Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have considered some of the implications of W. Powers (1973, 1991) 
control theory and dynamic systems approaches for our understanding of peak performance 
and performance variation in sport. Cybernetic models of self-regulation and dynamic system 
approaches offer the complementary principles of feedback and self-organisation (Carver & 
Scheier, 2002); both of which form the theoretical basis of correction theory. More importantly, 
we believe that the holistic notion of dynamic balance, as outlined in this paper, offers 
researchers a basis on which to explore performance variation in sport with regard to its 
interrelation to the person. When judged from this perspective, peak performance is not viewed 
as an end in itself, but part of an on-going dynamic process. Rather than viewing the 
inevitability of performance variation as a defeatist position, we believe that embracing its 
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reality will paradoxically free athletes and those who support them, to work towards a higher 
frequency of peak performances in their sport. As M. A. Powers (1994) observed: 
“variability…(is) the essence of behavior: the phenomenon to be explained, not explained 





























Theoretical implications for sport psychology: The role of time 
 
When god is dead, human beings – much to their detriment – are at risk of taking 
psychological centre stage. They imagine themselves to be commanders of their own 
destinies, they trample upon nature, forget the rhythms of the earth, deny death and shy 
away from valuing and honouring all that slips through their grasp, until they must 
collide catastrophically with the sharp edges of reality. (Botton, 2012, p. 200) 
 
7.1   Introduction 
Appropriation of a Newtonian epistemology (i.e., the general linear model) with respect 
to psychological processes implies that such processes do not fundamentally manifest as a 
function of time. The assumption being that if one were to conduct a study based on the 
isolation and control of all pertinent variables (including time as an independent variable), the 
resulting observed phenomena will theoretically repeat ad infinitum irrespective of when the 
experiment was conducted. In other words, any measurements taken can be meaningfully 
extrapolated over time. Critically, with respect to the psychological sciences this assumption 
has consistently not held up to empirical scrutiny, as demonstrated by the ongoing “replication 
crisis” referred to in the introduction. Furthermore, as suggested by this thesis, the denial of 
the non-ergodic quality of psychological processes will inevitably lead to an infinite regress 
with respect to the associated findings64. Despite psychological processes existing by definition 
as a function of time, time seems to rarely take centre stage when it comes to their elucidation. 
Rather than being viewed as another independent variable, Tateo and Valsiner (2015) 
have suggested that “time…needs to be taken into account as a fundamental dimension of every 
psychological theory” (p. 357). Yet, as these authors observe, “considering time as a ‘variable’ 
implies a stance that is about to eliminate time from psychology whilst talking precisely about 
time. Considering time as a ‘variable’…creates a misfit between psychology’s axiomatic stance 
and the nature of psychological phenomena” (p. 357). As a response to the ongoing “crisis” in 
                                               
64 The problem of infinite regress has been demonstrated with respect to current theorising in 
flow (chapter 3), motivation (chapter 3) and mental toughness (chapter 5) in sport. 
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psychological science which abides by the general linear model, temporality represents part of 
the epistemological criteria for idiographic science.  
Idiographic science “which emphasizes the time-based variability within each unique 
case” (Molenaar & Valsiner, 2005, p. 2) places temporality back at the centre of our 
understanding of psychological process. Accordingly, general laws only become possible when 
it is acknowledged that psychological processes are non-ergodic, and therefore do not possess 
“time-invariant statistical characteristics (stationarity)” (Molenaar, 2007, p. 36). Thus, time 
becomes a fundamentally confounding factor, when it does not represent an axiomatic 
contextual dimension in psychological theory construction (Tateo & Valsiner, 2015)65.  
In contrast, when the general linear model is adopted, time becomes a variable which 
is theoretically reversible - a position which is clearly a misnomer for human experience itself. 
Thus, Tateo and Valsiner (2015) advocate an epistemological shift towards its non-linear 
equivalent - a position actively explored over 100 years previously by Jung, whose psychology 
was in part an attempt to understand the role of non-linear time in relation to psychological 
processes (Yiassemides, 2014). It is therefore not without irony that Jung’s attempt to 
understand the complex relationship between time and psychological processes could be one 
of the reasons why his work has historically sat outside of mainstream academia. 
Jung is not alone in recognising the fundamental role that time plays in our 
understanding of psychological processes. The acknowledgement of relative and absolute time, 
which manifests in the interaction of past, present and future, is a defining aspect of the 
psychoanalytic tradition as a whole (Yiassemides, 2014). William Powers – a psychologist 
shunned by mainstream academia - argued that the reliance on abstract generalisations as the 
basis for theory building in psychology fails because one is unable to meaningfully extrapolate, 
due to the change of conditions (internal and external) over time (Powers, 1973). The problem 
of extrapolation is particularly pertinent in sport, where athletes operate in dynamic 
environments, and wherein success is, in part, dependent on flexibility and adaptability. When 
time becomes part of the analysis; environments, psychological processes, and their 
manifestation are a picture of variability, which betrays the “detached, action-independent, 
highly detailed, [and] static” (Clark, 1997, p. 472) character of any respective objectivist 
representation.  
Further back, at the end of the 20th century, William James recognised that 
psychologists tended to rely on common-sense language for the elucidation of psychological 
                                               
65 See chapter 5 for a more detailed consideration of this point. 
     146  
phenomena (see Valsiner, 2014), yet as Valsiner (2014) points out, the “naming of 
psychological state is not the same as the state itself” (p. 7)66. Critically, conflating process 
with state has far reaching epistemological consequences for theory development beyond the 
lack of associated temporality itself. Firstly, by assigning an objectivist representation to a 
state, subject and object separation becomes enshrined within theory. Secondly, in order to 
legitimise objectivist representations researchers are compelled to search for their elusive 
causal properties. And thirdly, capturing states in the form of an objectivist representation 
serves to appropriate into consciousness, processes which are typically sub-personal and 
unconscious.  
 
7.2   Objectivist representations, independent of time, enshrine subject-object separation 
By its very nature, being, and by association experience, is by definition dependent on 
the passage of time. Experience is ephemeral, in that it is, in part, a function of the time during 
which the experience occurred. Although experience has the potential for individual meaning 
for the subject which extends beyond the experience itself, any attempt to capture the objective 
meaning, in the form of a theme, is typically at the expense of its temporal dimension. Let’s 
say, for example, that identity confusion represents an emergent (objective) theme which 
captures part of the “experience” of recently retired professional athletes. If carefully 
appropriated via the phenomenological method, we might accept that this theme is a 
meaningful objective representation, or essence, of shared experiences associated with 
retirement from professional sport. But does it capture the universal quality of the experience 
as lived through time? Can there even be a universal objectivist representation - on which an 
associated theme is dependent on - as lived through time? When time, and by association 
context, becomes part of the analysis, one is inevitable confronted with the multitude of forms 
and manifestations that identity confusion can take. The lived experience of identity confusion, 
for those that experience it, will inevitably be a function of time – history, and all that happens 
                                               
66 The very act of naming a state using common-sense language might appear harmless for 
psychological science, but, as suggested in chapter 5, it serves to (falsely) legitimize the 
scientific credibility of encoding states as variables (Toomela, 2008), and in turn promotes 
pseudo-empiricism (Smedlund, 1991, 2016). 
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within the experience itself. Thus, when viewed temporally, the idea that a theme, or essence, 
can meaningfully capture the experience itself as lived becomes absurd67.  
The reliance on themes to capture lived experience highlights what Varela et al. (1991) 
referred to as “the shiftiness, the instability of the entire subjective/objective polarity” (p. 242), 
which results from an objectified subject and a subjectified object. Whilst a theme such as 
identity confusion has the potential to represent shared experience up to a point (i.e., objectified 
subject), it is only when the individual imposes their own unique temporal association with the 
theme that it becomes alive (i.e., subjectified object). Part of this shiftiness results from an 
epistemological frame which conflates process - which necessitates temporality - with state, 
which does not. 
Does this matter? No, if one accepts subject-object separation as part of the 
epistemological frame. If, however, as proposed by this thesis, one adopts an epistemology 
predicated on subject-object reconciliation, such findings are at best meaningless, and at worst, 
harmful to the discipline’s scientific prospects. Thus, as this thesis suggests, the scientific value 
of any empirical findings is primarily dependent on the epistemological frame adopted, rather 
than how exactingly a methodological protocol is followed. 
The consequence of not prioritising epistemology as the basis for the development of a 
legitimate psychological science is that we risk the continued destructive analysis of the subject 
matter. When time is not part of the epistemological frame, capturing psychological processes 
as static states becomes legitimate, given that the idea of states is consistent with non-
temporality. In sport psychology, descriptive constructs such as motivation, confidence, 
anxiety, mental toughness, flow etc. do not in themselves require time for their elucidation, but 
become relatively meaningless in themselves when trying to explain, as opposed to describing, 
lived experience. Given the transient and variable nature of any moment of experience, such 
associated constructs cannot be prescribed in advance. Rather, their meaning can only be 
assigned retrospectively in the form of an objective representation, which unwittingly creates 
a separation from the subjective experience as lived. When time becomes part of the analysis 
of any given state, one recognises a picture of variability – states become viewed as transitory, 
ephemeral - of which the retrospective elucidation of the state itself offers no explanation for 
their temporal (subjective) manifestation.  
                                               
67 See chapter 5 for consideration of the proposition made by idiographic science that 
psychological processes are non-ergodic in nature when viewed over time. 
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For example, an athlete might report that he or she had high levels of “motivation” 
leading up to a competitive event. Whilst this construct might represent an appropriate 
objective representation of part of their lived experience, this labelling process is dependent on 
separating the objective representation from its source. Furthermore, by denying the temporal 
dimension, one is confronted with infinite regress with respect to the subjective manifestation 
due to the non-ergodic nature of psychological processes. At any given point in time the 
particular experience of motivation is not least the manifest result of past, present, and possible 
futures, and will therefore vary as a function of time and context. From this perspective, the 
idea that motivational states can be anticipated in advance becomes absurd. It is not therefore 
surprising that recent attempts to establish linear nomothetic relationships between behaviour 
and motivation has failed. On this point it is worth being reminded of Keegan et al.’s (2014) 
conclusion with respect to their programme of research into motivation in elite sport: 
…there was no discernable one-to-one correspondence between specific behaviours 
and their impact on motivation. Instead, the findings suggest complex contextual 
interactions between the immediate behaviours of social agents and the impact on 
athlete’s motivation. If supported, this finding would necessitate new and novel 
approaches in future research in order to facilitate a more advanced understanding of 
athlete motivation in elite sport. (p. 97) 
A recent review of sport motivation research between 1995 and 2016 (Clancy, Herring, 
MacIntyre, and Campbell, 2016) observed that the majority of research designs employed have 
been cross-sectional rather than longitudinal. The authors proposed that in future, more 
longitudinal research is required to understand how motivation varies, in part as a function of 
time. Indeed, the limited amount of longitudinal research that has been done is suggestive of a 
more complex picture. For example, Stenling, Lindwell, and Hassmén (2015) studied over the 
period of a season the “intraindividual” interactions between variables, which included 
motivation and wellbeing, in young elite athletes. The authors concluded that “the relations 
between these variables are complex, dynamic, and that more attention should be given to 
potential reciprocal effects between the variables in the motivational sequence” (p. 50). To 
their credit, Clancy et al. (2016) also acknowledge that “motivation is not a fixed trait but rather 
a dynamic construct that influences and is influenced by numerous factors” (p. 240). However, 
given the authors proposal that we therefore need to consider yet more variables associated 
with motivation, we again run the risk of falling into the trap of infinite regress. More of the 
same might be the template for Kuhnian normal science, but does not, in itself, represent 
scientific process. In addition to temporality, the reported reciprocal links between factors 
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associated with motivation would suggest that circularity and non-linearity, not linearity, 
would represent a more expedient epistemological basis on which to develop our understanding 
of this complex phenomenon. Yet Clancy et al. (2016) give no explicit consideration to the 
epistemological implications of the research considered.   
The temporal, dynamic nature of psychological processes necessitates longitudinal 
research in order to study intra-individual variation. Furthermore, the non-ergodic nature of 
psychological processes require that they are studied first and foremost on the individual level, 
as suggested by idiographic science. In comparison to group-based designs, within sport 
psychology there still remains a lack of single-case research being published (Barker, 
McCarthy, Jones, & Moran, 2011). Motivation is clearly an important construct which 
represents part of the individual athletes lived experience. The failure to establish one-to-one 
correspondence, or empirical regularities, is a failure of the underpinning epistemological 
assumptions (e.g., linearity, ergodicity, a-temporality). Continued destructive analysis can only 
be avoided if the discipline engages in a robust and systematic examination of the assumptions 
underpinning the methods used. With respect to our understanding of motivation, or any 
psychological construct associated with sport; methodology need to be cognisant of 
epistemological criteria outlined in this thesis (e.g., non-linearity, teleology, non-ergodicity, 
temporality), and prioritise the use of single-case research, in order to avoid continued subject 
and object separation. 
In sum, when time is removed from the analysis reducing psychology down to states 
(i.e., being) becomes permissible, without any consideration needed for how the current state 
is both an emergent function of our individual and shared pasts, and our future potential (i.e., 
being~becoming). Furthermore, subject/object shiftiness becomes the norm, if not inevitable, 
given that it does not represent a threat to the assumption of non-temporality of psychological 
processes. The end result, is so-called empirical findings which are lifeless exhibits, robbed of 
their essential human qualities: “To deny the truth of our own experience in the scientific study 
of ourselves is not only unsatisfactory; it is to render the scientific study of ourselves without 
a subject matter” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 13).  
As outlined in chapter 2, Jung based his own psychology on establishing an intellectual 
union of subject and object, and whose “methodology was in search of a universal principle, 
one that would bridge the gap between physical laws and inner psychological reality” 
(Yiassemides, 2014, p. 38). The union of physical and psychological reality was fundamentally 
important for the development of an analytical psychology, given his view that the “psyche 
and body are not separate entities but one and the same life” (Jung, 1966a, p. 115). This search 
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led Jung to propose the notion of the archetypes: Universal inherited predispositions within the 
objective psyche, or collective unconscious68, which organise conscious experience 
(Papadopoulos, 2006), and manifest as “ever reoccurring patterns of psychic functioning” 
(Jung, 1958, p. xvi). In the same way, our biology is the legacy of our shared history and 
evolution, the collective unconscious represents our shared ancestral past - which manifests in 
the form of archetypes, and in turn helps shape our individual subjective psyche. Furthermore, 
as with biological adaptations, archetypes can be viewed as patterns of psychic functioning 
which have developed by virtue of bestowing evolutionary advantage (Fordman, 1957). 
It is a mistake however to assume that archetypes represent mere biological drives, or 
objective representations (i.e., themes) of psychological states. Rather, archetypes represent 
“some sort of structuring principle that lies outside of everyday consciousness” (Haule, 2011, 
p.11). Furthermore, archetypes capture the temporal dimension to their origin and 
manifestation, given they are, by definition, shaped by shared history, as well as serving to 
shape our experience in time. For example, Greene (1994) has suggested that sport itself 
represents a “profound psychological experience” (p. 34) with a clear archetypal heritage, 
which cannot simply be explained away based on associated infantile experience and emotion. 
Rather, sport can be viewed as the manifestation and expression of our shared ancestral past, 
wherein the energy associated with playing and spectating “touches that archetypal layer and 
therefore evokes from many people a numinous quality of feeling and experience” (p. 37).  
As well as representing an important theoretical contribution, the proposed existence 
of the collective unconscious and the archetypes makes a clear epistemological statement: 
Objective knowledge is possible concerning the psyche, but it is dependent on looking all the 
way back through our history in search of the unconscious “patterns of instinctual behavior” 
(Jung, 1969a, p. 44).  
One of the patterns or structuring principles which Jung refers to throughout his work 
is the self-regulating nature of the psyche which functions in a state of dynamic equilibrium 
(Stevens, 1990); akin to the principle of homeodynamics (Rose, 1997)69. In contemporary 
                                               
68 Jung (1969a) has described the collective unconscious as “a common psychic substrate of a 
suprapersonal nature which is present in every one of us” (p. 4), and therefore represents 
“sheer objectivity…There I am the object of every subject, in complete reversal of the 
ordinary consciousness, where I am always the subject that has an object” (p. 22). 
69 The implications of the notion of dynamic equilibrium where considered in chapter 5, in 
relation to the psychological basis for performance variation in sport. 
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parlance, this proposition is comparable to the self-organisation70 of the system, a necessary 
feature of any system wherein multiple parts are interacting, and a fundamental tenet of 
complexity science (Haken, 1988). Although complex systems are ubiquitous in nature, it is 
the brain - the basis on which psychological processes become possible - which is viewed by 
many as the most complex system that we are aware of due to the vast number of interconnected 
neurons (Haken, 1988). Thus, if psychology is to be based on conceptual integration - by 
bridging the gap between subject and object, psychological reality and physical laws – such 
shared principles are of primary importance. For psychological science, notions of self-
regulation and self-organisation require a fundamental shift away from abstracting causal 
relations (i.e., linear causality) towards viewing the person as a purposive system (i.e., the 
system is defined by the functions, or goal[s] it is working towards; Pickering, 2010). Not only 
does the teleological viewpoint overcome the fallacy of linear causal relations, it offers a basis 
on which psychic activity can be understood as a function of time.  
From the teleological viewpoint, psychic activity is not understood primarily in terms 
of abstracting the current state of the system (which does not require time for its elucidation), 
but as a function of what the system is working towards. In other words, the greater objective 
meaning of psychic processes can only be understood when “causes are understood as a means 
to an end” (Jung, 1960, p. 23) – which Jung referred to as the energetic standpoint. 
Furthermore, as a complementary position to the mechanistic standpoint “which conceives an 
event as the effect of a cause” (Jung, 1960, p. 4), the energetic standpoint provides a structuring 
principle wherein psychological processes are understood as a function of the energetic system 
itself – namely the tendency of an energetic system to be working towards a state of equilibrium 
(Jung, 1960).  
For example, correction theory (Cowen, Nesti, & Cheetham, 2014) proposes that 
temporal variation in sporting performance is a necessary consequence of a dynamically 
balanced system (i.e., balance~imbalance) working towards successive peak performances 
over time (i.e., imbalance). The concept of dynamic balance71 as a structuring principle 
                                               
70 Which Haken (1988) defines as “a spatial, temporal or functional structure without specific 
interference from the outside” (p. 11). 
71 Defined as “a state in which a robust complex system will self-correct in response to 
imbalance (resulting from perceived variation/challenge) to maintain functional organization, 
or the individual and coordinated expression of balance and imbalance” (Cowen et al., 2014, 
p. 423). 
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governing the ongoing self-organisation of the system, reframes performance variation as a 
necessary “means to an end” rather than just an unwanted phenomenon. Alternatively, 
accumulating objectivist representations of psychological states (i.e., casual standpoint) is 
complicit in the deceit that performance itself can be temporally isolated and causally 
influenced through the isolation and control of psychological variables. Although the objective 
of elite sport might be sustainable peak performances, the energetic standpoint suggests any 
psychological influence requires an understanding of how this goal interrelates with temporal, 
subjective and sub-personal processes. In other words, future research into the psychology of 
performance, and its variation, is required to prioritise the theoretical basis for this interrelation 
between the person (i.e., the structural dynamics of the psyche) and the performance. 
Encouragingly, this close relationship is now beginning to be articulated and explored in the 
dual career literature72, which represents a promising development within sport psychology. 
Furthermore, the energetic standpoint is consistent with the central premise of 
idiographic science which stresses that humans are governed by general laws (e.g., self-
organisation), but which manifest uniquely in every individual: “Generality in uniqueness is 
not a contradiction in terms, but the basic operating principle in all nature, psyche, and society” 
(Salvatore and Valsiner, 2010, p. 4). Thus, the energetic standpoint and idiographic science 
suggests that an objective understanding of the psychology of performance over time requires 
a focus on intra-individual variation (i.e., object~subject). 
In sum, psychological science which prioritises the accumulation of objectivist 
representations (i.e., themes, variables, measurements) independently of time, perpetuates 
subject-object separation. Integration is dependent on focusing on the structuring principles 
which govern both subject and object, psychological processes and nature itself. Given the 
ubiquity of complex systems throughout nature, conceptual integration is dependent on 
establishing principles which apply at all levels (Haken, 1988). Conceiving the psyche as an 
energetic system, governed by laws equivalent in nature (i.e., laws of thermodynamics), 
provides one avenue for conceptual integration to be established. For the psychological 
sciences, this means understanding the (teleological) structural principles which govern how 
experience manifests over time (e.g., dynamic equilibrium/balance). Subjectivity is then 
understood, in part, based on the development of these structuring principles. Thus, subject-
object integration is inseparable from understanding the general laws which govern the psyche. 
 
                                               
72 See chapter 4. 
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7.3   Meaningful objectivist representations do not conform to linear causal, reductive 
explanation 
 
A truly scientific philosophy will be more humble, more piecemeal, more arduous, 
offering less glitter of outward mirage to flatter fallacious hopes, but more indifferent 
to fate, and more accepting of the world without tyrannous imposition of our human 
and temporary demands. (Russell, 1963, p. 30) 
 
In searching for a universal principle which integrated our understanding of the physical 
and psychic level, Jung repeatedly challenged the one-sidedness of the casual, reductive and 
positivist scientific approach: In part, because the causal standpoint excludes the 
epistemological significance of time as a fundamental dimension concerning psychological 
processes (Yiassemides, 2014). Science predicated on a Newtonian epistemology assumes 
linear temporality which in turn allows for causal relations to be established at the reductive 
level of analysis. However, when non-linearity is accepted as part of the epistemological frame, 
linear causality becomes an explanatory fiction with respect to the pattern of the whole 
(Spauling, 1995).  
In situating time as an axiomatic contextual dimension, Tateo and Valsiner (2015) ask: 
“Shall all psychology be a developmental science?” (p. 357), given the unfolding rather than 
fixed nature of human experience. In contrast, by adopting the causal standpoint, lived 
experience becomes petrified as a result of being robbed of this essential quality. Similarly, 
Jung wrote 
The symbolic interpretation of causes by means of the energetic standpoint is necessary 
for the differentiation of the psyche, since unless the facts are symbolically interpreted, 
the causes remain immutable substances which go on operating continuously…Cause 
alone does not make development possible. For the psyche the reduction ad causam is 
the very reverse of development; it binds the libido to the elemental facts. From the 
standpoint of rationalism this is all that can be desired, but from the standpoint of the 
psyche it is lifeless and comfortless boredom. (1960, p. 24) 
Jung understood that incorporating time into the epistemological frame necessitates a 
teleological approach, in order to account for the totality of psychological processes as manifest 
through time. To do otherwise would be to petrify the subject into a timeless state; a clear 
absurdity when psychological processes are understood as being organismic and purposeful. 
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Jung did not dismiss the causal standpoint altogether73, but teleology, or the energetic 
standpoint, in order to capture the vibrant, complex nature of the subject, was a more defining 
characteristic of his epistemology (Papadopoulos, 2006). 
From the energetic standpoint, lived experience is understood based on that which 
structures it rather than the products thereof. For example, if we attempt to understand and 
isolate the psychological mechanisms associated with a period of dysfunctional performance, 
one might consider abstract representations of the associated psychological experience (e.g., 
loss of confidence, anxiety). However, from the energetic standpoint, such abstractions would 
represent little more than psychological concomitants or epiphenomena, which do not require 
time for their elucidation. In contrast, the energetic standpoint requires lived experience to be 
understood based on the current state of the system in relation to that which the system is 
working towards. Thus, experience (e.g., anxiety) is placed within a temporal context wherein 
its meaning is understood as a function of its structural purpose. 
This tension between energetic and causal accounts of psychological phenomena, was 
evident in a debate which took place towards the end of the last century, between those who 
believed in the linear causal efficacy of cognitions, and those who did not. A leading advocate 
of the former position was Albert Bandura who consistently argued that individuals can affect 
control over their thoughts and thereby actions (e.g., Bandura, 1989, 1991, 1995, 1997; 
Bandura & Locke, 2003). For example, in his paper entitled “Comments on the crusade against 
the causal efficacy of human thought”, Bandura (1995) argues that self-efficacy itself has 
functional explanatory value with respect to motivation and behaviour: 
I am using the term causation in this context as functional dependence between 
perceived self-efficacy and other events. This issue has been extensively investigated 
by a variety of experimental strategies in which perceived self-efficacy is systematical 
varied, whereupon its effects on subsequent performance are measured. (p. 180) 
In particular, Bandura was keen to differentiate his theories from “control theories 
rooted solely in a negative feedback control system aimed at error correction” (Bandura & 
Locke, 2003, p. 87). Instead, Bandura consistently asserted the primacy of human agency as 
                                               
73 Jung recognised that both the causal and energetic standpoint merely offered a different 
perspective. The former recognises reductive causal relations (i.e., linear epistemology), 
whilst the latter acknowledges the ongoing interaction between different factors (i.e., circular 
epistemology; see Papadopoulos, 2006). 
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the psychological basis for our understanding of performative behaviours (e.g., Bandura, 1989, 
1991, Bandura & Locke, 2003).  
Yet, as Vancouver and colleagues (Vancouver, Thompson, & Williams, 2001; 
Vancouver, Thompson, Tischner, & Putka, 2002; Vancouver & Kendall, 2006) have repeatedly 
observed, the nature of the relationship between self-efficacy and performance is dependent on 
whether or not time is assumed to be a fundamental component to its elucidation. Specifically, 
if time is assumed to play a role in this relationship, a within-person rather than between-person 
approach is required to establish temporal precedence (Curran & Bauer, 2011). As outlined in 
chapter 6, when the former approach is adopted, self-efficacy has been shown to be either 
unrelated or negatively related to future performance (e.g., Vancouver & Kendall, 2006), in 
direct opposition to the wealth of evidence which suggests a positive relationship between the 
two (see Bandura & Locke, 2003, for a review). 
Should this be possible? Should we simply accept that two different designs, yield two 
opposing yet valid conclusions in their own right concerning the relationship between self-
efficacy and performance? What these different outcomes reveal is not primarily a failure in 
method, but a failure in the underpinning epistemological assumptions which permit 
contradictory outcomes. In both cases, faith in an epistemology which places faith in method; 
and in turn faith that the derived results are correct! The fact that the results are indeed correct 
for each design (i.e., within or between subjects) reveals the flaw in this means of doing 
science. As Valsiner observed, “[m]ethodology cannot be reduced to method” (Valsiner, 2014, 
p. 24); yet in the absence of epistemological debate, we settle by default for faith in method, 
ironically for the sake of epistemological clarity. Why, because normal science requires no 
systematic engagement with epistemology which might bring the efficacy of any given method 
into doubt. The consequence is that findings primarily serve method rather than subject. The 
failure of subject to conform to flawed epistemological assumptions is all too evident in the 
aforementioned debate concerning self-efficacy and performance. 
 Firstly, when the sheer complexity of psychological processes and the associated 
behaviours becomes part of the epistemological frame, any supposed reductive linear 
relationships will inevitably struggle to conform to this non-linear view of nature (e.g., 
Spaulding, 1995). Secondly, even if one assumes a meaningful relationship between self-
efficacy and performance, it is unlikely to be ergodic in nature (i.e., each person will not 
respond in the same way at any given time to their self-efficacy beliefs – see Molenaar, 2007). 
Therefore, the decision concerning whether time represents an axiomatic dimension or not – 
not least as determined by the design used (i.e., within or between subjects) - will have a 
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significant if not fundamental influence on the outcome. And thirdly, speculation concerning 
any such relationship presupposes that constructs such as self-efficacy in their own right have 
causal agency. This assumption is scientifically questionable because the existence of self-
efficacy in-itself relies on a circularity between the construct and its assumed effects74. Thus, 
rather than offer any explanatory power, abstractions such as self-efficacy in themselves are 
little more than self-serving pseudo-empirical, common sense notions of limited scientific 
value (Smedlund, 1978).    
Taken together, we are again confronted with the conclusion that our epistemological 
assumptions will fundamentally serve to shape our findings, as well as the subject matter itself. 
Indeed, Dougher (1995) has argued that the debate concerning the causal efficacy of cognitions 
is fundamentally ontological and epistemological in nature and is therefore “not resolvable by 
data” (my italics, p. 215). 
It is a distinctive feature of Bandura’s work to cite the numerous empirical studies 
which support his theoretical proclamations concerning the causal efficacy of human thought. 
As an empiricist, Bandura clearly derived confidence for his theoretical position based on the 
sheer weight of supporting empirical data, and in his writing regularly challenged others who 
questioned his work, based on their lack of supporting “evidence”. This reliance on data as the 
bedrock for theory itself, inevitably leads to shifting sands and confusion with respect to the 
description of the key constructs (see Corcoran, 1995), in part due to an epistemology which 
conflates complexity with linear causality. As the discipline of psychology became cognisant 
of what Clark (1997) referred to as the dynamical challenge75, the notion of isolating cause and 
effect relationships between cognitions, abstract representations, and behaviour becomes 
redundant when the whole pattern of the system is apprehended (Powers, 1973; Spaulding, 
1995). To put it bluntly: All the data in the world will not compensate for the futility of 
conflating linearity with non-linearity, and a-temporality with temporality. When non-linearity 
and temporality is accepted into the epistemological frame, theory and data which denies this 
fundamental quality is at best arbitrary and at worst harmful to psychology’s scientific 
prospects. 
                                               
74 See chapter 5 for a brief discussion on the pseudo-empirical nature of such constructs. 
75 Which posits that psychological phenomena “are best understood as the emergent products 
of the complex, often non-linear and temporarily rich, interplay between a variety of forces” 
(Clark, 1997, p. 465) 
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At its heart, Bandura’s social cognitive approach represents a rudimentary form of 
cognitivism (i.e., classical cognitivism) in which cognitions, such as self-efficacy, are assumed 
to mediate between stimulus and response (Dougher, 1995). As such, associated research is 
predicated on the assumption that the mind operates as an information processing system, 
wherein the cognitions themselves are afforded agency with respect to associated behaviour. 
The consequence is that “[p]ersonal history is generally neglected in this type of research, and 
behavior is seen as resulting from an internal, independent causal agent or system” (Dougher, 
1995, p. 218).    
In a paper entitled “Waking up from the cognitivist dream”, Ilundáin-Agurruza (2014a) 
argues that the mind, conceived as a reductive, rule based information processing machine, is 
simply incapable of accounting for how complex, dynamic bodily movements associated with 
high performance are executed, either on a phenomenological or biological level. Rather, we 
are required to acknowledge “a seamless continuity and overlap between body(mind) and 
(body)mind as we kinetically work our way through the world, perhaps with aspirations of an 
integrated bodymind” (p. 344).76  
The alternative is: 
Body–brain dualism [which] reifies the mind (and cognition, and movement) as a 
substance, thereby committing to an ontological quagmire. Positing a substance and 
reducing animate dynamics to stuff, to the brain and its neural and motor structure and 
processes, stultifies the very living and energetic qualities we wanted to study. It turns 
them into dead specimens much as taxidermy, in stuffing the animals, cannot but give 
an ersatz impression of the animated and beautiful creatures they once were. (Ilundáin-
Agurruza, 2014a, p 354) 
Rather than let mind-body dualism dictate the development of theory and research, 
more representative accounts of psychological processes necessitate an understanding of how 
the lived experience is inseparable from its physical embodiment (i.e., mind~body; Varela, 
Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). If mental representation is to make a meaningful contribution to 
our understanding of expert performance in sport, it is likely to be on an intermediary 
unconscious level between the phenomenological and the biological given the automatic nature 
of skilled action (Moe, 2005). Thus, it would seem that Jung’s notion of the objective psyche 
(i.e., collective unconscious and the archetypes) – the bridge between our phenomenology and 
                                               
76 Also referred to as “thick holism” (Ilundáin-Agurruza, 2014b) 
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our biology - is ideally suited as a starting point on which to understand the manifestation of 
embodied cognition within sport or any other human domain.   
Does the notion of embodiment mean that we renounce the importance of cognitions 
and consciousness altogether, in favour of the study of the unconscious? On the contrary; as 
Jung recognised, a dialectical relationship exists between consciousness and unconsciousness 
(consciousness~unconsciousness), and therefore one is needed for the elucidation of the other:  
The unconscious processes stand in compensatory relation to the conscious mind. I 
expressly use the word “compensatory” rather than “contrary” because conscious and 
unconscious are not necessarily in opposition to one another, but complement one 
another to form a totality, which is the self. (Jung, 1966a, p. 177)  
Rather than merely representing the subjective manifestation of unconscious processes, 
consciousness is part of the seamless continuity of being. Any understanding of the self 
therefore requires an exploration of the structural coupling that exists between mind and body, 
conscious and unconscious processes (i.e., consciousness~unconsciousness). To focus on 
unconsciousness alone is a form of one-sidedness which Jung spent his intellectual life seeking 
to avoid. Furthermore, from the energetic standpoint, any attempt to understand the teleological 
value of cognitivist states becomes inseparable from its structural purpose. This purpose 
requires associated theory to embrace the union of conscious and unconscious processes into a 
whole. 
For example, if we return to the debate concerning the causal properties of cognitivist 
states, the notion of complementarity, or thick holism, offers a new perspective on which to 
begin to understand the role of cognitions within performance related domains. Indeed, a closer 
inspection of the respective arguments between control theorists and social cognitive theorists 
reveals the potential for complementarity, rather than merely presenting diametrically opposed 
views. Bandura and colleagues have argued in favour of causal properties inherent within 
cognitions such as self-efficacy (e.g., Bandura, 1997; Bandura & Locke, 2003) and the 
rejection of feedback, or discrepancy reduction, as the primary basis for motivation and 
behaviour (Bandura & Locke, 2003). Yet despite this, at other times, Bandura (1991) has 
observed that “self-motivation…involves a hierarchical dual control process of disequilibrating 
discrepancy production (proactive control) followed by equilibrating discrepancy reduction 
(reactive control)” (p.158), wherein the agency can be understood in terms such as beliefs, 
motivation and optimism, rather than error reduction per se. In response, Powers (1991) argued 
that the supposition of causal properties being attributed to cognitions such as self-efficacy, is 
to prioritise ambiguous common-sense language over the possibility of mechanism. Instead, 
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Powers (1991) suggests that by firstly elucidating mechanism, we have the possibility of 
addressing the ambiguity associated with pseudo-empirical constructs. Constructs, such as 
motivation and confidence, have a place in our understanding of goal directed behaviour, but 
their purpose can only be properly understood when framed in relation to any associated 
mechanism. 
Thus, in place of the choice between asserting the causal agency of cognitions (causal 
standpoint) or asserting that behaviour is a function of a system working towards equilibrium 
(energetic standpoint), complementarity suggests a structural coupling between the two. Rather 
than cognitions, such as self-efficacy beliefs, having no place at all in our understanding of 
goal-directed behavior, I propose a structural coupling between manifest states (i.e., 
beliefs/cognitions), goals (i.e., feedback systems) and the current state of the system (i.e., 
current performance level), with each dependent on the other for its elucidation. 
 Consistent with control theory (Powers, 1973), cognitions such as anxiety and 
confidence potentially represent feedback via consciousness regarding the current state in 
relation to the reference condition (i.e., goal). Consistent with social cognitive theory (Bandura, 
1986), goals are shaped, and can vary, in part, as a function of cognition. Thus, rather than 
representing a choice in the form of a dichotomy between conscious agency or unconscious 
mechanistic control, this position suggests that cognitivist states are not merely the manifest 
effect of sub-personal processes (i.e., an epiphenomena), but also have the potential to shape 
the form that such sub-personal processes take (i.e., consciousness~unconsciousness). In the 
language of analytical psychology, mechanisms associated with the sub-personal level (i.e., 
feedback, dynamic balance) refers to the objective psyche (i.e., that which we all have in 
common), and the manifestations thereof (i.e., cognition) refer to the subjective psyche (i.e., 
that which is unique to the individual; Jung, 1966a). Both exist, in energetic complementary 
relation to one another, and are thus not governed by linear causal laws. 
From this new perspective, two important yet poorly understood phenomena within 
sport - self-fulfilling prophesies and placebo effect - become necessary epistemological 
realities in order to account for consciousness~unconsciousness, and mind~body.  
Self-fulfilling prophesy refers to the observed influence that perceived expectations of 
others can have on individual behaviour (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). External expectations 
are introjected, and in turn are assumed to result in behaviours consistent with the expectations. 
Horn, Lox, and Labrador, (2010) have suggested that this occurs in a 4-step process (see table 
4). 
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Step 1 An expectation develops which predicts 
athletes’ level of performance 
Step 2 These expectations shape how the athlete is 
treated, the way they are coached etc. 
Step 3   The way the athlete is treated affects how 
they develop and their performance levels 
Step 4 The performances confirm the expectations 
placed on the athlete, and the process 
continues 
 
Table 4: Adapted from Horn et al. (2010) 
 
Central to the idea of self-fulfilling prophesies is that expectations in themselves can 
have a direct influence on behavioural outcomes. One of the most famous examples within UK 
sport is Roger Bannister breaking the 4-minute mile with a time of 3:59.40 in 1954, when many 
thought it was not possible. Bannister, a medical student at the time recalled in a recent 
interview what his coach said to him before the race: “‘I think you can do 3:56 and if you had 
this potential chance and you didn’t take it you’d never forgive yourself, maybe for the rest of 
your life.’ And I think that idea stuck in my mind.” (Wallop, 2014). Critically, Bannister’s 
record was broken 46 days later, and the following year more than a dozen runners achieved a 
sub-4-minute time when the expectation of its possibility was evidentially realistic. It is hard 
to imagine how this could have happened without beliefs, in some way, having an influence on 
these performances. Yet it is self-evident that beliefs or expectations alone are not enough for 
the realisation of goals - one can theoretically believe in the possibility of anything, but that 
alone will not make it real. Beliefs exist in part based on a dynamic tension between one’s 
current situation (i.e., facticity) and the goals set (i.e., transcendence); and in part mediated by 
behaviour (i.e., training). For if one does not believe in the possibility of a sub 4-minute mile 
it is unlikely they will train accordingly. Equally, if the training does not suggest that a sub 4-
minute mile is possible then it is unlikely that belief in its possibility will remain stable77. Thus, 
                                               
77 As Powers summarised, “behaviour is the control of perception” (1973, p. xi). 
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self-fulfilling prophesies is reliant on a structural coupling between beliefs (“A sub-four-
minute mile is possible”), goals (a training prescription which makes this possible), and 
behaviour (the training)78 – mind~body.  
Alternatively, if one assumes linear causal relationships between these variables, one is 
confronted with the question of reverse causality – did the belief cause a change in the training, 
or did the training cause a change in the beliefs?  Following the 4-minute mile being broken, a 
new precedent was set with respect to what was perceived possible, and in turn resulted in 
others goals/behaviours being adjusted accordingly. This empirical observation, as with other 
goal directed phenomena, can only be accounted for based on the premise of epistemological 
circularity as opposed to causal linearity. For if goal directed phenomena could be attributed 
to the latter, running a sub 4-minute mile would be merely subject to introjecting the right set 
of beliefs.  
Similarly, the placebo effect, which describes “the positive outcome, resulting from the 
belief that a beneficial treatment has been received” (Beedie & Foad, 2009, p. 314) represents 
an additional challenge to the linear, causal view of cognitive processes. Placebo effects are 
historically associated with medically related treatments (i.e. sugar pills), which might go some 
way to explaining the general lack of consideration in the sport psychology literature to date. 
In comparison to the relatively limited research into the placebo effect in sport (Beedie & Foad, 
2009), there exists a plethora of empirical studies extolling the positive effects of mental skills 
interventions (e.g., self-talk, imagery etc.) on sporting performance. 
 Rarely in sport psychology intervention studies is the placebo effect acknowledged as 
an equally plausible explanation for the observed effect, or that the intervention itself could 
theoretically be conceived as a placebo, at least with regards to the mechanism. One reason for 
this could be that placebo effects represent a threat to an epistemology based on the notion of 
linear causality. Such studies are implicitly wedded to the medical model approach which 
assumes linear causal relationships between the intervention and its intended effects. Indeed, 
it is the very intention of randomised controlled trials, the gold standard of experimental design, 
to determine whether or not the intervention was more effective than a placebo (Di Blasi, 2003). 
The tacit implication being that a positive scientific finding cannot be predicted on placebo 
being the effect (i.e., circularity between mind and body), but the intervention or experimental 
                                               
78 “What an organism senses affects what it does, and what it does affects what it senses” 
(Powers, 1973, p. 41).  
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manipulation in itself. In other words, agency for the effect belongs to what the experimenter 
has done rather than the “recipient” themselves, at least on the epistemological level. 
Whilst this might appear a rather benign observation, the implications are insidious. 
Assuming an experimental effect based on linear causation implies a relative passivity on the 
part of the recipients, who are reduced to deterministic entities. In the name of objectivity, 
agency is attributed to the intervention rather than subjectivity of the recipient. Data which 
doesn’t conform to this objective, deterministic view can therefore be dismissed as “natures 
noise” or “natural variation”. Furthermore, attributing agency to the intervention itself situates 
power, place and purpose in the researchers, and by extension validates applied practitioners 
who use interventions such as mental skills as part of their work: Something tangible is being 
offered, seemingly for the benefit of the recipient. Just as the biomedical model is premised on 
providing treatments for physical ailments, such cause and effect relationships are seductive 
because they allow objectivity and power to become complicitous. As Di Blasi (2003) 
observed, accepting placebo as the effect is a threat to this position, because it “exposes the 
paradoxes and fissures in our own self-created definitions of the real and active factors in 
treatment” (Harrington, 1997, p. 1; cited by Di Blasi, 2003). 
In sum, when linear causality is assumed, the tacit implication is that it is the 
interventions themselves, and by extension the experimenters, which possess the agency. In 
turn, the subject, in which the effect is observed, represents little more than a passive specimen: 
an entity used for the purpose of reflecting the interventions power, in the name of objectivity 
and at the expense of individual subjectivity. The implicit message sent to the recipient is that 
improvement is tied to the external agency of the intervention, rather than autonomous 
processes happening within the individual. In turn, as with any sort of intervention, one risks a 
sense of dependency, rather than a process which emphasises self-determination. This is not to 
suggest that interventions in their own right cannot influence intrapsychic processes. Rather, it 
is a question of whether, when making a judgement about the determinants of change, one 
assigns primary agency to the intervention or the individual. When one is guided by objectivity 
alone, the choice of assigning power to the intervention becomes seductive. Furthermore, one 
has no reason to challenge this status quo, and more importantly to acknowledge its self-serving 
nature.  
Yet when one takes a step back from the imposition of objectivity and reflects on where 
the true agency is in any psychological process, it becomes hard to look beyond the self-
determining, teleological nature of the psyche itself. When a child learns to master the 
profoundly complex computation required to catch a ball, who do we primarily credit? When 
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an elite athlete performs a near miraculous feat of seamless mind~body, spatial and temporal 
integration, where is the real expertise? Do we consider development primarily as a 
manifestation of accumulative external interventions (i.e., external agency), or a function of 
processes already taking place within the individual?  
It is ironic that sport psychology, in which self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 
2000) is one of the most widely applied theories to motivation (Hodge, 2017), continues to be 
wedded to an epistemology (i.e., causal standpoint, subject-object separation) that robs the 
subject of this essential quality. In the name of science, this part of the lived experience has 
been objectified, dissected (i.e., autonomy, relatedness, competence), and operationalised - an 
activity which amounts to little more than pseudo-empiricism (Smedlund, 2016). In other 
words, objectifying human qualities such as self-determination for the purpose of 
“operationalisation” results in everyday language notions becoming entified (Valsiner, 2014) - 
disembodied from their subjective form and nature. Only when subjectivity~objectivity 
complementarity, complexity and non-linearily become part of the epistemological frame, can 
theory bear testament to the seemingly spontaneous emergence of self-organising behaviour 
within dynamic sporting environments (e.g., Davids and Aruájo, 2006). When theory is built 
on a set of epistemological assumptions which denies these fundamental qualities of human 
experience, only the theorist themselves are being served. As has been shown with self-efficacy 
theory, just because we have a wealth of “empirical” data supporting the self-serving 
assumptions, does not, in itself, determine scientific legitimacy. Constructs, such as self-
determination, only become meaningful when the respective epistemology is able to capture 
its true nature.   
Rather than relying on objectifying lived experience, if sport psychology is to make a 
more meaningful contribution to our understanding of psychological processes associated with 
skilled performance, understanding the role of self-determining intrapsychic processes already 
taking place should be of primary concern. Furthermore, as the above discussion suggests, this 
will only become possible when the respective epistemology avoids objectification of the 
subjective experience itself. Clearly, acknowledging the role of irrational, subjective, 
teleological, and intrapsychic processes in developmental feats does not lend itself to 
straightforward objective scrutiny79, but this is no reason to overlook them. Continuing to 
prioritise the doctrines of objectivity and positivism (in the absence of critical epistemological 
                                               
79 As Jung observed: “Our famous scientific reality does not afford us the slightest protection 
against the so-called irreality of the unconscious” (Jung, 1966a, p. 217).  
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debate) will maintain divergence in thought between those who work with athletes and 
academic sport psychology (Martens, 1987; Nesti, 2010). 
Inseparable from Jung’s theoretical work is his method, or apparent lack of, for working 
with clients. Given the dynamic, teleological nature of the psyche as conceived by Jung, his 
approach was distinctly non-prescriptive and un-systematic. Instead, placing faith in the 
process of the psyche rather than any particular model of practice. Even if the psyche does 
share a set of organising principles which serves to influence experience, Jung understood that 
any subjective manifestation will be unique to each individual: 
Naturally, a doctor must be familiar with the so-called “methods”. But he must guard 
against falling into any specific routine approach. In general one must guard against 
theoretical assumptions…In my analysis they play no part. I am unsystematic very 
much by intention. To my mind, in dealing with individuals, only individual 
understanding will do…The crucial point is that I confront the patient as one human 
being to another. Analysis is a dialogue demanding two partners. Analysist and patient 
sit facing one another, eye to eye; the doctor has something to say, but so does the 
patient. (Jung, 1995, p.153) 
           The seed for this non-directive approach was planted early on in his medical training. 
As Jung observed: “I had the feeling that I knew nothing whatsoever about what psychiatry 
purported to be. I felt extremely uncomfortable beside my chief and my colleagues, who 
assumed such airs of certainty while I was groping perplexedly in the dark” (Jung, 1995, p. 
146).  
Humility in the face of overwhelming complexity was one of the hallmarks of Jung’s 
approach to working with his patients. Rather than following reductive theories which offer 
“great service to the doctor” (Jung, 1966a, p. 168), Jung argued that we “must follow nature as 
a guide, and what the doctor then does is less a question of treatment than of developing the 
creative possibilities latent within the patient themselves” (Jung, 1966b, p.41). As such, Jung’s 
approach to working with patients involved minimal interference on his part, but guided by the 
experience itself, the relationship80, and the process of individuation (Moacanin, 2003). When 
                                               
80 “…the personalities of doctor and patient are infinitely more important for the outcome of 
the treatment than what the doctor says or thinks” (Jung, 1966b, p. 71). Similarly, with 
respect to applied practice, Tod and Andersen (2005) have observed “The sport psychologist 
is the primary consulting tool and the practitioner-athlete relationship is the main 
intervention” (p. 309).  
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one conceives of the psyche as an energetic system which is relatively autonomous and self-
determining, how could it be any other way? 
Up until recently, applied sport psychology has been predominantly informed by the 
medical model (Poczwardowski, Sherman, & Ravizza, 2004), and research has focused on the 
contributions made by practitioners in the consulting process (Sharp & Hodge, 2014). Yet, the 
idea that the athlete is also an expert in their own development has already been recognized 
within the literature (e.g., Pates, Cowen, & Karageorghis, 2012, Ravizza, 2002; Rotella, 1990). 
In a recent series of studies by Sharp and colleagues (Sharp & Hodge, 2011, 2014; Sharp, 
Hodge, & Danish, 2014, 2015), factors associated with consulting effectiveness from both the 
athletes and practitioner perspective were explored. In all studies, the relationship itself, not 
the effectiveness of an intervention, was found to be of primary importance for both athletes 
and practitioners. In addition, it was found that athletes valued consulting experience, and an 
athlete-centred approach, in order to help facilitate development (Sharp & Hodge, 2014). 
Clearly, given its infancy, we have to be cautious about drawing conclusions from this 
programme of research. Yet taken together, this research supports the idea that conceiving 
healthy growth to be primarily based on self-determination (as opposed to bending to the will 
of external forces), requires development to be primarily understood in terms of relatively 
autonomous intrapsychic processes that allow for this to happen. On this basis, it is hard to 
theoretically conceive of the athlete and practitioners as a static, deterministic entities, 
governed by linear causal laws. If theory and practice are to converge, then theoretical 
developments are required to acknowledge the true nature of the psyche: A “state of fluidity, 
change and growth where nothing is eternally fixed and hopelessly petrified” (Jung, 1996b, p. 
46).  
Given the significant theoretical and applied contributions made by Jung, it is perhaps 
surprising that his work has not been considered within the applied sport psychology literature 
to date. However, although analytical psychology has not been referenced, the spirit of some 
of Jung’s key ideas are evident within the applied literature. For example, in addition to the 
work of Sharp and colleagues, there is a wealth of applied literature reporting the value of a 
more holistic, athlete-centred model of practice which acknowledges the importance of 
personal growth and its role in the development of the athlete (e.g., Bond, 2002; Collins, Evan-
Jones, O’Conner, 2013; Lindsay, Breckon, Thomas, & Maynard, 2007; Frieson & Orlick, 
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2010; Tod, Andersen, & Marchant, 2009; Tod & Bond, 2010). As will be shown in the final 
section of this chapter, Jung’s conceptualisation of individuation offers a novel basis on which 
to account for the inter-relation of person and athlete (i.e., person~athlete; subject~object), and 
has important implications for our understanding of working with athletes. Similarly, with 
respect to the development of the practitioners themselves, Tod, Hutter, and Eubank (2017) 
have used the term “individuation” to account for the ongoing process of reconciling the 
practitioners self with their work, and the environment within which they operate. Given the 
recognition that the development of the practitioner is an ongoing process intimately connected 
to their personal histories (e.g., McCarthy & Jones, 2013), it is hard to conceive of the reductive 
causal standpoint being able to meaningfully account for such idiographic narratives. In order 
to begin to bridge the gap between theory and practice, Jung’s energetic standpoint and the 
associated psychological processes (e.g., teleology; individuation; personality 1~personality 2; 
consciousness~unconsciousness; persona~shadow), offers an original basis on which to 
theoretically explore the complex, dynamic and temporal nature of practitioner and athlete 
development.  
For the medical model approach to practice (i.e., causal standpoint), which emphasises 
the importance of the intervention itself (Poczwardowski, Sherman, & Ravizza, 2004), the idea 
that the practitioner is little more than a witness to the athlete’s own individuation process is 
understandably unsettling. Effecting change within the medical model presupposes agency and 
expertise to be associated with the intervention and practitioner respectively. Yet, how can one 
conceive of the psyche as a teleological, self-organising system whilst at the same time holding 
objective dominion over the associated subjectivity? As will be explored in the next section, 
this question is key to understanding not only Jung’s approach to working with his patients, 
but also to understanding his own science of the psyche. 
 
   
7.4   Objective processes in the psyche are fundamentally sub-personal and unconscious 
in nature 
 
There is no arising of consciousness without conditions. (Buddha) 
 
At the heart of [Jung’s] metaphysical system of inquiry lies the premise that all 
psychological processes are necessarily conditioned on innate universal structures of 
subjectivity that allow for human experience to transpire, and that these processes 
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participate of a greater cosmic organizing principle that transcends all levels of 
particularity or individuality. (Mills, 2014, p. 120) 
 
If time represents a fundamental unit of analysis, then consideration of the implications 
of time in relation to psychology processes is of primary importance for the establishment of a 
scientific psychology (Molenaar, 2004; Tateo and Valsiner, 2015). In this thesis it has been 
argued that reliance on establishing linear cause and effect relationships – what Jung referred 
to as the causal standpoint – as the basis for doing science has significantly contributed to the 
so-called crisis which continues to beset psychology.  
Linear causality, as applied to psychological processes, requires the assumption of fixed 
relationships that exist in absolute time (Yiassemides, 2014). Yet, as suggested by idiographic 
science, most psychological processes are fundamentally non-ergodic in nature wherein 
stationarity cannot be assumed (Molenaar, 2007). When it does not become possible to 
establish linear cause and effect relationships, non-linearity or relative time is assumed 
(Yiassemides, 2014), which by definition requires the intra-individual or subjective dimension 
of time to be acknowledged. According to Jung, time only acquires an absolute quality in 
relation to psychological processes as a consequence of appropriation in consciousness. Yet, 
this is to betray the non-linear nature of the psyche (i.e. consciousness~unconsciousness) which 
necessitates absolute and relative time to be acknowledged (Yiassemides, 2014): 
For Jung, space and time in the psyche are elastic and only become fixed in 
consciousness because we measure things. As we do this, repressed unconscious 
dimensions constellate and break through as affect. Two things happen here: and 
unconscious image come into consciousness and we experience an objective image 
which coincides with the image. (Karcher, 1999, p. 289) 
If one assumes an individual dimension to psychological processes, which manifests in 
the form of intra-individual variation, there is therefore a direct trade-off between our ability 
to develop nomothetic, objective theories, and our ability to account for the true nature of 
psychological processes (i.e., account for their associated subjectivity). The result is “a 
mismatch between what we may want psychology to do for us…and what the scientific method 
permits us to do. The history of psychology in general could be viewed as an ongoing struggle 
with that dilemma” (Jones, 2013, p. 412). 
 In order to be credible, the future development of psychology is dependent on the 
appreciation of this tension between objectivity and subjectivity (Klempe, 2012). In other 
words, a credible human science is required to account for the idiographic quality of human 
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experience, whilst at the same time understanding the general laws which make this possible 
(Salvatore and Valsiner, 2010). Rather than represent an epistemological threat, 
subjectivity~objectivity represents the basis on which an indigenous science can be assumed. 
Within psychology, this is the project that Jung started over 100 years ago, and idiographic 
science represents one of the most recent iterations. 
As already outlined, the objective psyche - as conceived by Jung - refers to the sub-
personal level (i.e., collective consciousness, archetypes) and the subjective psyche refers to 
the manifestations thereof (i.e., personal unconscious, consciousness, cognition). Whilst the 
subjective psyche is therefore unique to every individual, it is the unconscious sub-personal 
level which mediates between our biology and experience (Moe, 2005), and therefore offers 
one basis for the establishment of general laws governing subjectivity~objectivity. Thus, given 
a science of the psyche, as conceived by analytical psychology, is dependent on articulating 
the nature and form of the objective psyche, a brief discussion about its scientific legitimacy is 
warranted. This is particularly important because, as will be shown, any associated conclusion 
will ultimately depend on whether one is primarily led by epistemological or methodological 
considerations. 
If individuation represents the defining project of the psyche, it is the theory of the 
archetypes and the collective unconscious which represents the bedrock of Jung’s analytical 
psychology (Haule, 2011). Yet, more than any other theoretical contributions made by Jung, it 
is these latter concepts which have attracted the most criticism.  
The theory of the archetypes and the collective unconscious polarise opinion and have 
been frequently challenged for their non-scientific quality (Shamdasani, 2003). This challenge 
is evident on two fronts: (1) Jung’s failure to provide a clear and consistent definition of these 
terms, providing numerous different versions throughout his collected works (Haule, 2011); 
and (2) The flawed reliance on inductive logic to make the jump from self-analysis, clinical 
observations and the interpretation of mythical material, to fully formed universal archetypal 
structures (Jones, 2007; Neher, 1996).  
When judged by the benchmarks of the modern psychology, the way Jung developed 
such ideas is fatally flawed on methodological grounds given its deeply subjective and overtly 
unsystematic nature (Jones, 2013). The personal approach that Jung adopted to formulating 
theory means that the apparent lack of objectivity is an easy charge to make. As a consequence, 
it is of no surprise that historically Jung’s psychology has been viewed as belonging to the 
realm of mysticism not science (Jones, 2013). As Jones (2013) observed, “the way Jung 
develops his ideas is not recognizably science as scientists know it” (p. 412).  
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Yet a critique of the scientific validity of ideas cannot be based on methodological 
considerations alone. Methodology is ultimately the application of any given epistemological 
assumptions concerning what constitutes valid knowledge (Papadopoulos, 2006). Science, in 
all its forms, cannot be reduced to a singular scientific method (Chambers, 1982). Given 
methodology is inseparable from epistemology, knowledge itself has to be viewed as a process 
between the ongoing refinement of one epistemological assumptions and the fruits thereof 
(Piaget, 1972). Unless, one assumes that any given epistemology represents the final word on 
the matter. If so, one is required to also assume that science itself has an absolute nature. 
Chambers (1982) suggests otherwise:   
[To presume] that there is a single category “science”…implies that various areas of 
knowledge, physics, biology, history, sociology and so on, either come under that 
category or do not. I do not know how such a general characterization of science can 
be established or defended…there is no general category “science” and no concept of 
truth which is up to the task of characterizing science as a search for truth. Each area of 
knowledge is to be judged on its merits by investigating its aims and the extent to which 
it is able to fulfil them. (p. 166) 
If science itself has this relative quality, engagement with epistemology is essential to 
ensure that the type of methodology being conducted, in the name of science, is the best fit 
with respect to the subject matter. For psychology, it seems implausible that an epistemology 
which prioritises objectivity - defined by its separation from subjectivity - would represent this 
best approximation to the idea of science. Objectivity in-itself presupposes the finality of facts 
and data assigned to retrospective events, as if independent of time and context (Valsiner, 
2014). In psychology, the process of doing science requires a human subject and a human 
scientist, and their respective subjectivity. Hence Valsiner’s (2014) conclusion that 
The scientist in that process is central—the intuitive grasp of phenomena can turn in 
the hands and minds of creative scientists into general knowledge. The complexity of 
psychological phenomena includes self-reflexivity of the meaning-maker as a 
complicated condition that needs to be considered explicitly. Psychology has avoided 
doing so for a century—but cannot continue that practice any longer. (p. 25) 
 When the subjectivity of both subject and scientist is acknowledged as playing a central 
role in knowledge construction, working towards an indigenous basis on which valid 
knowledge can be assumed is of primary importance. The alternative, holding on to the notion 
of pure objectivity will at best permit the continued destructive analysis of the subject matter, 
and at worst leave the discipline without a subject (Varela et al., 1991). In the absence of a 
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clear epistemological frame within which the development of psychology as a science can be 
assumed, psychology requires closer ties to epistemology itself. In sum, the idiographic 
dimension of psychological processes requires developments in psychology to be closer to 
developments in epistemology (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). 
 In light of the preceding discussion, I will now return to challenges made to Jung’s 
theory of the archetypes and the collective unconscious. As suggested, when judged by the 
canons of positivist science, Jung’s methodology is difficult to defend. Yet, Shamdasini (2003) 
suggests two modes evident throughout Jung’s collected works: (1) the development of theory, 
and (2) the “ongoing questioning concerning the possibility of a psychology” (p. 16). 
Furthermore, Shamdasini observes: 
When considering Jung’s strictures on the possibility of psychology and his statements 
about the premature status of general theories in psychology, it is important to realize 
that he is including his own work in this assessment. It is precisely this mode of thinking 
which tends to be filtered out. These two modes thread themselves throughout his work. 
(p. 17, my italics) 
 Thus, when viewed as a whole, Jung’s psychology cannot be judged on methodological 
grounds alone, given its aim was also to question the possibility of a psychology. The merits 
of contributions such as the theory of the archetypes and the collective unconscious ultimately 
have to be judged on these terms: 
While the theory of the collective unconscious is generally dismissed as being non-
scientific, one of the reasons he advanced it was precisely to secure the scientificity of 
psychology, through positing a level of universality in the personality which underlay 
individual differences. (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 88) 
 By positing the idea of archetypes and the collective unconscious, Jung was drawing 
his line in the sand: Psychology, if it is to be a science, requires the existence of a sub-personal 
level, in order to rise above documenting individual events. Lived experience is then not 
viewed solely as a function of the individual, but also a function of that which structures it. 
Whether one believes or not in the theory of the archetypes or the collective unconscious, as 
the basis for how experience is structured is to miss the point. The language and the description 
of these ideas represent in part Jung’s own subjectivity. The point is that if one accepts that a 
science of the psyche is dependent on establishing general laws which govern it, the basis on 
which this occurs is of primary importance. Jung chose to articulate his own vision in his own 
way, it is up to others who work in the same spirit to do the same. 
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When epistemology acknowledges this personal dimension to knowledge construction 
“[m]ethodology cannot be reduced to method” (Valsiner, 2014, p. 24). In a similar vein, 
Polanyi, a chemist and philosopher wrote: “It seems reasonable to describe this fusion of the 
personal and the objective as personal knowledge (1958, p. viii).  By definition, methodology 
becomes as much a function of the process of the individual which allows for the possibility of 
novel insight to form - The creative independence that led Einstein to his theory of relativity is 
as much a reflection of his genius as it is the theory itself, given the latter is dependent on the 
former. Thus it would be a mistake to assume that the development of an analytical sport 
psychology should be reduced to the appropriation of Jung’s theoretical contributions in 
relation to sport related phenomena. To do so would be to repeat the mistakes of normal science 
wherein sport related phenomena is endlessly forced into the box supplied by the paradigm, in 
the name of “fact finding” (Kuhn, 1996). This is not to say that the language of Jung does not 
have a role to play in our understanding of sport related phenomena – as demonstrated in 
chapter 4 in relation to momentum in sport – but it should not form the basis for the 
development of an analytical sport psychology. Rather, an analytical sport psychology is 
primarily accountable to the advancement of psychology as a science. Specifically, sport 
related phenomena, particularly performance itself, offer a unique window into the conceptual 
laws which organise, or regulate the psyche.  
By definition, normal science has no reason to challenge the status quo, thus in part 
perpetuating the ongoing crisis, and the general absence of epistemological debate within 
psychology81. In the name of orthodoxy, researchers are paradoxically entitled to carry on in 
their locally reflective ways without any clear accountability to the idea of science; as 
highlighted in the aforementioned debate concerning the relationship between self-efficacy and 
performance. An analytical sport psychology, as with all sciences, necessitates systematic 
collaboration between individual contributions and collective goals, in order to establish 
empirical regularities. These collective goals do not simply amount to strengthening the 
paradigm, but consolidating sport psychology with the idea of science.  
 In addition to proposing a set of epistemological criteria as a starting point for the 
development of an analytical sport psychology (i.e., subject~object, conceptual integration, 
circularity, temporality), and developing an original theoretical account of momentum in sport, 
                                               
81 As Valsiner (2014) observed, as “the empirical enterprise of contemporary psychology 
moves ahead in its usual locally reflective ways, so the constructive critiques of the epistemic 
practices in the field are easily passed by” (p. 4). 
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the main theoretical contribution of this thesis is the introduction of new theoretical perspective 
which attempts to account for the psychological basis for performance variation in sport. 
Correction theory (Cowen, Nesti, & Cheetham, 2014), based on the energetic standpoint, 
attempts to account for the organisation of unconscious sub-personal properties (i.e., dynamic 
balance and correction), which are hypothesised to be, in part, responsible for performance 
variability.  
Furthermore, correction theory is an attempt to provide a complementary counterpoint 
to psychology’s general reliance on theory based on what Vancouver (2005) called “a theory 
of systems” (p. 41). Namely, the development of theory based on the assumption that 
explanation can be based on the generalisation of abstract relations between cognitivist states 
and behaviours. Correction theory also belongs to the cybernetic-systems paradigm which is 
primarily concerned with the subsystem level (i.e., mediators understood as mechanisms), in 
contrast to social cognitive theory which focuses on the systems level (i.e., mediators 
understood as constructs, such as perceptions and beliefs; Vancouver, 2000, 2005). Whilst 
acknowledging they exist as relative entities, Vancouver (2005) argues, that the former 
exclusively offers explanatory power, whilst the latter is concerned with “terms [which] have 
little meaning beyond being mere labels for the results of the underlying processes” (p. 42). 
Rather than suggest a binary choice between description and explanation, system and sub-
system, Vancouver (2005) suggests that a renewed focus on subsystem processes will in turn 
help further elucidate system level processes. Interestingly, and consistent with the premise of 
idiographic science; rather than such a programme of research relying on conventional 
experimental methods and observational studies, Vancouver, (2005) suggested that with 
respect to our understanding of sub-system level properties “it makes more sense to measure 
these properties within an individual, usually over time, to assess the relationships among 
properties as well as whether they can account for individual-level properties” (p. 44). Thus, 
future work on the hypothesised sub-personal properties outlined in chapter 6 (i.e., dynamic 
balance, correction) would require an intra-individual level of analysis as the basis for any 
potential verification and further elucidation. 
Sport is only one aspect of a rich tapestry of human experience, yet a sub-personal level 
of analysis implies that psychological mechanisms which help structure human experience 
transcend context. To my knowledge, Jung did not explicitly refer to sporting endeavour in his 
work, at least not in any systematic way. Sport psychology as a discipline did not exist at the 
time when he completed his major works. Yet, the deep themes which Jung touches upon 
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throughout his work resonate in any activity which reflects in some way the nature of the 
psyche. Sport is undoubtedly one of those activities. 
  Valsiner (2007) observed that human sciences are typically concerned with their own 
domain “[y]et behind these different contents are the same general ideas – of maintenance of 
the given state of organisation, its variability, and its potential for transformation” (my italics; 
p.3). With respect to theory, this thesis has primarily focused on how, according to Jung, the 
psyche is dynamically organised; and the implications of this position with respect to our 
understanding of performance variation in sport. In the remainder of this chapter I will consider 
how performance itself, offers not only a window into the psyche, but also a basis on which to 
understand its transformation.  
 
7.5   Reframing performance 
When time becomes a fundamental dimension in the psychological analysis of 
performance, a picture of variability emerges. Performance levels, and the associated cognitive 
states, become fleeting and relatively uncontrollable (e.g., Ravizza, 1977, 1984); as though 
they have a life of their own. Momentum becomes as much defined by the shifts, as the 
sustained performance levels. Elite athletes are not just defined by their superior athletic 
prowess, but also the inherent vulnerability that this brings: The more athletes push themselves 
physically and psychologically, the greater the risk of burnout (Gould & Dieffenbach, 2002); 
in any given season, successes and failures, highs and lows, are inevitable for most if not all; 
the whole course of a career becomes defined and shaped by successive “critical moments” in 
the form of inevitable threats, challenges and transitions, as well as the opportunities, rewards 
and successes (Nesti, Littlewood, Halloran, Eubank & Richardson, 2012). Taken together, the 
challenges and demands of elite sport not only provide the conditions for excellence, but also 
represent a threat to the mental health of athletes (MacIntyre et al., 2017). 
Rather than merely representing some of the ideals of competition - citius, altius, forties 
– athletes equally reflect our flaws and shortcomings. In response, it is tempting, perhaps 
necessary, to place such individuals on a pedestal and assume that this special group of people 
have more than we do, beyond the athleticism itself: Resilience, mental toughness, confidence, 
self-determination. But what does it say about us that we choose to bestow upon athletes such 
heroic psychological characteristics? Is the performance itself not enough? And, are such 
attributes really a fundamental component of athletic prowess?  
Or is something else occurring? Could it be that sport psychology as a human and social 
enterprise runs the risk of unwittingly reflecting a desire, fantasy even, for what we would like 
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to see in ourselves, or our cultural ideals, but we know is unrealistic in any controllable form? 
Is this why success and failure are generally treated as unrelated occurrences? Successes 
represent cultural ideals, embodied in the archetype of an athlete; failures, the inconvenient 
truths?  
The alternative position is that rather than representing a dualism, we experience this 
tension of opposites (success~failure, facticity~transcendance) within ourselves and that 
allows us to relate to this part of the athlete’s lived experience through our own. Whilst we 
might wish that failures could be eliminated - as projected onto the athlete - deep down we 
know that this aspect of lived experience, and its relation to its opposite, belongs to the human 
condition82. The seeming contradiction of the flawed athlete is relatable, because it resonates 
with our collective nature (see Culbertson, 2005).  
If sport offers a unique perspective on our collective nature, the latter can equally be 
used to help elucidate the deeper meaning of sport. Looking beyond the doctrines of positivism 
provides an opportunity to apply the wisdom that has been acquired over the centuries to ideas 
which concern psychologists in our current age (Robinson, 1986). If current theorising on the 
psychology of athletic excellence is culturally situated and reveals as much about our collective 
imaginations (e.g., Andersen, 2011) as it does about reality, there is a clear need to look outside 
the discipline given that any collective nature will transcend time and context. Sport 
psychology has historically been led by its parent discipline (Kontos & Feltz, 2008), at the 
expense of systematic engagement with closely related academic disciplines (e.g., philosophy 
of sport). If the differentiation of sport psychology as a distinct discipline is justifiable, it has 
no reason to avoid this dialogue in the future. 
Overlooking the lessons from history risks conflating culturally situated knowledge 
with the development of permanent laws governing human behaviour (Collingwood, 1972). 
An authentic dialogue requires an acknowledgment that more established systems of thought 
not only have the potential to offer new insights, but can also inform the development of the 
respective epistemology. In searching for universal principles governing the psyche, Jung 
turned to the more established Eastern philosophies of mind in an attempt to see beyond the 
cultural traditions which influenced his thought (Clarke, 1994). Eastern philosophies, as Jung 
understood well, are rich in their value and meaning but their contribution can only be fully 
                                               
82 I am indebted to one of my supervisors for this observation. See Harford (2011) and Syed 
(2015) for consideration of the intimate relationship between success and failure in different 
domains. 
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realised once it is acknowledged that they also challenge many of our tacit assumptions about 
human nature. Equally, dialogue does not equate to abandoning the western notion of science 
in the face of seemingly incompatible ideas. Rather, Jung believed that western intellectual 
thought “would have so much greater possibilities if he would remain true to himself and 
develop out of his own nature all that the East has brought forth from its inner being in the 
course of the centuries” (Wilhelm & Jung, 1931, p. 82).  
In the past 15 years there has been an increasing academic interest in Eastern 
approaches, in particular with respect to the application of Buddhism in applied sport 
psychology (e.g., Jenkins, 2008; Thompson & Andersen, 2012; Zizzi & Andersen, 2010). 
Developments such as this are encouraging as they provide an opportunity to re-evaluate the 
philosophical and theoretical basis which frames the relationship between psychological 
processes and performance in sport. 
For example, Gardner and Moore (2012) have proposed the introduction of 
mindfulness-based interventions within sport, given that “none of the traditional sport 
psychology interventions had been demonstrated to be efficacious for enhancing competitive 
athletic performance among actual competitive performers” (p. 312). Mindfulness, defined as 
“the state of being attentive to and aware of what is taking place in the present” (Brown & 
Ryan, 2003, p. 822), offers an alternative to interventions which seek to influence and control 
internal processes (e.g., PST), in favour of acknowledgement and acceptance of the “natural 
ebb and flow of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ internal experience” (Sappington & Longshaw, 2015, 
p. 234).  
With respect to applied sport psychology, the move towards a focus on organismic 
processes and the development of deeper self-awareness is a necessary counterpoint to 
interventions which emphasise self-control. As outlined in chapter 4, it also highlights a 
fundamental tension between the need to adapt to external demands and the needs of our 
internal world (i.e., progression and regression). What this tension reveals is that the psyche is 
not solely a mechanistic entity which exists to bend to external demands, but is also 
autonomous in its functioning: Dynamic internal sub-personal and personal processes are 
already taking place, regardless of the external demands. Yet at the same time these internal 
processes will inevitably influence how we adapt to environmental conditions, and vice versa 
(i.e., progression~regression). Thus, a more complete understanding of the relationship 
between psychological processes and performance requires a deeper understanding of the 
“conditions of the inner world” (Jung, 1960, p.39). In other words, the person behind the 
performance. 
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7.5.1   What is the nature of the relationship between performance and the person? 
A Jungian perspective  
 
It’s about self. I’ve always said it’s not about the belts, even though they are great. Even 
Mike Tyson said, ‘What are these? They don’t mean nothing any more.’ I’m not doing 
it for them. It’s about where can I take myself? Because, if it’s for the belts, certain 
people have won them and then derailed because they set out to become heavyweight 
champion of the world; they did it and then there was nothing because that’s all they 
set out to do. I’m challenging myself. The unifications and undisputed [recognition] are 
just titles on the shelf. This is an everlasting battle and bigger than any unification. 
(Anthony Joshua, [Mitchell, 2018])  
 
Life is a tennis match between polar opposites. Winning and losing, love and hate, open 
and closed. It helps to recognize that fact early. Then recognize the polar opposites 
within yourself, and if you can’t embrace them, or reconcile them, at least accept them 
and move on. The only thing you cannot do is ignore them. (Agassi, 2009, p.383-384) 
 
 When performance is viewed a-temporally, values and meaning become linear and 
dualistic. At any given point in time, only one level of performance is possible. As such, 
winning/peak performance is framed as the goal, success, and becomes the motivational drive. 
Losing/dysfunctional performance represents an anathema, failure, and all we want to avoid. 
For athletes who introject this fatally flawed dualistic viewpoint, the end result is a disunion of 
the self.  
 The appropriation of science as a means of enhancing performance in sport is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. In its earliest form, “sport served the ends of scientific research 
rather than the other way around” (Hoberman, 1992, p. ix). The consequence of this 
development is that most professionals who support athletes is to draw upon their specialism 
to contribute towards increasing the number of times winning occurs, at the expense of losing. 
In doing so, Holowchak and Reid (2011) argue that elite sport has lost touch with many of the 
human qualities and values which defined it in the past - creativity, cooperation, aesthetics, 
ethics, and virtue – in favour of winning at all costs. In turn, the notion of excellence has 
become high-jacked to encapsulate a narrower meaning, primarily associated with performance 
itself (Miller & Kerr, 2002). For those who also work in academia, and who collude with this 
one-dimensional premise, do so in the name of science and/or progress: The body is reduced 
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to a mechanical system to be “optimised”, and the mind becomes reduced to a controllable, 
deterministic entity to be manipulated for performance ends (Hoberman, 1995). Within this 
frame, how could progress equate to anything else?  
One consequence of this cultural frame is that the study of sport as a window into the 
nature of the psyche itself becomes an after-thought; overlooked, in favour of accumulating 
objective representations of psychological states assumed to be associated with performance 
and therefore progress. Where the autonomous self-governing psyche (i.e., person) fits within 
this frame is generally left to the imagination.  
Jung (1960) suggests that a focus on tangible achievements (i.e., performance 
outcomes) as the basis for progress serves a deeper psychological purpose. To focus on 
psychological growth itself is to embrace the confusion and difficulties associated with higher 
levels of consciousness; what Jung referred to as the “problematical state”: 
…society does not value these feats of the psyche very highly; its prizes are always 
given for achievement and not personality…These facts compel us to a particular 
solution: we are forced to limit ourselves to the attainable, and to differentiate particular 
aptitudes in which socially effective individuals discovers his true self…Achievement, 
usefulness and so forth are the ideals that seem to point the way out of the confusions 
of the problematical state. (p. 394)  
Problems, Jung (1960) argued, is what makes growth possible, but equally are what 
take away the certainties that we seek. Thus, development of the psyche is dependent on a 
paradox: Growth offers the hope of greater certainty or clarity, yet in order to grow we have to 
be prepared to embrace confusion that accompanies higher levels of consciousness: 
We wish to make our lives simple, certain, and smooth, and for that reason problems 
are taboo. We want to have certainties and no doubts – results and no experiments – 
without even seeing that certainties can only arise through doubt and results only 
through experiment…When we must deal with problems, we instinctively resist trying 
the way that leads through obscurity and darkness. We wish to hear only of unequivocal 
results, and completely forget that these results can only be brought about when we 
have ventured into and emerged again from the darkness. (p. 389)  
Indeed, writing in relation to talent identification in sport, Collins and MacNamara 
(2012) have argued that rather than representing a threat, adversity or “trauma” is a necessary 
developmental tool for the realisation of talent. This should come as no surprise given the 
wealth of anecdotal evidence from high performing athletes that adversity, in its many forms, 
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was an integral part of their formative development. For example, in a recent interview the 
golfer Gary Player observed 
My mother died when I was eight, and my father worked 8000 feet down the mine. My 
brother went to war at 17 to fight with the British, while my sister went to boarding 
school. I’d come all the way home from school each night, by bus and tram, to a dark 
house, nobody there. I was eight. I’ve got to cook my food, iron my clothes, get up in 
the morning at five. I lay in bed every night wishing I was dead, crying. It’s the reason 
I became a champion: because I knew what it was to suffer. (Murrey, 2017) 
Drawing on 9 years of experience working with Premier League footballers, Nesti and 
colleagues (Nesti, 2010, 2011; Nesti and Littlewood, 2009; Nesti, Littlewood, Halloran, 
Eubank & Richardson, 2012) have observed that players are subject to numerous negative 
situations throughout their careers. Rather than just representing challenges to overcome, Nesti 
et al. (2012) has argued that if appropriately utilised, adversity “can provide an opportunity for 
psychological growth and development” (p. 26). This should perhaps not be surprising, given 
the wealth of aphorisms and inspirational quotes from within sport which points towards an 
interdependent nature between challenge and achievement83.  
Achievement, it seems, offers not only a path away from “trauma” and “confusion”, 
but can also be dependent on it. Yet when achievement becomes conflated with psychological 
growth we are, as Jung suggests, risking the development of the self. If sport psychology is 
going to be committed to understanding the interrelation between the person and the athlete, 
finding the mechanisms for their complementarity is of primary concern.  
Albeit on a rather cursory, descriptive level, there have been recent attempts in the sport 
psychology literature to articulate this relationship between the person and the athlete. As 
outlined in chapter 4, the notion of dual career acknowledges the important role that both the 
athlete’s personal and professional life has on athletic development (Wylleman & Lavallee, 
2004). Similarly, Holistic sport psychology is predicated on the principle that “improving an 
athlete’s capabilities in sport begins, and is facilitated by, the growth and improvement of the 
athlete as a human being” (Frieson & Orlick, 2010, p. 227). If so, what is it about the 
                                               
83 See chapter 4 for an analysis of the interdependent nature of challenge and achievement on 
the intrapsychic level (i.e., regression~progression). Chapter 6 provides an original 
theoretical basis (i.e., correction theory) for the interdependent nature of success and failure 
within sport.     
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development of the person which fundamentally impacts on the development of the athlete, 
and vice versa? Or should performance be viewed as solely the function of the athlete? 
When performance is viewed as a function of the athlete, the assumption that the 
“athlete” executes the performance is to implicitly assume a separation between the person and 
athlete. The “person”, represented by the natural ebb and flow of internal experiences (i.e., the 
inferior function), needs to be controlled or managed in order to free up the “athlete”. The 
athlete represents a subset of the person, a form of specialism, and what is possible when this 
path is clear. In other words, the person potentially represents a threat or barrier to athletic 
excellence. By dealing with the needs of the person, these threats can be removed, making peak 
performances possible. 
Alternatively, if we accept the premise of holistic sport psychology, articulating the 
meaning of performance based on its complementarity to the person is of primary concern. 
This can be understood on two levels. Firstly, performance can be understood in relation to the 
individual subjectivity which accompanies it (i.e., subjective psyche)84. Descriptive 
idiographic accounts could be documented, revealing the individual meaning and/or dimension 
of performance. Whilst this level of analysis is temporally rich and informative, a focus on 
subjectivity alone will inevitably lead to an infinite regress with respect to the findings. 
Alternatively, performance can be understood based on hypothesised general laws governing 
the way the psyche is organised (i.e., objective psyche)85. Organising principles (e.g., self-
organisation, dynamic balance) and structures (e.g., archetypes, collective unconscious) could 
be used to provide an explanation of the underlying processes governing the complementary 
relationship between the person and the performance. The latter overcomes the problem of 
regress but given the associated objectivity, does not, in itself, capture any of the visceral 
immediacy of lived experience. Is it right to continue accepting this trade off - resulting from 
the separation of subjectivity and objectivity - as a necessary sacrifice in order to “do science”? 
Or, as suggested by this thesis - lived experience results from the interaction of both subjective 
and objective processes - it becomes necessary to state their complementarity as an 
epistemological assumption underpinning an indigenous science of the psyche. 
On the face of it, the latter approach represents a problem for the development of sport 
psychology as a science, given the apparent lack of certainty which would result from taking 
this path. When subjectivity and objectivity are viewed as necessarily separate, progress feels 
                                               
84 Or “system” level (Vancouver, 2005).  
85 Or “sub-system” level (Vancouver, 2005). 
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tangible: so-called “objective” and “subjective” data becomes relatively easy to collect from a 
limitless source. Furthermore, the sense of confusion and difficulty that wrestling with the 
complexity of the psyche brings, becomes attenuated - So why challenge this status quo?  
By placing epistemology at the heart of the development of a psychological science is 
to step away from the seeming comfort and protection of positivism, with its emphasis on 
objectivity and the scientific method, and onto shifting sands. Yet as observed in chapters 2 
and 3, to prioritise objectivity and the scientific method over subject is to overlook the 
epistemological challenges that this presents: “You can make a model more complex and 
faithful to reality, or you can make it simpler and easier to handle” (Gleick, 1998, p. 278). A 
discipline which makes a claim to the idea of science has to ask itself, which is its biggest 
priority: nature or method, truth or certainty. If we acknowledge the complexity of the subject 
matter we are also required to confront the epistemological challenge of avoiding its continued 
destructive analysis. To do anything else is to ultimately reflect the present intellectual and 
cultural epoch, rather than the subject itself.  
Embracing the complexity of the subject matter requires letting go of the protectionism 
of positivist science and entering the problematical state. Historically, those who have done 
so, such as Jung, sit outside of mainstream “scientific” academia on the charge of lacking 
scientific credentials (Jones, 2013). The tragic irony being that progress, through the 
advancement of normal science, implicitly condones the problematic task of understanding on 
an epistemological level what would make such an endeavour scientifically legitimate. For 
psychological science Falzeder (2016) has summed up this problematic task as follows: 
Anything humans say about themselves is self-referential and remains the heart of the 
problem. We lack an outside “Archimedean point,” from which objective conclusions 
can be drawn, as Jung stated numerous times. In other words, in psychology (as in 
philosophy) the observer and the observed coincide. (p. 17) 
Rather than merely representing a defining problem on which subject/object separation 
is justified, the uniqueness of this challenge offers a basis on which to develop an indigenous 
science of the psyche, and the knowledge which emerges (Saben, 2014). Understanding the 
relationship between the person and the performance based on subject and object 
complementarity offers a clear illustration of this close relationship between developments in 
epistemology and knowledge.   
Writing in relation to sport, there are few writers who have systematically explored the 
complex, dynamic and paradoxical relationship between the subject and the object, the person 
and the performance. In this respect, an important contribution has been made by Gallwey 
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(1986) in his seminal book The Inner Game of Tennis. Similar to Jung, Gallwey describes two 
selves: Self 1 the “conscious ego-mind” (p. 44), and Self 2 the unconscious mind, or “automatic 
doer” (p. 18)86. It is Self 2 which is associated with effortless performance, whereas Self 1 is 
more likely to represent the internal barriers to performance (i.e., conscious processes which 
disrupts fast, automatic unconscious processes associated with high performance)87. Thus, 
quieting the mind, or Self 1, is necessary in order to avoid “interference with the natural doing 
processes of Self 2” (p. 22).  
Critically however, rather than suggesting that performance itself represents the prize 
and the basis on which progress can be assumed, Gallwey (1986) observes that this merely 
reflects a cultural pattern. A pattern wherein winning and losing becomes polarised, the sense 
of self becomes conflated with how well we perform in relation to others, and where “the 
development of many other human potentialities is sadly neglected” (p. 107). In other words, 
in order to achieve athletic excellence, athletes must make sacrifices not just with respect to 
the life choices made, but also with respect to the self. Instead, Gallwey (1986) argues that the 
true objective of competitive sport is to be presented with challenges which allow us to realise 
our limits (i.e., facticity) as well as to discover out true potential (i.e., facticity~transcendence; 
see Culbertson, 2005). Rather than viewing competitors as simply adversaries or threats, they 
also represent facilitators in an ongoing process of the development of self: 
So we arrive at the startling conclusion that true competition is identical with true 
cooperation. Each player tries his hardest to defeat the other, but in this use of 
competition it isn’t the other person we are defeating; it is simply a matter of 
overcoming the obstacles he presents. In true competition no person is defeated. Both 
players benefit by their efforts to overcome the obstacles presented by the other…both 
grow stronger and each participates in the development of the other. (Gallwey, 1986, 
p. 111) 
Thus, rather than conceive of performance as an end, a function of the athlete, defined 
by its separation from the person, performance can equally be viewed as a means for the 
development of self: 
When a player comes to recognize, for instance, that learning to concentrate maybe 
more valuable to him than a backhand, he shifts from being a player of the outer game 
to being a player of the Inner Game. Then instead of learning concentration to improve 
                                               
86 See chapter 1 for consideration of Jung’s Personality No. 1 and Personality No. 2. 
87 I.e., Constrained action hypothesis (McNevin, Shea, & Wulf, 2003). 
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his tennis, he practices tennis to improve his concentration…Thus, there are two games 
involved in tennis: one is the outer game played against the obstacles presented by an 
external opponent…the other, the Inner Game, played against internal mental and 
emotional obstacles for the reward of increased self-realization. (Gallwey, 1986, pp. 
114-115; italics inserted) 
Gallwey (1986) recognises that this inner and outer game both play a role in most 
human activity to the extent that they can potentially be viewed as complementary processes88. 
As outlined in chapter 2, Jung spent his intellectual life attempting to reconcile his public 
adaptive self with his private self - Personality No. 1 and Personality No. 2 respectively (Jung, 
1995) – and developed the notion of individuation as the theoretical basis on which seemingly 
opposing parts of one’s nature can potentially become whole. Indeed, as previously suggested, 
when the psyche is viewed as a teleological system, individuation is the defining project of the 
psyche, as well as the “theoretical background against which all psychic phenomena are 
interpreted” (Haule, 2011, p. 83). 
Whilst the notion of individuation might sound far removed from the language of 
contemporary sport psychology, the idea has found favour in Csikszentmihalyi’s work into 
human creativity (Csikszentmihaly, 1996). Through studying highly successful creative 
people, Csikszentmihalyi (1996) identified one personality characteristic above others which 
differentiated creative and non-creative people: Complexity. 
By this I mean that they show tendencies of thought and action that in most people are 
segregated. They contain contradictory extremes – instead of being an “individual,” 
each of them is a “multitude”. Like the color white that includes all the hues of the 
spectrum, they tend to bring together the entire range of human possibilities within 
themselves. 
 These qualities are present in all of us, but we are usually trained to develop 
only one pole of the dialectic. We might grow up cultivating the aggressive, competitive 
side of our nature, and disdain or repress the nurturant, cooperative side. A creative 
individual is more likely to be both aggressive and cooperative, either at the same or at 
different times, depending on the situation. Having a complex personality means being 
able to express the full range of traits that are potentially present in the human repertoire 
                                               
88 E.g., “The main job of Self 1, the conscious ego-mind, is to set goals, that is, to 
communicate to Self 2 what it wants from it and then let Self 2 do it.” (pp. 44-45), in order 
that one can become “consciously unconscious” (p. 17). 
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but usually atrophy because we think that one or the other pole is “good,” whereas the 
other extreme is “bad”. (p. 57) 
For elite athletes, expressing ones complexity requires reconciling the development of 
an athletic identity founded on strengths and based on a relatively simple goal (i.e., winning), 
with other more complex aspects of their lived experience such as career transitions, 
relationships and parenthood89. For the latter, there is no simple goal guiding the way; yet as 
the literature on dual careers suggests, effectively navigating through other developmental 
domains is fundamental to the development of the athlete (e.g., Debois, Ledon, and Wylleman, 
2015; Wylleman & Lavallee, 2004). Reflecting on applied practice, Uphill & Hemmings 
(2017) observed how addressing issues of mental toughness raise questions regarding the role 
of vulnerability, and their relationship to each other. Yet, as the authors point out, when applied 
practice prioritised the development of mental toughness and resilience, the coexisting 
vulnerability is likely to be silenced, despite its importance.  
Similarly, Jung viewed one-sidedness as a fundamental inhibitor to psychological 
growth - based on the view of a dynamic psyche, whose nature is regulated through the tension 
of opposites (Jung, 1966a). To assign value to any aspect of our nature represents little more 
than a cultural pattern: Nature itself is value free. Jung viewed the self as representing one’s 
totality (Jung, 1969b). To deny the value of any part of self, however “inferior” it might appear 
to be, is therefore to create a disunion: The antithesis of psychological growth. The functioning 
of self - being and becoming - requires a dynamic tension between opposing parts of our nature 
based on their co-existence, in order to maintain a “state of fluidity, change and growth where 
nothing is eternally fixed and hopelessly petrified” (Jung, 1966b, p. 46). Performance variation 
therefore not only reflects the fact that athletes compete in dynamic environments, but also the 
dynamic nature of the psyche itself. Thus, rather than representing a threat to self, performance 
variation, and in particular “under” performance, represents its autonomous expression. 
…losing on purpose isn’t easy. It’s almost harder than winning. You have to lose in 
such a way that the crowd can’t tell, and in a way that you can’t tell - because of course 
you’re not wholly conscious of losing on purpose. You’re not even half conscious. Your 
mind is tanking, but your body is fighting on. Muscle memory. It’s not even all of your 
mind that purposely loses, but a breakaway faction, a splinter group. The deliberately 
                                               
89 Nesti et al. (2012) has referred to this as identity as synthesis, to stress the importance of 
elite footballers not only acknowledging their different identities, but also their role in the 
development of the whole person. 
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bad decisions are made in a dark place, far below the surface. You don’t do those tiny 
things you need to do. You don’t run the extra few feet, you don’t lunge. You’re slow 
to come out of stops. You hesitate to bend or dig. You get handsy, not using your legs 
or hips. You make a careless error, compensate for the error with a spectacular shot, 
then make two more errors, and slowly but surely you slide backward. You never 
actually think, I’m going to net this ball. Its more complicated, more insidious. (Agassi, 
2009, p. 226-227) 
When viewed temporally, the archetype of an elite athlete ultimately represents the 
realisation of exquisite talent, coupled with human frailty and limitation 
(transcendence~facticity). We all possess the potential to display extraordinary feats of skill, 
in whatever form that might take, but for most there is a tendency to see the possibility of such 
feats in others. Everyday life has a habit of reminding us of our own limitations as well as 
stressing what is possible. This finds its expression in our indulgence of the failures of athletes, 
alongside the celebration of success. Thus, part of the deeper appeal of elite sport is that 
however exceptional an athlete might be, the associated feats are understood as symbolising 
only one side of the human condition. At its heart, the appeal of elite sport therefore rests on a 
paradox: We are both disconnected and connected to the exceptional achievements of others, 
reminding us of our limitations and what is possible. As Culbertson (2005) observed: 
Humans are their facticity (their past, their current situation, and their body-in short, 
that which is a given fact of their existence), but they are also more than that. They also 
have a transcendental existence insofar as they freely project possible futures and 
conceive of action to achieve goals. (p. 67-68) 
If we accept the premise that all humans, athletes and non-athletes, are both facticity 
and transcendence - being and becoming - the full expression of human nature requires the 
avoidance of any such one-sidedness. The defining project of the psyche, according to Jung, is 
the process individuation whereby through reconciling opposing sides of our nature we become 
who we truly are. For if self, is as much defined by the problems and challenges encountered 
as by the personal milestones and achievements, its expression necessarily encapsulates both 
strengths and weaknesses. Hence the observation that “[p]erformative endeavors whose telos 
centrally involves physical performance…are privileged ways for a holistic cultivation of our 
talents and limitations” (Ilundáin-Agurruza, 2014b, p. 224)90. Only when time is part of the 
                                               
90 Similarly, Corlett (1996) observed that sport offers “undistracted absorption in which the 
player may explore fully her or his personal limits and find ways to transcend them” (p. 444). 
     185  
epistemological frame can such critical moments be understood in relation to this structural 
purpose. 
In sum, the purpose of sport is not to prioritise the development of self over 
performance, or vice versa. Rather sport offers one basis on which individuation becomes 
possible; through the union of subject and object, person and performance. When viewed 
































 The “crisis” that has defined the history of psychology as a science is epistemological, 
and therefore existential in nature. Given psychology is the parent discipline of sport 
psychology, questions raised by this crisis cannot be avoided indefinitely by the latter. The 
questions are more fundamental than a debate over methods and concern the bedrock on which 
any science of the psyche can be assumed. These questions include: Does the existence of a 
discipline, in-itself, justify its current and future status as a science? Is it even possible to 
consider the idea of scientific truths with respect to the psyche? Or, do we concede to relativism 
and be left documenting individual events and/or cultural phenomena, framed within the 
researcher’s personal onto-epistemological position? 
 In this thesis it has been argued that the future of sport psychology as a science is 
dependent on more directly confronting the challenges posed by epistemology. By doing so, 
we have the opportunity to make a legitimate claim to the idea of science, through asserting 
the basis on which scientific status can be assumed. As suggested, this can only happen when 
theoretical and methodological developments within the discipline become more closely tied 
to ongoing rationalisation with epistemology. This argument is not without precedent. As 
outlined, the development of Jung’s analytical psychology is inseparable from the “ongoing 
questioning concerning the possibility of a psychology” (Shamdasini, 2003, p. 16). More 
recently, idiographic science has grown out of the acknowledgement that general knowledge 
concerning the idiographic nature of psychological processes is primarily dependent on 
epistemology, rather than the accumulation of data (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). 
 Although historically, sport psychology has adopted positivism as the basis for “doing 
science” (Martens, 1987; Whaley & Krane, 2011), we are currently witnessing an increased 
interest in post-positivist and non-positivist epistemologies in sports related research (Giardina, 
2017)91. Indeed, it seems that the theoretical and methodological monoculture identified by 
Stelter (2005), is beginning to be replaced by a kaleidoscope of epistemologically diverse 
methodologies being employed by sport psychology researchers. On the one hand, the sense 
                                               
91 See Krane and Baird (2005) for a summary of these different epistemological approaches. 
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that positivism no longer holds a monopoly over the practice of science within sport 
psychology is to be welcomed. On the other, we have to be cognisant of what this increasing 
fragmentation means for the future of the discipline as a science. As Giardina (2017) asks, 
“how do we come to terms with the idea that many self-identified ‘qualitative researchers’ are 
engaged in vastly different epistemological, ontological and axiological forms of research 
within these fields?” (p. 259-260).  
 Despite the increasingly diverse range of epistemologies being adopted within sport 
psychology research, this has happened paradoxically at the expense of systematic engagement 
with epistemology itself. In turn, this gap has been replaced with the misnomer that is the so-
called qualitative versus quantitative debate (Whaley & Krane, 2011). A misnomer, because 
as Whaley and Krane observe: “The conflict among scholars who debate this issue is not 
grounded in qualitative vs. quantitative methods; rather, the issue is one of ontology and 
epistemology” (2011, p. 395). When methodology becomes conflated with epistemology in 
this way, to what does a fragmented science become accountable to? 
On this question, scholars (e.g., Cresswell, 2011) have observed that researchers 
typically adopt one of two stances: Purism and pragmatism. For purists, the different 
philosophical paradigms (i.e., interpretativism and positivism) which underpin qualitative or 
quantitative methods are by their very nature incommensurable92. Thus, purists tend to favour 
single methods rather than a mixed-methods approach to research (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 
2005). Pragmatists however contend that ontology and epistemology are not required to inform 
the choice of method(s) adopted: “This approach sees no necessary connection between 
knowing and how we know thereby redirecting our attention away from concerns to do with 
ontology and epistemology and moving it towards method” (Sparkes, 2015, p. 51). Given the 
general lack of direct engagement with epistemology itself within the sport psychology 
literature it would appear that researchers, unwittingly or otherwise, favour pragmatism over 
purism. Indeed, McGannon & Schweinbenz (2011) suggest that the appeal of pragmatism for 
sport and exercise psychology is the real-world context within which it operates. Thus, 
pragmatism can be justified because the discipline is primarily concerned with addressing 
outward concerns rather than inward questions of science. For example, Giacobbi, 
Poczwardowski and Hager (2005) have argued that because sport related research is more 
concerned with utility and context, the philosophical assumptions which underpin any given 
methods used are of secondary importance.  
                                               
92 Otherwise known as the “incompatibility thesis” (Howe, 1998). 
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As someone who favours purism over pragmatism however, I believe that a pragmatic 
approach to research ultimately represents a sleight of hand (i.e., it is a philosophy of science 
which suggests that ontology and epistemology are not, in themselves, required to guide 
scientific research). By research, in the name of science, not being answerable to epistemology 
itself, it ceases to be accountable to the necessary “checks and balances” which separate science 
from non-scientific enquiry; and “to argue otherwise is both naïve and fraudulent”. (Sparkes, 
2015, p. 52). Naïve, because epistemology not method provides the standards by which true 
knowledge can be assumed (Harre, 1972). Fraudulent, because without engaging in this most 
fundamental step in the process of knowledge creation, any type of research can make a claim 
to science in the name of method.   
Because method and data alone does not provide the critical vantage point from which 
to judge empirical work, epistemology becomes inseparable from methodology as the basis for 
doing science (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). The alternative, uncoupling philosophy and 
method, is to adopt a non-paradigmatic position which, in effect, allows pseudoscience to be 
conducted in the name of science (Lincoln, 2010; Sparkes, 2015). Although this unfettered 
form of science allows for an abundance of data led research, it also contributes to the inevitable 
fragmentation which occurs as the discipline develops. In the name of ontological pluralism, 
researchers are able to frame their work within an increasingly diverse range of epistemologies, 
with little accountability to epistemology itself. When significant parts of a discipline develop 
a-philosophically in this way, to challenge this methodology on philosophical grounds is, by 
definition, an existential threat. Thus, data breeds more data, and the connection to that which 
gives the data scientific credibility (i.e., epistemology) becomes more distant and seemingly 
more irrelevant. In turn, fragmentation in the name of diversity becomes the norm. 
The current importance placed on data is perhaps not surprising given that the discipline 
is still in its infancy and arguably still in the pre-paradigm stage. As Kuhn (1996) observed, 
when a discipline has very little pre-established theory93 to draw upon, emphasis is placed on 
the accumulation of “facts” or data, rather than epistemology itself. Furthermore, when facts 
cannot readily be derived from the subject matter itself, there is a tendency for the development 
                                               
93 One might point to established theories, such as self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 
1985) and self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1977), that are employed within sport psychology. 
However, as discussed in chapter 5, the constructs on which they are based are little more 
than abstract generalisations (Powers, 1973) or pseudo-empirical constructions which offer 
no real explanatory power (Smedlund, 2016). 
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of a discipline to be profoundly shaped by external forces (i.e., institutional, political, cultural). 
Thus, rather than pre-paradigm science being informed by established, objective structures 
(i.e., natural laws and accepted principles) which critically guide a discipline, developments 
become tied to factors beyond the subject itself, making fragmentation inevitable: 
This is the situation that creates the schools characteristic of the early stages of 
development. No natural history can be interpreted in the absence of at least some 
implicit body of intertwined theoretical and methodological belief that permits 
selection, evaluation and criticism. If that body of belief is not already implicit in the 
collection of facts – in which case more than “mere facts” at hand – it must be externally 
supplied, perhaps by a current metaphysic, or another science, or by personal or 
historical accident. No wonder, then, that in the early stages of the development of any 
science different men confronting the same range of phenomena, but not usually all the 
same particular phenomena, describe and interpret them in different ways. What is 
surprising, and perhaps also unique in its degree to fields we call science, is that such 
divergences should ever largely disappear. (italics inserted; Kuhn, 1996, p. 16-17)  
As proposed by this thesis, the future of sport psychology as a science is dependent on 
theoretical developments being judged on their potential for conceptual integration within the 
discipline itself (i.e., internal integration), and other branches of science (i.e., external 
integration). Jung’s analytical psychology drew upon the notion of equilibrium or balance as a 
point of convergence between the physical world and the psyche (Stevens, 1990). Indeed, the 
tendency for a complex, open system to be able to maintain a state of dynamic equilibrium has 
been shown to be an important structuring principle in biological organisms (Rose, 1997) and 
complex systems in general (Kauffman, 1995; Strogatz, 2003). Furthermore, with respect to 
sport related phenomena, Vázquez, Balagué, and Hristovski (2017) have proposed that the 
language and concepts of complexity theory (e.g., stability~instability, non-linear dynamics) 
offer a potential unifying framework for not only the increasingly fragmented sport sciences, 
but also for science in general. Exploring such points of convergence offer a basis on which to 
deepen our understanding of psychological phenomena within sport. For example, as 
demonstrated in this thesis, notions of self-organisation and feedback, ubiquitous in nature, 
offer an original basis on which to understand performance variation in sport (Cowen, Nesti, 
& Cheetham, 2014). Equally, studying phenomenon such as performance variation, provides 
an opportunity to refine and clarify our understanding of how such principles help structure the 
psyche itself.     
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In addition to the principle of conceptual integration, closer ties with epistemology 
require an analytical sport psychology to determine the basis on which it can be considered a 
separate discipline in its own right. Although no one individual (not even Jung!) can determine 
exactly what this basis should be, drawing predominantly upon the work of Jung I have 
proposed a provisional set of epistemological criteria upon which an analytical sport 
psychology could be based (i.e., subject~object, conceptual integration, being~becoming, 
teleology, temporality). Furthermore, by becoming primarily accountable to epistemology 
rather than method, creativity and innovation become possible through the tension between 
personal/collective insight and collective goals. For the former, the emphasis is on valuing the 
process of thought, creativity, and criticality which drives innovation, over faith in any given 
established method of science (Powers, 1973). For the latter, this requires ongoing clarification 
of our epistemological framework which taken together offers the hope of a science.  
A renewed commitment with respect to ontology and epistemology allows for a closer 
examination of personal dimension to knowledge construction, as we become compelled to ask 
more fundamental, self and structurally reflexive questions concerning the process of doing 
research. As Giardina (2017) suggests, prioritising ontological and epistemology requires 
researchers to critically question more broadly their personal motivation for pursuing the 
research they do. Such questions include, “why we do it, how we do it, for what purposes is 
that research done and how are we implicated in or worked over by a politics of research that 
is governed by those structures which are (often) outside of our control.” (p. 264). By 
acknowledging how research is both personally and structurally situated, we have the chance 
to critically question the extent to which work can make a contribution towards science, or 
stands in the way (Valsiner, 2014). As a rare example from the sport psychology literature, 
Andersen (2011) asks: “What is “usefulness” of a mental toughness inventory (besides getting 
it published and meeting university productivity quotas)?” (p. 81).  
In contrast, by prioritising utility and context over ontology and epistemology, the role 
of the researcher in the process knowledge construction becomes overlooked. Not in the name 
of objectivity – pragmatism, by definition, does not require a position on any such aspect of 
science – but in the name of practicality. In turn, researchers are not required to critically 
examine how their own assumptions, agendas and biases shape their work, and thus reduces 
the need for accountability to science in the name of ‘getting the job done’ (Sparkes, 2015): 
“All of which diminishes the role of researcher to that of competent technician as opposed to 
that of a creative and innovative scholar” (p. 52). 
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It would be a mistake however to replace faith in method with faith in epistemology. 
Epistemology is not a fixed set of dogmas, but an ongoing enquiry in its own right; and 
therefore, in itself, does not provide solid ground on which to conduct science. In contrast to 
methods and data, which offer a sense of progress, solidity and tangibility, there is a need to 
embrace what Jung called the “problematical state”; or to experience the “getting lost” which 
accompanies questions of ontology and epistemology (Giardina, 2017). By positivism 
becoming subsumed into a plethora of epistemologies it acquires a relativistic value and any 
sense of certainties becomes removed. The consequence is fragmentation, which Lincoln and 
Denzin (2005) predict will further intensify in the social sciences in future. Furthermore, the 
over-reliance on data and method at the expense of dialogue with epistemology legitimises the 
ongoing fragmentation, as accountability is directed to one’s onto-epistemological position, 
not epistemology itself. 
Given the reliance on positivism for so long as the gold standard for doing science in 
sport psychology, reorienting the discipline with the philosophy of science will inevitably 
require a period of moratorium and more inward questioning (i.e., regression). During this 
period, longer-term collective goals need to be established which re-positions the discipline as 
an autonomous science; and which resists a short-term pragmatic approach to research, heavily 
incentivised by our current neo-liberal model of higher education (Sparkes, 2013). Prioritising 
scientific quality over quantity requires greater importance placed on students of science being 
taught the value of ‘bigger picture problems’ over productivity, philosophy and critical 
thinking over rote knowledge (Bosch, 2018; Giardina, 2017). As Bosch suggests, a broader 
education necessitates the “need to put the philosophy back into the doctorate of philosophy: 
that is, the ‘Ph’ back into the PhD” (p. 277).  
With too few exceptions (e.g., Martens, 1987; Nesti, 2004; Salter, 1997; Andersen, 
2009, 2011) there has been a distinct lack of critical, dissenting voices to prevent normal 
science in sport psychology carrying on in its locally reflexive ways. Yet the roots of this are 
not just born out of the legacy of sport psychology’s historical ties to its parent discipline, 
psychology, but also in the increasingly metric driven and unstable climate that the discipline 
is operating in (Sparkes, 2013). When science is increasingly being reduced to metrics (e.g., 
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number of publications) inconsistent and disconnected with the idea of science, there is little 
incentive to take risks and to challenge the status quo94.  
Although the “publish or perish” phenomenon is nothing new, its effects could be 
particularly acute for the future of a discipline still in its infancy. Sport psychology could in 
theory claim dominion over a range of sport related psychological phenomena (e.g., mental 
toughness, competitive anxiety) but there are no reasons that I am aware of as to why the 
discipline can assume any form of exclusivity with respect to the associated science. The risk 
of becoming scientifically redundant or being subsumed into related disciplines is made even 
greater when such phenomenon in their own right are of dubious scientific value95. Thus, if 
sport psychology wants a future “seat around the table”, it has to be able to demonstrate what 
it is able to offer the development of science itself. 
The legacy of Jung’s work is evident in the language he introduced, the theoretical 
contributions still discussed, and its application (e.g., psychotherapy). However, his 
psychology was primarily an epistemological endeavour, intent on creating a discipline which 
could unite all sciences. Psychology’s very legitimacy as a science was predicated on there 
being no separation between psychology and other sciences. Furthermore, Jung believed that 
psychology was uniquely placed to establish this synthesis, given that “it was the only 
discipline which could grasp the subjective factor that underlay other sciences” (Shamdasani, 
2003, p. 15). When reflecting on his life’s work however, Jung acknowledged his attempt to 
develop such a psychology, in order to counter the increasing fragmentation in science and 
psychology itself, inevitably fell short (Shamdasani, 2003). Perhaps in part because of the 
“personal equation” associated with a science which offers no Archimedian point - which Jung 
consciously wrestled with throughout his career - makes it impossible for any one person to 
grasp the nature of the universal principles and structures which make lived experience 
                                               
94 Indeed, this is clearly not a new phenomenon. As Einstein observed: An “academic career 
in which a person is forced to produce scientific writings in great amounts creates a danger of 
intellectual superficiality” (quoted in Isaacson, 2008, p.79). 
95 As Mammen & Mironenko (2015) have observed:  
For the time being it seems that psychology has very little to offer which could not on 
the one hand be offered by biological sciences such as neuroscience or—on the other 
hand—by a spectrum of cultural-humanistic sciences. Psychology as a scientific 
discipline is in danger of being cannibalized from two sides”. (p. 682) 
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possible. Indeed, it has been suggested that the personal equation was one of the reasons Jung 
stopped his early experimental work into word associations due to the unmanageable variation 
in outcomes which this factor introduced (Shamdasini, 2003).  
Jung rejected the methods of the natural sciences, but he did not abandon empiricism 
altogether. By acknowledging the personal dimension to knowledge construction, Jung’s post-
experimental work became dependent on both empirical observations and theory, whilst 
recognising that neither in themselves could capture the elusive objective nature of 
psychological processes. Rather, Jung understood that a circularity exists between what is 
observed (i.e., experience) and what is known (i.e., theory). In other words, the theoretical 
structures hypothesised to organise experience (i.e., archetypes) shape our understanding of 
that which we observe/experience, and vice versa (Papadopoulos, 2006). Thus, the 
consequence of acknowledging this personal equation in an epistemology of the psyche is that 
knowledge itself can never be viewed as complete, but in itself represents a finite part of an 
indefinite process in its own right. Within this frame, knowledge becomes in the making, rather 
than an end in itself (Papadopoulos, 2006). The position adopted by Jung is remarkably similar 
to the process of abductive reasoning in which “theory and evidence are circularly bonded 
within an open-ended cycle” (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010, p. 12). Rather than placing faith in 
method and data for generating knowledge, abductive reasoning is based on a critical tension 
between the observation of “empirical regularities” and theory, with each being accountable to 
the other. Given the addition of the personal dimension, in respect to both the observer and the 
observed, theory offers an objective counterpoint from which to assess any given interpretation 
of an underlying structure (Polanyi, 1958).  
In addition to the primacy of theory over data as a counterpoint to subjectivity, the 
personal equation necessitates the need for collaboration - on both an intra and inter-
disciplinary level - as the methodological basis on which knowledge concerning the psyche 
can be developed. On the inter-disciplinary level, collaboration is needed because when 
knowledge is viewed as a process, and cannot be reduced to facts, epistemological validity is 
dependent on collaboration with associated disciplines in order to be accountable to the real 
world (Piaget, 1972). When the discipline is only accountable to itself, the circularity between 
the epistemological assumptions adopted and the associated methods forgo the critical tension 
required for scientific development (i.e., normal science; Kuhn, 1996). On the intra-
disciplinary level, collaboration is needed to overcome individual subjectivity associated with 
the very act of doing science. Ideas need to be “inter-subjectively tested” (Popper, 2002, p. 22), 
in order to work towards objectivity in our science. Furthermore, it is theory which offers the 
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possibility of objectivity within science, given its potential to be examined and tested by others 
(Polanyi, 1958; Popper, 2002). 
Given the circularity which exists between, epistemology and knowledge, what is 
observed and what is known, the objective value of theory is dependent on others challenging, 
verifying and/or developing both the premises/assumptions and the associated (personal) 
language used to account for the empirical regularity observed. In other words, the value of a 
theory or personal insight is not just based on its potential to offer explanation and stimulate 
future work (Polanyi, 1958), but also its potential to account for shared lived experience, 
independent of time or context. In sum, despite Jung’s belief that all knowledge about ourselves 
being born out of personal experience (Papadopolous, 2006), the personal equation necessitates 
the need for any associated objectivity to be verified by a collective process. Human science 
and the knowledge associated with it are therefore predicated on the tension between collective 
verification and personal insight. 
Many of Jung’s most important insights followed his “confrontation with the 
unconscious”, a sustained period of creative exploration, introspection and self-analysis which 
followed his split with Freud. In response to this period, Jung became concerned with rooting 
deeply personal experiences in reality or science, in order to connect the “inner” with the 
“outer”: 
I saw that so much fantasy needed firm ground underfoot, and that I must first return 
wholly to reality. For me, reality meant scientific comprehension. I had to draw 
concrete conclusions for the insights the unconscious had given me – and that task 
became a life work. (Jung, 1995, p. 213) 
The paradox underpinning Jung’s work was that he drew upon deeply personal experiences in 
an attempt to connect with universal truths. Without the deep and sustained commitment that 
Jung had with respect to understanding his self and the individuation process, we would not 
have the epistemological and theoretical insights which continue to inform developments 
within science and the arts. In addition to the fundamental necessity for collaboration as the 
basis for doing science, the personal equation requires that research is underpinned by a 
commitment to self, and its role in knowledge construction. For Jung, the ultimate project was 
to understand and work towards what makes us whole. That task is dependent on a commitment 
to that which is greater than any one individual yet is shared by all. The idea of science offers 
this possibility. 
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